universality is an immediate one； and for that reason has equally the significance of being； for
being is precisely this abstract relation…to…self。 Being requires no further derivation； as though it
belonged to the abstract product of definition only because it is taken from sensuous intuition or
elsewhere； and in so far as it is pointed out to us。 This pointing out and derivation is a matter of
mediation； which is more than a mere beginning； and is a mediation of a kind that does not belong
to a comprehension by means of thinking； but is the elevation of ordinary thinking； of the empirical
and ratiocinative consciousness； to the standpoint of thought。 According to the current opposition
of thought or concept and being it is regarded as an important truth that no being belongs as yet to
the former； taken on its own； and that the latter has a ground of its own that is independent of
thought。 But the simple determination of being is in itself so meagre that； if only for that reason；
there is no need to make much fuss about it； the universal is immediately itself this immediate； since
as abstract it also is merely the abstract relation…to…self； which is being。 As a matter of fact； the
demand that being should be exhibited for us to see has a further； inner meaning involving more
than this abstract determination； what is meant by it is in general the demand for the realisation of
the Notion； which realisation does not lie in the beginning itself； but is rather the goal and the task
of the entire further development of cognition。 Further； since the content of the beginning is
supposed to be justified and authenticated as something true or correct by its being pointed out in
inner or outer perception； it is no longer the form of universality as such that is meant； but its
determinateness； of which we shall need to speak presently。 The authentication of the
determinate content with which the beginning is made seems to lie behind it； but in fact it is to be
considered as an advance； that is； if it belongs to philosophical cognition。
Hence the beginning has for the method no other determinateness than that of being simple and
universal； this is itself the determinateness by reason of which it is deficient。 Universality is the pure
simple Notion； and the method； as consciousness of the Notion； knows that universality is only a
moment and that in it the Notion is not yet determined in and for itself。 But with this consciousness
that would carry the beginning further only for the sake of the method； the method would be a
formal affair； something posited in external reflection。 Since however it is the objective immanent
form； the immediate of the beginning must be in its own self deficient and endowed with the urge
to carry itself further。 But in the absolute method the universal has the value not of a mere
abstraction but of the objective universal； that is； the universal that is in itself the concrete
totality； though that totality is not yet posited； is not yet for itself。 Even the abstract universal as
such； considered in its Notion； that is in its truth； is not merely the simple； but as abstract is
already posited as infected with a negation。 For this reason too there is nothing； whether in
actuality or in thought； that is as simple and as abstract as is commonly imagined。 A simple thing
of this kind is a mere presumption that has its ground solely in the unconsciousness of what is
actually present。 Above； that with which the beginning is made was determined as the immediate；
the immediacy of the universal is the same thing that is here expressed as the in…itself that is
without a being…for…self。 Hence it may indeed be said that every beginning must be made with the
absolute； just as all advance is merely the exposition of it； in so far as its in…itself is the Notion。
But because the absolute is at first only in itself it equally is not the absolute nor the posited
Notion； and also not the Idea； for what characterises these is precisely the fact that in them the
in…itself is only an abstract； one…sided moment。 Hence the advance is not a kind of superfluity；
this it would be if that with which the beginning is made were in truth already the absolute； the
advance consists rather in the universal determining itself and being for itself the universal； that is；
equally an individual and a subject。 Only in its consummation is it the absolute。
It is to be recalled that the beginning； which is in itself a concrete totality； may as beginning also
be free and its immediacy have the determination of an external existence； the germ of the
living being and the subjective end in general have proved themselves to be such beginnings and
therefore both are themselves urges。
The non…spiritual and inanimate； on the contrary； are the Notion only as real possibility； cause is
the highest stage in which the concrete Notion； as a beginning in the sphere of necessity has an
immediate existence； but it is not yet a subject that maintains itself as such even in its actual
realisation。 The sun； for example； and in general all inanimate things； are determinate concrete
existences in which real possibility remains an inner totality and the moments of the totality are not
posited in subjective form in them and； in so far as they realise themselves； attain an existence by
means of other corporeal individuals。
2。 The concrete totality which makes the beginning contains as such within itself the beginning of
the advance and development。 As concrete； it is differentiated within itself： but by reason of its
first immediacy the first differentiated determinations are in the first instance merely a diversity。
The immediate； however； as self…related universality； as subject； is also the unity of these diverse
determinations。 This reflection is the first stage of the movement onwards … the emergence of real
difference； judgement； the process of determining in general。 The essential point is that the
absolute method finds and cognises the determination of the universal within the latter itself。 The
procedure of the finite cognition of the understanding here is to take up again； equally externally；
what it has left out in its creation of the universal by a process of abstraction。
The absolute method； on the contrary； does not behave like external reflection but takes the
determinate element from its own subject matter； since it is itself that subject matter's immanent
principle and soul。 This is what Plato demanded of cognition； that it should consider things in and
for themselves； that is； should consider them partly in their universality； but also that it should not
stray away from them catching at circumstances； examples and comparisons； but should keep
before it solely the things themselves and bring before consciousness what is immanent in them。
The method of absolute cognition is to this extent analytic。 That it finds the further determination
of its initial universal simply and solely in that universal； is the absolute objectivity of the Notion； of
which objectivity the method is the certainty。 But the method is no less synthetic； since its subject
matter； determined immediately as a simple universal； by virtue of the determinateness which it
possesses in its very immediacy and universality； exhibits itself as an other。
This relation of differential elements which the subject matter thus is within itself； is however no
longer the same thing as is meant by synthesis in finite cognition； the mere fact of the subject
matter's no less analytic determination in general； that the relation is relation within the Notion；
completely distinguishes it from the latter synthesis。
This no less synthetic than analytic moment of judgement； by which the universal of the beginning
of its own accord determines itself as the other of itself； is to be named the dialectical moment。
＇Lenin's Summary of Dialectics appears at this point in Lenin's annotations＇
Dialectic is one of those ancient sciences that have been most misunderstood in the metaphysics of
the moderns； as well as by popular philosophy in general； ancient and modern alike。
Diogenes Laertius says of Plato that； just as Thales was the founder of natural philosophy and
Socrates of moral philosophy； so Plato was the founder of the third science pertaining to
philosophy； namely； dialectic … a service which the ancient world esteemed his highest； but which
often remains quite overlooked by those who have most to say about him。
Dialectic has often been regarded as an art； as though it rested on a subjective talent and did not
belong to the objectivity of the Notion。 The shape it takes and the result it reaches in Kantian
philosophy have already been pointed out in the specific examples of the Kantian view of it。 It
must be regarded as a step of infinite importance that dialectic is once more recognised as
necessary to reason； although the result to be drawn from it must be the opposite of that arrived at
by Kant。
Besides the fact that dialectic is generally regarded as contingent； it usually takes the following
more precise form。 It is shown that there belongs to some subject matter or other； for example the
world； motion； point； and so on； some determination or other； for example （taking the objects in
the order named）； finite in space or time； presence in this place； absolute negation of space； but
further； that with equal necessity the opposite determination also belongs to the subject matter； for
example； infinity in space and time； non…presence in this place； relation to space and so spatiality。
The older Eleatic school directed its dialectic chiefly against motion。 Plato frequently against the
general ideas and notions of his time； especially those of the Sophists； but also against the pure
categories and the determinations of reflection； the more cultivated scepticism of a later period
extended it not only to the immediate so…called facts of consciousness and maxims of common life；
but also to all the notions of science。
Now the conclusion drawn from dialectic of this kind is in general the contradiction and nullity of
the assertion made。 But this conclusion can be drawn in either of two sens