the assertion made。 But this conclusion can be drawn in either of two senses either in the objective
sense； that the subject matter which in such a manner contradicts itself cancels itself out and is null
and void … this was； for example； the conclusion of the Eleatics； according to which truth was
denied； for example； to the world； to motion； to the point； or in the subjective sense； that cognition
is defective。
One way of understanding the latter sense of the conclusion is that it is only this dialectic that
imposes on us the trick of an illusion。 This is the common view of so…called sound common sense
which takes its stand on the evidence of the senses and on customary conceptions and
judgements。 Sometimes it takes this dialectic lightly； as when Diogenes the cynic exposes the
hollowness of the dialectic of motion by silently walking up and down；； but often it flies into a
passion； seeing it in perhaps a piece of sheer foolery； or； when morally important objects are
concerned； an outrage that tries to unsettle what is essentially established and teaches how to
supply wickedness with grounds。 This is the view expressed in the Socratic dialectic against that of
the Sophists； and this is the indignation which； turned in the opposite direction； cost even Socrates
his life。 The vulgar refutation that opposes to thinking； as did Diogenes； sensuous consciousness
and imagines that in the latter it possesses the truth； must be left to itself； but in so far as dialectic
abrogates moral determinations； we must have confidence in reason that it will know how to
restore them again； but restore them in their truth and in the consciousness of their right； though
also of their limitations。 Or again； the conclusion of subjective nullity may mean that it does not
affect dialectic itself； but rather the cognition against which it is directed and in the view of
scepticism and likewise of the Kantian philosophy； cognition in general。
The fundamental prejudice in this matter is that dialectic has only a negative result； a point which
will presently be more precisely defined。 First of all as regards the above…mentioned form in which
dialectic is usually presented； it is to be observed that according to that form the dialectic and its
result affect the subject matter under consideration or else subjective cognition； and declare
either the latter or the subject matter to be null and void； while on the other hand the
determinations exhibited in the subject matter as in a third thing receive no attention and are
presupposed as valid on their own account。
It is an infinite merit of the Kantian Philosophy to have drawn attention to this uncritical procedure
and by so doing to have given the impetus to the restoration of logic and dialectic in the sense of
the examination of the determinations 。of thought in and for themselves。
The subject matter kept apart from thinking and the Notion； is an image or even a name； it is in the
determinations of thought and the Notion that it is what it is。 Therefore these determinations are in
fact the sole thing that matters； they are the true subject matter and content of reason； and anything
else that one understands by subject matter and content in distinction from them as value only
through them and in them。 It must not therefore be considered the fault of a subject matter or of
cognition that these determinations； through their constitution and an external connection； show
themselves dialectical。 On that assumption； the subject matter or the cognition is represented as a
subject into which the determinations in the form of predicates； properties； self…subsistent
universals； are introduced in such a manner that； fixed and correct as they are by themselves； they
are brought into dialectical relationships and contradiction only by extraneous and contingent
connection in and by a third thing。 This kind of external and fixed subject of imagination and
understanding and these abstract determinations； far from meriting the status of ultimates； of
secure and permanent substrates； are rather to be regarded as themselves immediate； as just that
kind of presupposed and initial immediate that； as was shown above； must in its own essential
nature ＇in and for itself＇ submit to dialectic； because it is to be taken as in itself the Notion。
Thus all the oppositions that are assumed as fixed； as for example finite and infinite； individual and
universal； are not in contradiction through； say； an external connection； on the contrary； as an
examination of their nature has shown； they are in and for themselves a transition； the synthesis and
the subject in which they appear is the product of their Notion's own reflection。 If a consideration
that ignores the Notion stops short at their external relationship； isolates them and leaves them as
fixed presuppositions； it is the Notion； on the contrary； that keeps them steadily in view； moves
them as their soul and brings out their dialectic。
Now this is the very standpoint indicated above from which a universal first； considered in and for
itself； shows itself to be the other of itself。
Taken quite generally； this determination can be taken to mean that what is at first immediate now
appears as mediated； related to an other； or that the universal appears as a particular。 Hence the
second term that has thereby come into being is the negative of the first； and if we anticipate the
subsequent progress； the first negative。 The immediate； from this negative side； has been
extinguished in the other； but the other is essentially not the empty negative； the nothing； that is
taken to be the usual result of dialectic； rather is it the other of the first； the negative of the
immediate； it is therefore determined as the mediated … contains in general the determination of the
first within itself。 Consequently the first is essentially preserved and retained even in the other。 To
hold fast to the positive in its negative； in the content of the presupposition； in the result； this is the
most important feature in rational cognition； at the same time only the simplest reflection is needed
to convince one of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement and so far as examples of
the proof of this are concerned； the whole of logic consists solely of such。
Accordingly； what we now have before us is the mediated； which to begin with； or； if it is likewise
taken immediately； is also a simple determination； for as the first has been extinguished in it； only
the second is present。 Now since the first also is contained in the second； and the latter is the truth
of the former； this unity can be expressed as a proposition in which the immediate is put as
subject； and the mediated as its predicate； for example； the finite； one is infinite； one is many； the
individual is the universal。 However； the inadequate form of such propositions is at once obvious。
In treating of the judgement it has been shown that its form in general； and most of all the
immediate form of the positive judgement； is incapable of holding within its grasp speculative
determinations and truth。 The direct supplement to it； the negative judgement； would at least have
to be added as well。 In the judgement the first； as subject； has the illusory show of a
self…dependent subsistence； whereas it is sublated in its predicate as in its other； this negation is
indeed contained in the content of the above propositions； but their positive form contradicts the
content； consequently what is contained in them is not posited … which would be precisely the
purpose of employing a proposition。
The second determination； the negative or mediated； is at the same time also the mediating
determination。 It may be taken in the first instance as a simple determination； but in its truth it is a
relation or relationship； for it is the negative； but the negative of the positive； and includes the
positive within itself。 It is therefore the other； but not the other of something to which it is indifferent
… in that case it would not be an other； nor a relation or relationship … rather it is the other in its
own self； the other of an other； therefore it includes its own other within it and is consequently as
contradiction； the posited dialectic of itself。 Because the first or the immediate is implicitly the
Notion； and consequently is also only implicitly the negative； the dialectical moment with it consists
in positing in it the difference that it implicitly contains。 The second； on the contrary； is itself the
determinate moment； the difference or relationship； therefore with it the dialectical moment consists
in positing the unity that is contained in it。
If then the negative； the determinate； relationship； judgement； and all the determinations falling
under this second moment do not at once appear on their own account as contradiction and as
dialectical。 this is solely the fault of a thinking that does not bring its thoughts together。 For the
material； the opposed determinations in one relation； is already posited and at hand for thought。
But formal thinking makes identity its law； and allows the contradictory content before it to sink
into the sphere of ordinary conception； into space and time； in which the contradictories are held
asunder in juxtaposition and temporal succession and so come before consciousness without
reciprocal contact。
On this point； formal thinking lays down for its principle that contradiction is unthinkable： but as a
matter of fact the thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the Notion。 Formal thinking
does in fact think contradiction； only it at once looks away from it； and in saying that it is
unthinkable it merely passes over from it into abstract negation。
Now the negativity just considered constitutes the turning point of the movement of the Notion。 It
is the simple point of the negative relation to self； the innermost source of all activity of all animate
and spiritual self…movement； the dialectical soul that everything true possesses and through which
alone it is true； for on this subjectivity alone rests the sublating of the opposition between the
Notion and reality； and the unity that is truth。 The seco