the science of right- 第25部分

punishment。

　　As　regards　civil　offices；　the　question　arises　as　to　whether　the

sovereign　has　the　right；　after　bestowing　an　office　on　an　individual；

to　take　it　again　away　at　his　mere　pleasure；　without　any　crime　having

been　committed　by　the　holder　of　the　office。　I　say；　〃No。〃　For　what

the　united　will　of　the　people　would　never　resolve；　regarding　their

civil　officers；　cannot　（constitutionally）　be　determined　by　the

sovereign　regarding　them。　The　people　have　to　bear　the　cost　incurred　by

the　appointment　of　an　official；　and　undoubtedly　it　must　be　their

will　that　any　one　in　office　should　be　completely　competent　for　its

duties。　But　such　competency　can　only　be　acquired　by　a　long　preparation

and　training；　and　this　process　would　necessarily　occupy　the　time

that　would　be　required　for　acquiring　the　means　of　support　by　a

different　occupation。　Arbitrary　and　frequent　changes　would

therefore；　as　a　rule；　have　the　effect　of　filling　offices　with

functionaries　who　have　not　acquired　the　skill　required　for　their

duties；　and　whose　judgements　had　not　attained　maturity　by　practice。

All　this　is　contrary　to　the　purpose　of　the　state。　And　besides　it　is

requisite　in　the　interest　of　the　people　that　it　should　be　possible　for

every　individual　to　rise　from　a　lower　office　to　the　higher　offices；　as

these　latter　would　otherwise　fall　into　incompetent　hands；　and　that

competent　officials　generally　should　have　some　guarantee　of

life…long　provision。

　　Civil　dignities　include　not　only　such　as　are　connected　with　a　public

office；　but　also　those　which　make　the　possessors　of　them；　without

any　accompanying　services　to　the　state；　members　of　a　higher　class　or

rank。　The　latter　constitute　the　nobility；　whose　members　are

distinguished　from　the　common　citizens　who　form　the　mass　of　the

people。　The　rank　of　the　nobility　is　inherited　by　male　descendants；　and

these　again　communicate　it　to　wives　who　are　not　nobly　born。　Female

descendants　of　noble　families；　however；　do　not　communicate　their

rank　to　husbands　who　are　not　of　noble　birth；　but　they　descend

themselves　into　the　common　civil　status　of　the　people。　This　being

so；　the　question　then　emerges　as　to　whether　the　sovereign　has　the

right　to　found　a　hereditary　rank　and　class；　intermediate　between

himself　and　the　other　citizens？　The　import　of　this　question　does　not

turn　on　whether　it　is　conformable　to　the　prudence　of　the　sovereign；

from　regard　to　his　own　and　the　people's　interests；　to　have　such　an

institution；　but　whether　it　is　in　accordance　with　the　right　of　the

people　that　they　should　have　a　class　of　persons　above　them；　who；　while

being　subjects　like　themselves；　are　yet　born　as　their　commanders；　or

at　least　as　privileged　superiors？　The　answer　to　this　question；　as　in

previous　instances；　is　to　be　derived　from　the　principle　that　〃what　the

people；　as　constituting　the　whole　mass　of　the　subjects；　could　not

determine　regarding　themselves　and　their　associated　citizens；　cannot

be　constitutionally　determined　by　the　sovereign　regarding　the　people。〃

Now　a　hereditary　nobility　is　a　rank　which　takes　precedence　of　merit

and　is　hoped　for　without　any　good　reason…　a　thing　of　the　imagination

without　genuine　reality。　For　if　an　ancestor　had　merit；　he　could　not

transmit　it　to　his　posterity；　but　they　must　always　acquire　it　for

themselves。　Nature　has　in　fact　not　so　arranged　that　the　talent　and

will　which　give　rise　to　merit　in　the　state；　are　hereditary。　And

because　it　cannot　be　supposed　of　any　individual　that　he　will　throw

away　his　freedom；　it　is　impossible　that　the　common　will　of　all　the

people　should　agree　to　such　a　groundless　prerogative；　and　hence　the

sovereign　cannot　make　it　valid。　It　may　happen；　however；　that　such　an

anomaly　as　that　of　subjects　who　would　be　more　than　citizens；　in　the

manner　of　born　officials；　or　hereditary　professors；　has　slipped　into

the　mechanism　of　government　in　olden　times；　as　in　the　case　of　the

feudal　system；　which　was　almost　entirely　organized　with　reference　to

war。　Under　such　circumstances；　the　state　cannot　deal　otherwise　with

this　error　of　a　wrongly　instituted　rank　in　its　midst；　than　by　the

remedy　of　a　gradual　extinction　through　hereditary　positions　being　left

unfilled　as　they　fall　vacant。　The　state　has　therefore　the　right

provisorily　to　let　a　dignity　in　title　continue；　until　the　public

opinion　matures　on　the　subject。　And　this　will　thus　pass　from　the

threefold　division　into　sovereign；　nobles；　and　people；　to　the

twofold　and　only　natural　division　into　sovereign　and　people。

　　No　individual　in　the　state　can　indeed　be　entirely　without　dignity；

for　he　has　at　least　that　of　being　a　citizen；　except　when　he　has　lost

his　civil　status　by　a　crime。　As　a　criminal　he　is　still　maintained　in

life；　but　he　is　made　the　mere　instrument　of　the　will　of　another；

whether　it　be　the　state　or　a　particular　citizen。　In　the　latter

position；　in　which　he　could　only　be　placed　by　a　juridical　judgement；

he　would　practically　become　a　slave；　and　would　belong　as　property

（dominium）　to　another；　who　would　be　not　merely　his　master　（herus）

but　his　owner　（dominus）。　Such　an　owner　would　be　entitled　to　exchange

or　alienate　him　as　a　thing；　to　use　him　at　will　except　for　shameful

purposes；　and　to　dispose　of　his　powers；　but　not　of　his　life　and

members。　No　one　can　bind　himself　to　such　a　condition　of　dependence；　as

he　would　thereby　cease　to　be　a　person；　and　it　is　only　as　a　person　that

he　can　make　a　contract。　It　may；　however；　appear　that　one　man　may

bind　himself　to　another　by　a　contract　of　hire；　to　discharge　a

certain　service　that　is　permissible　in　its　kind；　but　is　left

entirely　undetermined　as　regards　its　measure　or　amount；　and　that　as

receiving　wages　or　board　or　protection　in　return；　he　thus　becomes　only

a　servant　subject　to　the　will　of　a　master　（subditus）　and　not　a　slave

（servus）。　But　this　is　an　illusion。　For　if　masters　are　entitled　to

use　the　powers　of　such　subjects　at　will；　they　may　exhaust　these

powers…　as　has　been　done　in　the　case　of　Negroes　in　the　Sugar　Island…

and　they　may　thus　reduce　their　servants　to　despair　and　death。　But　this

would　imply　that　they　had　actually　given　themselves　away　to　their

masters　as　property；　which；　in　the　case　of　persons；　is　impossible。　A

person　can；　therefore；　only　contract　to　perform　work　that　is　defined

both　in　quality　and　quantity；　either　as　a　day…labourer　or　as　a

domiciled　subject。　In　the　latter　case　he　may　enter　into　a　contract

of　lease　for　the　use　of　the　land　of　a　superior；　giving　a　definite　rent

or　annual　return　for　its　utilization　by　himself；　or　he　may　contract

for　his　service　as　a　labourer　upon　the　land。　But　he　does　not　thereby

make　himself　a　slave；　or　a　bondsman；　or　a　serf　attached　to　the　soil

（glebae　adscriptus）；　as　he　would　thus　divest　himself　of　his

personality；　he　can　only　enter　into　a　temporary　or　at　most　a　heritable

lease。　And　even　if　by　committing　a　crime　he　has　personally　become

subjected　to　another；　this　subject…condition　does　not　become

hereditary；　for　he　has　only　brought　it　upon　himself　by　his　own

wrongdoing。　Neither　can　one　who　has　been　begotten　by　a　slave　be

claimed　as　property　on　the　ground　of　the　cost　of　his　rearing；

because　such　rearing　is　an　absolute　duty　naturally　incumbent　upon

parents；　and　in　case　the　parents　be　slaves；　it　devolves　upon　their

masters　or　owners；　who；　in　undertaking　the　possession　of　such

subjects；　have　also　made　themselves　responsible　for　the　performance　of

their　duties。



　　　　　　　　　　　　E。　The　Right　of　Punishing　and　of　Pardoning。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　I。　The　Right　of　Punishing。



　　The　right　of　administering　punishment　is　the　right　of　the

sovereign　as　the　supreme　power　to　inflict　pain　upon　a　subject　on

account　of　a　crime　committed　by　him。　The　head　of　the　state　cannot

therefore　be　punished；　but　his　supremacy　may　be　withdrawn　from　him。

Any　transgression　of　the　public　law　which　makes　him　who　commits　it

incapable　of　being　a　citizen；　constitutes　a　crime；　either　simply　as

a　private　crime　（crimen）；　or　also　as　a　public　crime　（crimen　publicum）。

Private　crimes　are　dealt　with　by　a　civil　court；　public　crimes　by　a

criminal　court。　Embezzlement　or　speculation　of　money　or　goods

entrusted　in　trade；　fraud　in　purchase　or　sale；　if　done　before　the　eyes

of　the　party　who　suffers；　are　private　crimes。　On　the　other　hand；

coining　false　money　or　forging　bills　of　exchange；　theft；　robbery；

etc。；　are　public　crimes；　because　the　commonwealth；　and　not　merely　some

particular　individual；　is　endangered　thereby。　Such　crimes　may　be

divided　into　those　of　a　base　character　（indolis　abjectae）　and　those　of

a　violent　character　（indolis　violentiae）。

　　Judicial　or　juridical　punishment　（poena　forensis）　is　to　be

distinguished　from　natural　punishment　（poena　naturalis）；　in　which

crime　as　vice　punishes　itself；　and　does　not　as　such　come　within　the

cognizance　of　the　legislator。　juridical　punishment　can　never　be

administered　merely　as　a　means　for　promoting　another　good　either

with　regard　to　the　criminal　himself　or　to　civil　society；　but　must　in

all　cases　be　imposed　only　because　the　individual　on　whom　it　is

inflicted　has　committed　a　crime。　For　one　man　ought　never　to　be　dealt

with　merely　as　a　means　subservient　to　the　purpose　of　another；　nor　be

mixed　up　with　the　subjects　of　real　right。　Against　such　treatment　his

inborn　personality　has　a　right　to　protect　him；　even　although　he　may　be

condemned　to　lose　his　civil　personality。　He　must　first　be　found　guilty

and　punishable；　before　there　can　be　any　thought　of　drawing　from　his

punishment　any　benefit　for　himself　or　his　fellow…citizens。　The　penal

law　is　a　categorical　imperative；　and　woe　to　him　who　creeps　through　the

serpent…windings　of　utilitarianism　to　discover　some　advantage　that　may

discharge　him　from　the　justice　of　punishment；　or　even　from　the　due

measure　of　it；　according　to　the　Pharisaic　maxim：　〃It　is　better　that

one　man　should　die　than　that　the　whole　people　should　perish。〃　For　if

justice　and　righteousness　perish；　human　life　would　no　longer　have

any　value　in　the　world。　What；　then；　is　to　be　said　of　suc