the science of right- 第3部分

his　own；〃　it　would　express　an　absurdity；　for　we　cannot　give　any　one

what　he　already　has。　If　it　is　to　have　a　definite　meaning；　it　must

therefore　run　thus：　〃Enter　into　a　state　in　which　every　one　can　have

what　is　his　own　secured　against　the　action　of　every　other〃　（lex

justitiae）。



　　These　three　classical　formulae；　at　the　same　time；　represent

principles　which　suggest　a　division　of　the　system　of　juridical

duties　into　internal　duties；　external　duties；　and　those　connecting

duties　which　contain　the　latter　as　deduced　from　the　principle　of　the

former　by　subsumption。





　　　　　　　　　　　　　　B。　Universal　Division　of　Rights。



　　I。　Natural　Right　and　Positive　Right。　The　system　of　rights；　viewed　as

a　scientific　system　of　doctrines；　is　divided　into　natural　right　and

positive　right。　Natural　right　rests　upon　pure　rational　principles　a

priori；　positive　or　statutory　right　is　what　proceeds　from　the　will

of　a　legislator。

　　II。　Innate　Right　and　Acquired　Right。　The　system　of　rights　may

again　be　regarded　in　reference　to　the　implied　powers　of　dealing

morally　with　others　as　bound　by　obligations；　that　is；　as　furnishing

a　legal　title　of　action　in　relation　to　them。　Thus　viewed；　the　system

is　divided　into　innate　right　and　acquired　right。　Innate　right　is

that　right　which　belongs　to　every　one　by　nature；　independent　of　all

juridical　acts　of　experience。　Acquired　right　is　that　right　which　is

founded　upon　such　juridical　acts。

　　Innate　right　may　also　be　called　the　〃internal　mine　and　thine〃

（meum　vel　tuum　internum）　for　external　right　must　always　be　acquired。



　　　　There　is　only　one　Innate　Right；　the　Birthright　of　Freedom。



　　Freedom　is　independence　of　the　compulsory　will　of　another；　and　in　so

far　as　it　can　coexist　with　the　freedom　of　all　according　to　a　universal

law；　it　is　the　one　sole　original；　inborn　right　belonging　to　every

man　in　virtue　of　his　humanity。　There　is；　indeed；　an　innate　equality

belonging　to　every　man　which　consists　in　his　right　to　be　independent

of　being　bound　by　others　to　anything　more　than　that　to　which　he　may

also　reciprocally　bind　them。　It　is；　consequently；　the　inborn　quality

of　every　man　in　virtue　of　which　he　ought　to　be　his　own　master　by　right

（sui　juris）。　There　is；　also；　the　natural　quality　of　justness

attributable　to　a　man　as　naturally　of　unimpeachable　right　（justi）；

because　be　has　done　no　wrong　to　any　one　prior　to　his　own　juridical

actions。　And；　further；　there　is　also　the　innate　right　of　common　action

on　the　part　of　every　man；　so　that　he　may　do　towards　others　what　does

not　infringe　their　rights　or　take　away　anything　that　is　theirs

unless　they　are　willing　to　appropriate　it；　such　merely　to

communicate　thought；　to　narrate　anything；　or　to　promise　something

whether　truly　and　honestly；　or　untruly　and　dishonestly　（veriloquim　aut

falsiloquim）；　for　it　rests　entirely　upon　these　others　whether　they

will　believe　or　trust　in　it　or　not。*　　But　all　these　rights　or　titles

are　already　included　in　the　principle　of　innate　freedom；　and　are　not

really　distinguished　from　it；　even　as　dividing　members　under　a

higher　species　of　right。



　　*It　is　customary　to　designate　every　untruth　that　is　spoken

intentionally　as　such；　although　it　may　be　in　a　frivolous　manner　a　lie；

or　falsehood　（mendacium）；　because　it　may　do　harm；　at　least　in　so　far

as　any　one　who　repeats　it　in　good　faith　may　be　made　a　laughing…stock

of　to　others　on　account　of　his　easy　credulity。　But　in　the　juridical

sense；　only　that　untruth　is　called　a　lie　which　immediately　infringes

the　right　of　another；　such　as　a　false　allegation　of　a　contract

having　been　concluded；　when　the　allegation　is　put　forward　in　order

to　deprive　some　one　of　what　is　his　（falsiloquim　dolosum）。　This

distinction　of　conceptions　so　closely　allied　is　not　without

foundation；　because　on　the　occasion　of　a　simple　statement　of　one's

thoughts；　it　is　always　free　for　another　to　take　them　as　he　may；　and

yet　the　resulting　repute；　that　such　a　one　is　a　man　whose　word　cannot

be　trusted；　comes　so　close　to　the　opprobrium　of　directly　calling　him　a

liar；　that　the　boundary…line　separating　what；　in　such　a　case；

belongs　to　jurisprudence；　and　what　is　special　to　ethics；　can　hardly　be

otherwise　drawn。



　　The　reason　why　such　a　division　into　separate　rights　has　been

introduced　into　the　system　of　natural　right；　viewed　as　including　all

that　is　innate；　was　not　without　a　purpose。　Its　object　was　to　enable

proof　to　be　more　readily　put　forward　in　case　of　any　controversy

arising　about　an　acquired　right；　and　questions　emerging　either　with

reference　to　a　fact　that　might　be　in　doubt；　or；　if　that　were

established；　in　reference　to　a　right　under　dispute。　For　the　party

repudiating　an　obligation；　and　on　whom　the　burden　of　proof　（onus

probandi）　might　be　incumbent；　could　thus　methodically　refer　to　his

innate　right　of　freedom　as　specified　under　various　relations　in

detail；　and　could　therefore　found　upon　them　equally　as　different

titles　of　right。

　　In　the　relation　of　innate　right；　and　consequently　of　the　internal

mine　and　thine；　there　is　therefore　not　rights；　but　only　one　right。

And；　accordingly；　this　highest　division　of　rights　into　innate　and

acquired；　which　evidently　consists　of　two　members　extremely　unequal　in

their　contents　is　properly　placed　in　the　introduction；　and　the

subdivisions　of　the　science　of　right　may　be　referred　in　detail　to

the　external　mine　and　thine。



　　　　　　　　　C。　Methodical　Division　of　the　Science　of　Right。



　　The　highest　division　of　the　system　of　natural　right　should　not　be…

as　it　is　frequently　put…　into　〃natural　right〃　and　〃social　right；〃

but　into　natural　right　and　civil　right。　The　first　constitutes

private　right；　the　second；　public　right。　For　it　is　not　the　〃social

state〃　but　the　〃civil　state〃　that　is　opposed　to　the　〃state　of　nature〃；

for　in　the　〃state　of　nature〃　there　may　well　be　society　of　some　kind；

but　there　is　no　〃civil〃　society；　as　an　institution　securing　the　mine

and　thine　by　public　laws。　It　is　thus　that　right；　viewed　under

reference　to　the　state　of　nature；　is　specially　called　private　right。

The　whole　of　the　principles　of　right　will　therefore　fall　to　be

expounded　under　the　two　subdivisions　of　private　right　and　public

right。

CH1

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　FIRST　PART。　PRIVATE　RIGHT。

　　The　System　of　those　Laws　Which　Require　No　External　Promulgation。

　　CHAPTER　I。　Of　the　Mode　of　Having　Anything　External　as　One's　Own。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　1。　The　Meaning　of　〃Mine〃　in　Right

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（Meum　Juris）。



　　Anything　is　〃Mine〃　by　right；　or　is　rightfully　mine；　when　I　am　so

connected　with　it；　that　if　any　other　person　should　make　use　of　it

without　my　consent；　he　would　do　me　a　lesion　or　injury。　The

subjective　condition　of　the　use　of　anything　is　possession　of　it。

　　An　external　thing；　however　as　such　could　only　be　mine；　if　I　may

assume　it　to　be　possible　that　I　can　be　wronged　by　the　use　which

another　might　make　of　it　when　it　is　not　actually　in　my　possession。

Hence　it　would　be　a　contradiction　to　have　anything　external　as　one's

own；　were　not　the　conception　of　possession　capable　of　two　different

meanings；　as　sensible　possession　that　is　perceivable　by　the　senses；

and　rational　possession　that　is　perceivable　only　by　the　intellect。

By　the　former　is　to　be　understood　a　physical　possession；　and　by　the

latter；　a　purely　juridical　possession　of　the　same　object。

　　The　description　of　an　object　as　〃external　to　me〃　may　signify

either　that　it　is　merely　〃different　and　distinct　from　me　as　a

subject；〃　or　that　it　is　also　〃a　thing　placed　outside　of　me；　and　to

be　found　elsewhere　in　space　or　time。〃　Taken　in　the　first　sense；　the

term　possession　signifies　rational　possession；　and；　in　the　second

sense；　it　must　mean　empirical　possession。　A　rational　or　intelligible

possession；　if　such　be　possible；　is　possession　viewed　apart　from

physical　holding　or　detention　（detentio）。



　　　　　　　　　2。　Juridical　Postulate　of　the　Practical　Reason。



　　It　is　possible　to　have　any　external　object　of　my　will　as　mine。　In

other　words；　a　maxim　to　this　effect…　were　it　to　become　law…　that　any

object　on　which　the　will　can　be　exerted　must　remain　objectively　in

itself　without　an　owner；　as　res　nullius；　is　contrary　to　the

principle　of　right。

　　For　an　object　of　any　act　of　my　will；　is　something　that　it　would　be

physically　within　my　power　to　use。　Now；　suppose　there　were　things　that

by　right　should　absolutely　not　be　in　our　power；　or；　in　other　words；

that　it　would　be　wrong　or　inconsistent　with　the　freedom　of　all；

according　to　universal　law；　to　make　use　of　them。　On　this

supposition；　freedom　would　so　far　be　depriving　itself　of　the　use　of

its　voluntary　activity；　in　thus　putting　useable　objects　out　of　all

possibility　of　use。　In　practical　relations；　this　would　be　to

annihilate　them；　by　making　them　res　nullius；　notwithstanding　the

fact　act　acts　of　will　in　relation　to　such　things　would　formally

harmonize；　in　the　actual　use　of　them；　with　the　external　freedom　of　all

according　to　universal　laws。　Now　the　pure　practical　reason　lays　down

only　formal　laws　as　principles　to　regulate　the　exercise　of　the　will；

and　therefore　abstracts　from　the　matter　of　the　act　of　will；　as　regards

the　other　qualities　of　the　object；　which　is　considered　only　in　so

far　as　it　is　an　object　of　the　activity　of　the　will。　Hence　the

practical　reason　cannot　contain；　in　reference　to　such　an　object；　an

absolute　prohibition　of　its　use；　because　this　would　involve　a

contradiction　of　external　freedom　with　itself。　An　object　of　my　free

will；　however；　is　one　which　I　have　the　physical　capability　of　making

some　use　of　at　will；　since　its　use　stands　in　my　power　（in　potentia）。

This　is　to　be　distinguished　from　having　the　object　brought　under　my

disposal　（in　postestatem　meam　reductum）；　which　supposes　not　a

capability　merely；　but　also　a　particular　act　of　the　free…will。　But

in　order　to　consider　something　merely　as　an　object　of　my　will　as　such；

it　is　sufficient　to　be　conscious　that　I　have　it　in　my　power。　It　is

therefore　an　assumption　a　priori