the science of right- 第4部分

it　is　sufficient　to　be　conscious　that　I　have　it　in　my　power。　It　is

therefore　an　assumption　a　priori　of　the　practical　reason　to　regard　and

treat　every　object　within　the　range　of　my　free　exercise　of　will　as

objectively　a　possible　mine　or　thine。

　　This　postulate　may　be　called　〃a　permissive　law〃　of　the　practical

reason；　as　giving　us　a　special　title　which　we　could　not　evolve　out

of　the　mere　conceptions　of　right　generally。　And　this　title　constitutes

the　right　to　impose　upon　all　others　an　obligation；　not　otherwise

laid　upon　them；　to　abstain　from　the　use　of　certain　objects　of　our　free

choice；　because　we　have　already　taken　them　into　our　possession。　Reason

wills　that　this　shall　be　recognised　as　a　valid　principle；　and　it

does　so　as　practical　reason；　and　it　is　enabled　by　means　of　this

postulate　a　priori　to　enlarge　its　range　of　activity　in　practice。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　3。　Possession　and　Ownership。



　　Any　one　who　would　assert　the　right　to　a　thing　as　his　must　be　in

possession　of　it　as　an　object。　Were　he　not　its　actual　possessor　or

owner；　he　could　not　be　wronged　or　injured　by　the　use　which　another

might　make　of　it　without　his　consent。　For；　should　anything　external　to

him；　and　in　no　way　connected　with　him　by　right；　affect　this　object；　it

could　not　affect　himself　as　a　subject；　nor　do　him　any　wrong；　unless　he

stood　in　a　relation　of　ownership　to　it。



　　　　　　　　　　　4。　Exposition　of　the　Conception　of　the。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　External　Mine　and　Thine。



　　There　can　only　be　three　external　objects　of　my　will　in　the

activity　of　choice：

　　（1）　A　corporeal　thing　external　to　me；

　　（2）　The　free…will　of　another　in　the　performance　of　a　particular

act　（praestatio）；

　　（3）　The　state　of　another　in　relation　to　myself。

　　These　correspond　to　the　categories　of　substance；　causality；　and

reciprocity；　and　they　form　the　practical　relations　between　me　and

external　objects；　according　to　the　laws　of　freedom。



　　A。　I　can　only　call　a　corporeal　thing　or　an　object　in　space　〃mine；〃

when；　even　although　not　in　physical　possession　of　it；　I　am　able　to

assert　that　I　am　in　possession　of　it　in　another　real　nonphysical

sense。　Thus；　I　am　not　entitled　to　call　an　apple　mine　merely　because

I　hold　it　in　my　hand　or　possess　it　physically；　but　only　when　I　am

entitled　to　say；　〃I　possess　it；　although　I　have　laid　it　out　of　my

hand；　and　wherever　it　may　lie。〃　In　like　manner；　I　am　not　entitled　to

say　of　the　ground；　on　which　I　may　have　laid　myself　down；　that

therefore　it　is　mine；　but　only　when　I　can　rightly　assert　that　it　still

remains　in　my　possession；　although　I　may　have　left　the　spot。　For　any

one　who；　in　the　former　appearances　of　empirical　possession；　might

wrench　the　apple　out　of　my　hand；　or　drag　me　away　from　my

resting…place；　would；　indeed；　injure　me　in　respect　of　the　inner　〃mine〃

of　freedom；　but　not　in　respect　of　the　external　〃mine；〃　unless　I

could　assert　that　I　was　in　the　possession　of　the　object；　even　when　not

actually　holding　it　physically。　And　if　I　could　not　do　this；　neither

could　I　call　the　apple　or　the　spot　mine。

　　B。　I　cannot　call　the　performance　of　something　by　the　action　of　the

will　of　another　〃mine；〃　if　I　can　only　say　〃it　has　come　into　my

possession　at　the　same　time　with　a　promise〃　（pactum　re　initum）；　but

only　if　I　am　able　to　assert　〃I　am　in　possession　of　the　will　of　the

other；　so　as　to　determine　him　to　the　performance　of　a　particular

act；　although　the　time　for　the　performance　of　it　has　not　yet　come。〃　In

the　latter　case；　the　promise　belongs　to　the　nature　of　things

actually　held　as　possessed；　and　as　an　active　obligation　I　can　reckon

it　mine；　and　this　holds　good　not　only　if　I　have　the　thing　promised…　as

in　the　first　case…　already　in　my　possession；　but　even　although　I　do

not　yet　possess　it　in　fact。　Hence；　I　must　be　able　to　regard　myself

in　thought　as　independent　of　that　empirical　form　of　possession　that　is

limited　by　the　condition　of　time　and　as　being；　nevertheless；　in

possession　of　the　object。

　　C。　I　cannot　call　a　wife；　a　child；　a　domestic；　or；　generally；　any

other　person　〃mine〃　merely　because　I　command　them　at　present　as

belonging　to　my　household；　or　because　I　have　them　under　control；　and

in　my　power　and　possession。　But　I　can　call　them　mine；　if；　although

they　may　have　withdrawn　themselves　from　my　control　and　I　do　not

therefore　possess　them　empirically；　I　can　still　say　〃I　possess　them　by

my　mere　will；　provided　they　exist　anywhere　in　space　or　time；　and；

consequently；　my　possession　of　them　is　purely　juridical。〃　They　belong；

in　fact；　to　my　possessions；　only　when　and　so　far　as　I　can　assert

this　as　a　matter　of　right。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　5。　Definition　of　the　Conception　of　the

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　External　Mine　and　Thine。



　　Definitions　are　nominal　or　real。　A　nominal　definition　is

sufficient　merely　to　distinguish　the　object　defined　from　all　other

objects；　and　it　springs　out　of　a　complete　and　definite　exposition　of

its　conception。　A　real　definition　further　suffices　for　a　deduction

of　the　conception　defined；　so　as　to　furnish　a　knowledge　of　the　reality

of　the　object。　The　nominal　definition　of　the　external　〃mine〃　would

thus　be：　〃The　external　mine　is　anything　outside　of　myself；　such　that

any　hindrance　of　my　use　of　it　at　will　would　be　doing　me　an　injury　or

wrong　as　an　infringement　of　that　freedom　of　mine　which　may　coexist

with　the　freedom　of　all　others　according　to　a　universal　law。〃　The　real

definition　of　this　conception　may　be　put　thus：　〃The　external　mine　is

anything　outside　of　myself；　such　that　any　prevention　of　my　use　of　it

would　be　a　wrong；　although　I　may　not　be　in　possession　of　it　so　as　to

be　actually　holding　it　as　an　object。〃　I　must　be　in　some　kind　of

possession　of　an　external　object；　if　the　object　is　to　be　regarded　as

mine；　for；　otherwise；　anyone　interfering　with　this　object　would　not；

in　doing　so；　affect　me；　nor；　consequently；　would　he　thereby　do　me

any　wrong。　Hence；　according　to　SS　4；　a　rational　possession

（possessio　noumenon）　must　be　assumed　as　possible；　if　there　is　to　be

rightly　an　external　mine　and　thine。　Empirical　possession　is　thus

only　phenomenal　possession　or　holding　（detention）　of　the　object　in　the

sphere　of　sensible　appearance　（possessio　phenomenon）；　although　the

object　which　I　possess　is　not　regarded　in　this　practical　relation　as

itself　a　phenomenon…　according　to　the　exposition　of　the　Transcendental

Analytic　in　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason…　but　as　a　thing　in　itself。　For

in　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason　the　interest　of　reason　turns　upon　the

theoretical　knowledge　of　the　nature　of　things　and　how　far　reason　can

go　in　such　knowledge。　But　here　reason　has　to　deal　with　the　practical

determination　of　the　action　of　the　will　according　to　laws　of

freedom；　whether　the　object　is　perceivable　through　the　senses　or

merely　thinkable　by　the　pure　understanding。　And　right；　as　under

consideration；　is　a　pure　practical　conception　of　the　reason　in

relation　to　the　exercise　of　the　will　under　laws　of　freedom。

　　And；　hence；　it　is　not　quite　correct　to　speak　of　〃possessing〃　a　right

to　this　or　that　object；　but　it　should　rather　be　said　that　an　object　is

possessed　in　a　purely　juridical　way；　for　a　right　is　itself　the

rational　possession　of　an　object；　and　to　〃possess　a　possession；〃　would

be　an　expression　without　meaning。



　　　　　　6。　Deduction　of　the　Conception　of　a　Purely　Juridical

　　　　　　Possession　of　an　External　Object　（Possessio　Noumenon）。



　　The　question；　〃How　is　an　external　mine　and　thine　possible？〃　resolves

itself　into　this　other　question：　〃How　is　a　merely　juridical　or

rational　possession　possible？〃　And　this　second　question　resolves

itself　again　into　a　third：　〃How　is　a　synthetic　proposition　in　right

possible　a　priori？〃

　　All　propositions　of　right…　as　juridical　propositions…　are

propositions　a　priori；　for　they　are　practical　laws　of　reason

（dictamina　rationis）。　But　the　juridical　proposition　a　priori

respecting　empirical　possession　is　analytical；　for　it　says　nothing

more　than　what　follows　by　the　principle　of　contradiction；　from　the

conception　of　such　possession；　namely；　that　if　I　am　the　holder　of　a

thing　in　the　way　of　being　physically　connected　with　it；　any　one

interfering　with　it　without　my　consent…　as；　for　instance；　in　wrenching

an　apple　out　of　my　hand…　affects　and　detracts　from　my　freedom　as

that　which　is　internally　mine；　and　consequently　the　maxim　of　his

action　is　in　direct　contradiction　to　the　axiom　of　right。　The

proposition　expressing　the　principle　of　an　empirical　rightful

possession　does　not　therefore　go　beyond　the　right　of　a　person　in

reference　to　himself。

　　On　the　other　hand；　the　proposition　expressing　the　possibility　of　the

possession　of　a　thing　external　to　me；　after　abstraction　of　all　the

conditions　of　empirical　possession　in　space　and　time…　consequently

presenting　the　assumption　of　the　possibility　of　a　possessio

noumenon…　goes　beyond　these　limiting　conditions；　and　because　this

proposition　asserts　a　possession　even　without　physical　holding；　as

necessary　to　the　conception　of　the　external　mine　and　thine；　it　is

synthetical。　And　thus　it　becomes　a　problem　for　reason　to　show　how　such

a　proposition；　extending　its　range　beyond　the　conception　of

empirical　possession；　is　possible　a　priori。

　　In　this　manner；　for　instance；　the　act　of　taking　possession　of　a

particular　portion　of　the　soil　is　a　mode　exercising　the　private

free…will　without　being　an　act　of　usurpation。　The　possessor　founds

upon　the　innate　right　of　common　possession　of　the　surface　of　the

earth；　and　upon　the　universal　will　corresponding　a　priori　to　it；　which

allows　a　private　possession　of　the　soil；　because　what　are　mere

things　would　be　otherwise　made　in　themselves　and　by　a　law　into

unappropriable　objects。　Thus　a　first　appropriator　acquires

originally　by　primary　possession　a　particular　portion　of　the　ground；

and　by　right　（jure）　he　resists　every　other　person　who　would　hinder　him

in　the　private　use　of　it；　although；　while　the　〃state　of　nature〃

continues；　this　cannot　be　done　by　juridical　means　（de　jure）；　because