re despotic power to enable them to exert great influence； as is evidenced by the three last mentioned。 The case most requiring consideration in reference to institutions is the not very uncommon one in which a small but leading portion of the population； from difference of race； more civilised origin； or other peculiarities of circumstance； are markedly superior in civilisation and general character to the remainder。 Under those conditions； government by the representatives of the mass would stand a chance of depriving them of much of the benefit they might derive from the greater civilisation of the superior ranks； while government by the representatives of those ranks would probably rivet the degradation of the multitude； and leave them no hope of decent treatment except by ridding themselves of one of the most valuable elements of future advancement。 The best prospect of improvement for a people thus composed lies in the existence of a constitutionally unlimited； or at least a practically preponderant； authority in the chief ruler of the dominant class。 He alone has by his position an interest in raising and improving the mass of whom he is not jealous； as a counterpoise to his associates of whom he is。 And if fortunate circumstances place beside him； not as controllers but as subordinates； a body representative of the superior caste； which by its objections and questionings； and by its occasional outbreaks of spirit； keeps alive habits of collective resistance； and may admit of being； in time and by degrees； expanded into a really national representation （which is in substance the history of the English Parliament）； the nation has then the most favourable prospects of improvement which can well occur to a community thus circumstanced and constituted。 Among the tendencies which； without absolutely rendering a people unfit for representative government； seriously incapacitate them from reaping the full benefit of it； one deserves particular notice。 There are two states of the inclinations； intrinsically very different； but which have something in common； by virtue of which they often coincide in the direction they give to the efforts of individuals and of nations： one is； the desire to exercise power over others； the other is disinclination to have power exercised over themselves。 The difference between different portions of mankind in the relative strength of these two dispositions is one of the most important elements in their history。 There are nations in whom the passion for governing others is so much stronger than the desire of personal independence； that for the mere shadow of the one they are found ready to sacrifice the whole of the other。 Each one of their number is willing； like the private soldier in an army； to abdicate his personal freedom of action into the hands of his general； provided the army is triumphant and victorious； and he is able to flatter himself that he is one of a conquering host； though the notion that he has himself any share in the domination exercised over the conquered is an illusion。 A government strictly limited in its powers and attributions； required to hold its hands from over…meddling； and to let most things go on without its assuming the part of guardian or director； is not to the taste of such a people。 In their eyes the possessors of authority can hardly take too much upon themselves； provided the authority itself is open to general competition。 An average individual among them prefers the chance； however distant or improbable； of wielding some share of power over his fellow citizens； above the certainty； to himself and others； of having no unnecessary power exercised over them。 These are the elements of a people of place…hunters； in whom the course of politics is mainly determined by place…hunting； where equality alone is cared for； but not liberty； where the contests of political parties are but struggles to decide whether the power of meddling in everything shall belong to one class or another； perhaps merely to one knot of public men or another； where the idea entertained of democracy is merely that of opening offices to the competition of all instead of a few； where； the more popular the institutions； the more innumerable are the places created； and the more monstrous the over…government exercised by all over each； and by the executive over all。 It would be as unjust as it would be ungenerous to offer this； or anything approaching to it； as an unexaggerated picture of the French people； yet the degree in which they do participate in this type of character has caused representative government by a limited class to break down by excess of corruption； and the attempt at representative government by the whole male population to end in giving one man the power of consigning any number of the rest； without trial； to Lambessa or Cayenne； provided he allows all of them to think themselves not excluded from the possibility of sharing his favours。 The point of character which； beyond any other； fits the people of this country for representative government is that they have almost universally the contrary characteristic。 They are very jealous of any attempt to exercise power over them not sanctioned by long usage and by their own opinion of right； but they in general care very little for the exercise of power over others。 Not having the smallest sympathy with the passion for governing； while they are but too well acquainted with the motives of private interest from which that office is sought； they prefer that it should be performed by those to whom it comes without seeking； as a consequence of social position。 If foreigners understood this； it would account to them for some of the apparent contradictions in the political feelings of Englishmen； their unhesitating readiness to let themselves be governed by the higher classes； coupled with so little personal subservience to them； that no people are so fond of resisting authority when it oversteps certain prescribed limits； or so determined to make their rulers always remember that they will only be governed in the way they themselves like best。 Place…hunting； accordingly； is a form of ambition to which the English； considered nationally； are almost strangers。 If we except the few families or connections of whom official employment lies directly in the way； Englishmen's views of advancement in life take an altogether different direction… that of success in business； or in a profession。 They have the strongest distaste for any mere struggle for office by political parties or individuals： and there are few things to which they have a greater aversion than to the multiplication of public employments： a thing； on the contrary； always popular with the bureaucracy…ridden nations of the Continent； who would rather pay higher taxes than diminish by the smallest fraction their individual chances of a place for themselves or their relatives； and among whom a cry for retrenchment never means abolition of offices； but the reduction of the salaries of those which are too considerable for the ordinary citizen to have any chance of being appointed to them。 Chapter 5 Of the Proper Functions of Representative Bodies。
IN TREATING of representative government； it is above all necessary to keep in view the distinction between its idea or essence； and the particular forms in which the idea has been clothed by accidental historical developments； or by the notions current at some particular period。 The meaning of representative government is； that the whole people； or some numerous portion of them； exercise through deputies periodically elected by themselves the ultimate controlling power； which； in every constitution； must reside somewhere。 This ultimate power they must possess in all its completeness。 They must be masters； whenever they please； of all the operations of government。 There is no need that the constitutional law should itself give them this mastery。 It does not in the British Constitution。 But what it does give practically amounts to this。 The power of final control is as essentially single； in a mixed and balanced government； as in a pure monarchy or democracy。 This is the portion of truth in the opinion of the ancients； revived by great authorities in our own time； that a balanced constitution is impossible。 There is almost always a balance； but the scales never hang exactly even。 Which of them preponderates is not always apparent on the face of the political institutions。 In the British Constitution； each of the three co…ordinate members of the sovereignty is invested with powers which； if fully exercised； would enable it to stop all the machinery of government。 Nominally； therefore； each is invested with equal power of thwarting and obstructing the others： and if； by exerting that power； any of the three could hope to better its position； the ordinary course of human affairs forbids us to doubt that the power would be exercised。 There can be no question that the full powers of each would be employed defensively if it found itself assailed by one or both of the others。 What then prevents the same powers from being exerted aggressively？ The unwritten maxims of the Constitution… in other words； the positive political morality of the country： and this positive political morality is what we must look to； if we would know in whom the really supreme power in the Constitution resides。 By constitutional law； the Crown can refuse its assent to any Act of Parliament； and can appoint to office and maintain in it any Minister； in opposition to the remonstrances of Parliament。 But the constitutional morality of the country nullifies these powers； preventing them from being ever used； and； by requiring that the head of the Administration should always be virtually appointed by the House of Commons； makes that body the real sovereign of the State。 These unwritten rules； which limit the use of lawful powers； are； however； only effectual； and maintain themselves in existence； on condition of harmonising with the actual distribution of real political strength。 There is in every constitution a strongest power… one which would gain the victory if the compromises by which the Constitution habitually works were suspended a