representative government- 第15部分

ould　gain　the　victory　if　the　compromises　by　which　the　Constitution　habitually　works　were　suspended　and　there　came　a　trial　of　strength。　Constitutional　maxims　are　adhered　to；　and　are　practically　operative；　so　long　as　they　give　the　predominance　in　the　Constitution　to　that　one　of　the　powers　which　has　the　preponderance　of　active　power　out　of　doors。　This；　in　England；　is　the　popular　power。　If；　therefore；　the　legal　provisions　of　the　British　Constitution；　together　with　the　unwritten　maxims　by　which　the　conduct　of　the　different　political　authorities　is　in　fact　regulated；　did　not　give　to　the　popular　element　in　the　Constitution　that　substantial　supremacy　over　every　department　of　the　government　which　corresponds　to　its　real　power　in　the　country；　the　Constitution　would　not　possess　the　stability　which　characterises　it；　either　the　laws　or　the　unwritten　maxims　would　soon　have　to　be　changed。　The　British　government　is　thus　a　representative　government　in　the　correct　sense　of　the　term：　and　the　powers　which　it　leaves　in　hands　not　directly　accountable　to　the　people　can　only　be　considered　as　precautions　which　the　ruling　power　is　willing　should　be　taken　against　its　own　errors。　Such　precautions　have　existed　in　all　well…constructed　democracies。　The　Athenian　Constitution　had　many　such　provisions；　and　so　has　that　of　the　United　States。　　　But　while　it　is　essential　to　representative　government　that　the　practical　supremacy　in　the　state　should　reside　in　the　representatives　of　the　people；　it　is　an　open　question　what　actual　functions；　what　precise　part　in　the　machinery　of　government；　shall　be　directly　and　personally　discharged　by　the　representative　body。　Great　varieties　in　this　respect　are　compatible　with　the　essence　of　representative　government；　provided　the　functions　are　such　as　secure　to　the　representative　body　the　control　of　everything　in　the　last　resort。　　　There　is　a　radical　distinction　between　controlling　the　business　of　government　and　actually　doing　it。　The　same　person　or　body　may　be　able　to　control　everything；　but　cannot　possibly　do　everything；　and　in　many　cases　its　control　over　everything　will　be　more　perfect　the　less　it　personally　attempts　to　do。　The　commander　of　an　army　could　not　direct　its　movements　effectually　if　he　himself　fought　in　the　ranks；　or　led　an　assault。　It　is　the　same　with　bodies　of　men。　Some　things　cannot　be　done　except　by　bodies；　other　things　cannot　be　well　done　by　them。　It　is　one　question；　therefore；　what　a　popular　assembly　should　control；　another　what　it　should　itself　do。　It　should；　as　we　have　already　seen；　control　all　the　operations　of　government。　But　in　order　to　determine　through　what　channel　this　general　control　may　most　expediently　be　exercised；　and　what　portion　of　the　business　of　government　the　representative　assembly　should　hold　in　its　own　hands；　it　is　necessary　to　consider　what　kinds　of　business　a　numerous　body　is　competent　to　perform　properly。　That　alone　which　it　can　do　well　it　ought　to　take　personally　upon　itself。　With　regard　to　the　rest；　its　proper　province　is　not　to　do　it；　but　to　take　means　for　having　it　well　done　by　others。　　　For　example；　the　duty　which　is　considered　as　belonging　more　peculiarly　than　any　other　to　an　assembly　representative　of　the　people；　is　that　of　voting　the　taxes。　Nevertheless；　in　no　country　does　the　representative　body　undertake；　by　itself　or　its　delegated　officers；　to　prepare　the　estimates。　Though　the　supplies　can　only　be　voted　by　the　House　of　Commons；　and　though　the　sanction　of　the　House　is　also　required　for　the　appropriation　of　the　revenues　to　the　different　items　of　the　public　expenditure；　it　is　the　maxim　and　the　uniform　practice　of　the　Constitution　that　money　can　be　granted　only　on　the　proposition　of　the　Crown。　It　has；　no　doubt；　been　felt；　that　moderation　as　to　the　amount；　and　care　and　judgment　in　the　detail　of　its　application；　can　only　be　expected　when　the　executive　government；　through　whose　hands　it　is　to　pass；　is　made　responsible　for　the　plans　and　calculations　on　which　the　disbursements　are　grounded。　Parliament；　accordingly；　is　not　expected；　nor　even　permitted；　to　originate　directly　either　taxation　or　expenditure。　All　it　is　asked　for　is　its　consent；　and　the　sole　power　it　possesses　is　that　of　refusal。　　　The　principles　which　are　involved　and　recognised　in　this　constitutional　doctrine；　if　followed　as　far　as　they　will　go；　are　a　guide　to　the　limitation　and　definition　of　the　general　functions　of　representative　assemblies。　In　the　first　place；　it　is　admitted　in　all　countries　in　which　the　representative　system　is　practically　understood；　that　numerous　representative　bodies　ought　not　to　administer。　The　maxim　is　grounded　not　only　on　the　most　essential　principles　of　good　government；　but　on　those　of　the　successful　conduct　of　business　of　any　description。　No　body　of　men；　unless　organised　and　under　command；　is　fit　for　action；　in　the　proper　sense。　Even　a　select　board；　composed　of　few　members；　and　these　specially　conversant　with　the　business　to　be　done；　is　always　an　inferior　instrument　to　some　one　individual　who　could　be　found　among　them；　and　would　be　improved　in　character　if　that　one　person　were　made　the　chief；　and　all　the　others　reduced　to　subordinates。　What　can　be　done　better　by　a　body　than　by　any　individual　is　deliberation。　When　it　is　necessary　or　important　to　secure　hearing　and　consideration　to　many　conflicting　opinions；　a　deliberative　body　is　indispensable。　Those　bodies；　therefore；　are　frequently　useful；　even　for　administrative　business；　but　in　general　only　as　advisers；　such　business　being；　as　a　rule；　better　conducted　under　the　responsibility　of　one。　Even　a　joint…stock　company　has　always　in　practice；　if　not　in　theory；　a　managing　director；　its　good　or　bad　management　depends　essentially　on　some　one　person's　qualifications；　and　the　remaining　directors；　when　of　any　use；　are　so　by　their　suggestions　to　him；　or　by　the　power　they　possess　of　watching　him；　and　restraining　or　removing　him　in　case　of　misconduct。　That　they　are　ostensibly　equal　shares　with　him　in　the　management　is　no　advantage；　but　a　considerable　set…off　against　any　good　which　they　are　capable　of　doing：　it　weakens　greatly　the　sense　in　his　own　mind；　and　in　those　of　other　people；　of　that　individual　responsibility　in　which　he　should　stand　forth　personally　and　undividedly。　　　But　a　popular　assembly　is　still　less　fitted　to　administer；　or　to　dictate　in　detail　to　those　who　have　the　charge　of　administration。　Even　when　honestly　meant；　the　interference　is　almost　always　injurious。　Every　branch　of　public　administration　is　a　skilled　business；　which　has　its　own　peculiar　principles　and　traditional　rules；　many　of　them　not　even　known；　in　any　effectual　way；　except　to　those　who　have　at　some　time　had　a　hand　in　carrying　on　the　business；　and　none　of　them　likely　to　be　duly　appreciated　by　persons　not　practically　acquainted　with　the　department。　I　do　not　mean　that　the　transaction　of　public　business　has　esoteric　mysteries；　only　to　be　understood　by　the　initiated。　Its　principles　are　all　intelligible　to　any　person　of　good　sense；　who　has　in　his　mind　a　true　picture　of　the　circumstances　and　conditions　to　be　dealt　with：　but　to　have　this　he　must　know　those　circumstances　and　conditions；　and　the　knowledge　does　not　come　by　intuition。　There　are　many　rules　of　the　greatest　importance　in　every　branch　of　public　business　（as　there　are　in　every　private　occupation）；　of　which　a　person　fresh　to　the　subject　neither　knows　the　reason　or　even　suspects　the　existence；　because　they　are　intended　to　meet　dangers　or　provide　against　inconveniences　which　never　entered　into　his　thoughts。　I　have　known　public　men；　ministers；　of　more　than　ordinary　natural　capacity；　who　on　their　first　introduction　to　a　department　of　business　new　to　them；　have　excited　the　mirth　of　their　inferiors　by　the　air　with　which　they　announced　as　a　truth　hitherto　set　at　nought；　and　brought　to　light　by　themselves；　something　which　was　probably　the　first　thought　of　everybody　who　ever　looked　at　the　subject；　given　up　as　soon　as　he　had　got　on　to　a　second。　It　is　true　that　a　great　statesman　is　he　who　knows　when　to　depart　from　traditions；　as　well　as　when　to　adhere　to　them。　But　it　is　a　great　mistake　to　suppose　that　he　will　do　this　better　for　being　ignorant　of　the　traditions。　No　one　who　does　not　thoroughly　know　the　modes　of　action　which　common　experience　has　sanctioned　is　capable　of　judging　of　the　circumstances　which　require　a　departure　from　those　ordinary　modes　of　action。　The　interests　dependent　on　the　acts　done　by　a　public　department；　the　consequences　liable　to　follow　from　any　particular　mode　of　conducting　it；　require　for　weighing　and　estimating　them　a　kind　of　knowledge；　and　of　specially　exercised　judgment；　almost　as　rarely　found　in　those　not　bred　to　it；　as　the　capacity　to　reform　the　law　in　those　who　have　not　professionally　studied　it。　　　All　these　difficulties　are　sure　to　be　ignored　by　a　representative　assembly　which　attempts　to　decide　on　special　acts　of　administration。　At　its　best；　it　is　inexperience　sitting　in　judgment　on　experience；　ignorance　on　knowledge：　ignorance　which　never　suspecting　the　existence　of　what　it　does　not　know；　is　equally　careless　and　supercilious；　making　light　of；　if　not　resenting；　all　pretensions　to　have　a　judgment　better　worth　attending　to　than　its　own。　Thus　it　is　when　no　interested　motives　intervene：　but　when　they　do；　the　result　is　jobbery　more　unblushing　and　audacious　than　the　worst　corruption　which　can　well　take　place　in　a　public　office　under　a　government　of　publicity。　It　is　not　necessary　that　the　interested　bias　should　extend　to　the　majority　of　the　assembly。　In　any　particular　case　it　is　of　ten　enough　that　it　affects　two　or　three　of　their　number。　Those　two　or　three　will　have　a　greater　interest　in　misleading　the　body；　than　any　other　of　its　members　are　likely　to　have　in　putting　it　right。　The　bulk　of　the　assembly　may　keep　their　hands　clean；　but　they　cannot　keep　their　minds　vigilant　or　their　judgments　discerning　in　matters　they　know　nothing　about；　and　an　indolent　majority；　like　an　indolent　individual；　belongs　to　the　person　who　takes　most　pains　with　it。　The　bad　measures　or　bad　appointments　of　a　minister　may　be　checked　by　Parliament；　and　the　interest　of　ministers　in　defending；　and　of　rival　partisans　in　attacking；　secures　a　tolerably　equal　discussion：　but　quis　custodiet　custodes？　who　shall　check　the　Parliament？　A　minister；　a　head　of　an　office；　feels　himsel