ituencies who sufficiently value mental ability； and eagerly seek for it； will generally succeed in obtaining men beyond mediocrity； and often men whom they can trust to carry on public affairs according to their unfettered judgment； to whom it would be an affront to require that they should give up that judgment at the behest of their inferiors in knowledge。 If such persons； honestly sought； are not to be found； then indeed the electors are justified in taking other precautions； for they cannot be expected to postpone their particular opinions； unless in order that they may be served by a person of superior knowledge to their own。 They would do well； indeed； even then； to remember； that when once chosen； the representative； if he devotes himself to his duty； has greater opportunities of correcting an original false judgment than fall to the lot of most of his constituents； a consideration which generally ought to prevent them （unless compelled by necessity to choose some one whose impartiality they do not fully trust） from exacting a pledge not to change his opinion； or； if he does； to resign his seat。 But when an unknown person； not certified in unmistakable terms by some high authority； is elected for the first time； the elector cannot be expected not to make conformity to his own sentiments the primary requisite。 It is enough if he does not regard a subsequent change of those sentiments； honestly avowed； with its grounds undisguisedly stated； as a peremptory reason for withdrawing his confidence。 Even supposing the most tried ability and acknowledged eminence of character in the representative； the private opinions of the electors are not to be placed entirely in abeyance。 Deference to mental superiority is not to go the length of self…annihilation… abnegation of any personal opinion。 But when the difference does not relate to the fundamentals of politics； however decided the elector may be in his own sentiments； he ought to consider that when an able man differs from him there is at least a considerable chance of his being in the wrong； and that even if otherwise； it is worth while to give up his opinion in things not absolutely essential； for the sake of the inestimable advantage of having an able man to act for him in the many matters in which he himself is not qualified to form a judgment。 In such cases he often endeavours to reconcile both wishes； by inducing the able man to sacrifice his own opinion on the points of difference： but； for the able man to lend himself to this compromise； is treason against his especial office； abdication of the peculiar duties of mental superiority； of which it is one of the most sacred not to desert the cause which has the clamour against it； nor to deprive of his services those of his opinions which need them the most。 A man of conscience and known ability should insist on full freedom to act as he in his own judgment deems best； and should not consent to serve on any other terms。 But the electors are entitled to know how he means to act； what opinions； on all things which concern his public duty； he intends should guide his conduct。 If some of these are unacceptable to them； it is for him to satisfy them that he nevertheless deserves to be their representative； and if they are wise； they will overlook； in favour of his general value； many and great differences between his opinions and their own。 There are some differences； however； which they cannot be expected to overlook。 Whoever feels the amount of interest in the government of his country which befits a freeman； has some convictions on national affairs which are like his life…blood； which the strength of his belief in their truth； together with the importance he attaches to them； forbid him to make a subject of compromise； or postpone to the judgment of any person； however greatly his superior。 Such convictions； when they exist in a people； or in any appreciable portion of one； are entitled to influence in virtue of their mere existence； and not solely in that of the probability of their being grounded in truth。 A people cannot be well governed in opposition to their primary notions of right； even though these may be in some points erroneous。 A correct estimate of the relation which should subsist between governors and governed； does not require the electors to consent to be represented by one who intends to govern them in opposition to their fundamental convictions。 If they avail themselves of his capacities of useful service in other respects； at a time when the points on which he is vitally at issue with them are not likely to be mooted； they are justified in dismissing him at the first moment when a question arises involving these； and on which there is not so assured a majority for what they deem right as to make the dissenting voice of that particular individual unimportant。 Thus （I mention names to illustrate my meaning； not for any personal application） the opinions supposed to be entertained by Mr。 Cobden and Mr。 Bright on resistance to foreign aggression might be overlooked during the Crimean war； when there was an overwhelming national feeling on the contrary side； and might yet very properly lead to their rejection by the electors at the time of the Chinese quarrel （though in itself a more doubtful question）； because it was then for some time a moot point whether their view of the case might not prevail。 As the general result of what precedes； we may affirm that actual pledges should not be required； unless； from unfavourable social circumstances or faulty institutions； the electors are so narrowed in their choice as to be compelled to fix it on a person presumptively under the influence of partialities hostile to their interest： That they are entitled to a full knowledge of the political opinions and sentiments of the candidate； and not only entitled； but often bound； to reject one who differs from themselves on the few articles which are the foundation of their political belief： That in proportion to the opinion they entertain of the mental superiority of a candidate； they ought to put up with his expressing and acting on opinions different from theirs on any number of things not included in their fundamental articles of belief： That they ought to be unremitting in their search for a representative of such calibre as to be entrusted with full power of obeying the dictates of his own judgment： That they should consider it a duty which they owe to their fellow…countrymen； to do their utmost towards placing men of this quality in the legislature： and that it is of much greater importance to themselves to be represented by such a man than by one who professes agreement in a greater number of their opinions： for the benefits of his ability are certain； while the hypothesis of his being wrong and their being right on the points of difference is a very doubtful one。 I have discussed this question on the assumption that the electoral system； in all that depends on positive institution； conforms to the principles laid down in the preceding chapters。 Even on this hypothesis； the delegation theory of representation seems to me false； and its practical operation hurtful； though the mischief would in that case be confined within certain bounds。 But if the securities by which I have endeavoured to guard the representative principle are not recognised by the Constitution； if provision is not made for the representation of minorities； nor any difference admitted in the numerical value of votes； according to some criterion of the amount of education possessed by the voters； in that case no words can exaggerate the importance in principle of leaving an unfettered discretion to the representative； for it would then be the only chance； under universal suffrage； for any other opinions than those of the majority to be heard in Parliament。 In that falsely called democracy which is really the exclusive rule of the operative classes； all others being unrepresented and unheard； the only escape from class legislation in its narrowest； and political ignorance in its most dangerous； form； would lie in such disposition as the uneducated might have to choose educated representatives； and to defer to their opinions。 Some willingness to do this might reasonably be expected； and everything would depend upon cultivating it to the highest point。 But； once invested with political omnipotence； if the operative classes voluntarily concurred in imposing in this or any other manner any considerable limitation upon their self…opinion and self…will； they would prove themselves wiser than any class； possessed of absolute power； has shown itself； or； we may venture to say； is ever likely to show itself； under that corrupting influence。 Chapter 13 Of a Second Chamber。
OF ALL topics relating to the theory of representative government； none has been the subject of more discussion； especially on the Continent； than what is known as the question of the Two Chambers。 It has occupied a greater amount of the attention of thinkers than many questions of ten times its importance； and has been regarded as a sort of touchstone which distinguishes the partisans of limited from those of uncontrolled democracy。 For my own part； I set little value on any check which a Second Chamber can apply to a democracy otherwise unchecked； and I am inclined to think that if all other constitutional questions are rightly decided； it is but of secondary importance whether the Parliament consists of two Chambers； or only of one。 If there are two Chambers； they may either be of similar； or of dissimilar composition。 If of similar； both will obey the same influences； and whatever has a majority in one of the Houses will be likely to have it in the other。 It is true that the necessity of obtaining the consent of both to the passing of any measure may at times be a material obstacle to improvement； since； assuming both the Houses to be representative； and equal in their numbers； a number slightly exceeding a fourth of the entire representation may prevent the passing of a Bill； while； if there is but one House； a Bill is secure of passing if it has a bare majority。 But the case supposed is rather abstractedly possible than likely to occur in p