representative government- 第40部分

has　a　bare　majority。　But　the　case　supposed　is　rather　abstractedly　possible　than　likely　to　occur　in　practice。　It　will　not　often　happen　that　of　two　Houses　similarly　composed；　one　will　be　almost　unanimous；　and　the　other　nearly　equally　divided：　if　a　majority　in　one　rejects　a　measure；　there　will　generally　have　been　a　large　minority　unfavourable　to　it　in　the　other；　any　improvement；　therefore；　which　could　be　thus　impeded；　would　in　almost　all　cases　be　one　which　had　not　much　more　than　a　simple　majority　in　the　entire　body；　and　the　worst　consequence　that　could　ensue　would　be　to　delay　for　a　short　time　the　passing　of　the　measure；　or　give　rise　to　a　fresh　appeal　to　the　electors　to　ascertain　if　the　small　majority　in　Parliament　corresponded　to　an　effective　one　in　the　country。　The　inconvenience　of　delay；　and　the　advantages　of　the　appeal　to　the　nation；　might　be　regarded　in　this　case　as　about　equally　balanced。　　　I　attach　little　weight　to　the　argument　oftenest　urged　for　having　two　Chambers…　to　prevent　precipitancy；　and　compel　a　second　deliberation；　for　it　must　be　a　very　ill…constituted　representative　assembly　in　which　the　established　forms　of　business　do　not　require　many　more　than　two　deliberations。　The　consideration　which　tells　most；　in　my　judgment；　in　favour　of　two　Chambers　（and　this　I　do　regard　as　of　some　moment）　is　the　evil　effect　produced　upon　the　mind　of　any　holder　of　power；　whether　an　individual　or　an　assembly；　by　the　consciousness　of　having　only　themselves　to　consult。　It　is　important　that　no　set　of　persons　should；　in　great　affairs；　be　able；　even　temporarily；　to　make　their　sic　volo　prevail　without　asking　any　one　else　for　his　consent。　A　majority　in　a　single　assembly；　when　it　has　assumed　a　permanent　character…　when　composed　of　the　same　persons　habitually　acting　together；　and　always　assured　of　victory　in　their　own　House…　easily　becomes　despotic　and　overweening；　if　released　from　the　necessity　of　considering　whether　its　acts　will　be　concurred　in　by　another　constituted　authority。　The　same　reason　which　induced　the　Romans　to　have　two　consuls　makes　it　desirable　there　should　be　two　Chambers：　that　neither　of　them　may　be　exposed　to　the　corrupting　influence　of　undivided　power；　even　for　the　space　of　a　single　year。　One　of　the　most　indispensable　requisites　in　the　practical　conduct　of　politics；　especially　in　the　management　of　free　institutions；　is　conciliation：　a　readiness　to　compromise；　a　willingness　to　concede　something　to　opponents；　and　to　shape　good　measures　so　as　to　be　as　little　offensive　as　possible　to　persons　of　opposite　views；　and　of　this　salutary　habit；　the　mutual　give　and　take　（as　it　has　been　called）　between　two　Houses　is　a　perpetual　school；　useful　as　such　even　now；　and　its　utility　would　probably　be　even　more　felt　in　a　more　democratic　constitution　of　the　Legislature。　　　But　the　Houses　need　not　both　be　of　the　same　composition；　they　may　be　intended　as　a　check　on　one　another。　One　being　supposed　democratic；　the　other　will　naturally　be　constituted　with　a　view　to　its　being　some　restraint　upon　the　democracy。　But　its　efficacy　in　this　respect　wholly　depends　on　the　social　support　which　it　can　command　outside　the　House。　An　assembly　which　does　not　rest　on　the　basis　of　some　great　power　in　the　country　is　ineffectual　against　one　which　does。　An　aristocratic　House　is　only　powerful　in　an　aristocratic　state　of　society。　The　House　of　Lords　was　once　the　strongest　power　in　our　Constitution；　and　the　Commons　only　a　checking　body：　but　this　was　when　the　Barons　were　almost　the　only　power　out　of　doors。　I　cannot　believe　that；　in　a　really　democratic　state　of　society；　the　House　of　Lords　would　be　of　any　practical　value　as　a　moderator　of　democracy。　When　the　force　on　one　side　is　feeble　in　comparison　with　that　on　the　other；　the　way　to　give　it　effect　is　not　to　draw　both　out　in　line；　and　muster　their　strength　in　open　field　over　against　one　another。　Such　tactics　would　ensure　the　utter　defeat　of　the　less　powerful。　It　can　only　act　to　advantage　by　not　holding　itself　apart；　and　compelling　every　one　to　declare　himself　either　with　or　against　it；　but　taking　a　position　among；　rather　than　in　opposition　to；　the　crowd；　and　drawing　to　itself　the　elements　most　capable　of　allying　themselves　with　it　on　any　given　point；　not　appearing　at　all　as　an　antagonist　body；　to　provoke　a　general　rally　against　it；　but　working　as　one　of　the　elements　in　a　mixed　mass；　infusing　its　leaven；　and　often　making　what　would　be　the　weaker　part　the　stronger；　by　the　addition　of　its　influence。　The　really　moderating　power　in　a　democratic　constitution　must　act　in　and　through　the　democratic　House。　　　That　there　should　be；　in　every　polity；　a　centre　of　resistance　to　the　predominant　power　in　the　Constitution…　and　in　a　democratic　constitution；　therefore；　a　nucleus　of　resistance　to　the　democracy…　I　have　already　maintained；　and　I　regard　it　as　a　fundamental　maxim　of　government。　If　any　people；　who　possess　a　democratic　representation；　are；　from　their　historical　antecedents；　more　willing　to　tolerate　such　a　centre　of　resistance　in　the　form　of　a　Second　Chamber　or　House　of　Lords　than　in　any　other　shape；　this　constitutes　a　stronger　reason　for　having　it　in　that　shape。　But　it　does　not　appear　to　me　the　best　shape　in　itself；　nor　by　any　means　the　most　efficacious　for　its　object。　If　there　are　two　Houses；　one　considered　to　represent　the　people；　the　other　to　represent　only　a　class；　or　not　to　be　representative　at　all；　I　cannot　think　that　where　democracy　is　the　ruling　power　in　society　the　Second　House　would　have　any　real　ability　to　resist　even　the　aberrations　of　the　first。　It　might　be　suffered　to　exist　in　deference　to　habit　and　association；　but　not　as　an　effective　check。　If　it　exercised　an　independent　will；　it　would　be　required　to　do　so　in　the　same　general　spirit　as　the　other　House；　to　be　equally　democratic　with　it；　and　to　content　itself　with　correcting　the　accidental　oversights　of　the　more　popular　branch　of　the　legislature；　or　competing　with　it　in　popular　measures。　　　The　practicability　of　any　real　check　to　the　ascendancy　of　the　majority　depends　henceforth　on　the　distribution　of　strength　in　the　most　popular　branch　of　the　governing　body；　and　I　have　indicated　the　mode　in　which；　to　the　best　of　my　judgment；　a　balance　of　forces　might　most　advantageously　be　established　there。　I　have　also　pointed　out；　that　even　if　the　numerical　majority　were　allowed　to　exercise　complete　predominance　by　means　of　a　corresponding　majority　in　Parliament；　yet　if　minorities　also　are　permitted　to　enjoy　the　equal　right　due　to　them　on　strictly　democratic　principles；　of　being　represented　proportionally　to　their　numbers；　this　provision　will　ensure　the　perpetual　presence　in　the　House　by　the　same　popular　title　as　its　other　members；　of　so　many　of　the　first　intellects　in　the　country；　that　without　being　in　any　way　banded　apart；　or　invested　with　any　invidious　prerogative；　this　portion　of　the　national　representation　will　have　a　personal　weight　much　more　than　in　proportion　to　its　numerical　strength；　and　will　afford；　in　a　most　effective　form；　the　moral　centre　of　resistance　which　is　needed。　A　Second　Chamber；　therefore；　is　not　required　for　this　purpose；　and　would　not　contribute　to　it；　but　might　even；　in　some　conceivable　modes　impede　its　attainment。　If；　however；　for　the　other　reasons　already　mentioned；　the　decision　were　taken　that　there　should　be　such　a　Chamber；　it　is　desirable　that　it　should　be　composed　of　elements　which；　without　being　open　to　the　imputation　of　class　interests　adverse　to　the　majority；　would　incline　it　to　oppose　itself　to　the　class　interests　of　the　majority；　and　qualify　it　to　raise　its　voice　with　authority　against　their　errors　and　weaknesses。　These　conditions　evidently　are　not　found　in　a　body　constituted　in　the　manner　of　our　House　of　Lords。　So　soon　as　conventional　rank　and　individual　riches　no　longer　overawe　the　democracy；　a　House　of　Lords　becomes　insignificant。　　　Of　all　principles　on　which　a　wisely　conservative　body；　destined　to　moderate　and　regulate　democratic　ascendancy；　could　possibly　be　constructed；　the　best　seems　to　be　that　exemplified　in　the　Roman　Senate；　itself　the　most　consistently　prudent　and　sagacious　body　that　ever　administered　public　affairs。　The　deficiencies　of　a　democratic　assembly；　which　represents　the　general　public；　are　the　deficiencies　of　the　public　itself；　want　of　special　training　and　knowledge。　The　appropriate　corrective　is　to　associate　with　it　a　body　of　which　special　training　and　knowledge　should　be　the　characteristics。　If　one　House　represents　popular　feeling；　the　other　should　represent　personal　merit；　tested　and　guaranteed　by　actual　public　service；　and　fortified　by　practical　experience。　If　one　is　the　People's　Chamber；　the　other　should　be　the　Chamber　of　Statesmen；　a　council　composed　of　all　living　public　men　who　have　passed　through　important　political　offices　or　employments。　Such　a　Chamber　would　be　fitted　for　much　more　than　to　be　a　merely　moderating　body。　It　would　not　be　exclusively　a　check；　but　also　an　impelling　force。　In　its　hands　the　power　of　holding　the　people　back　would　be　vested　in　those　most　competent；　and　who　would　generally　be　most　inclined；　to　lead　them　forward　in　any　right　course。　The　council　to　whom　the　task　would　be　entrusted　of　rectifying　the　people's　mistakes　would　not　represent　a　class　believed　to　be　opposed　to　their　interest；　but　would　consist　of　their　own　natural　leaders　in　the　path　of　progress。　No　mode　of　composition　could　approach　to　this　in　giving　weight　and　efficacy　to　their　function　of　moderators。　It　would　be　impossible　to　cry　down　a　body　always　foremost　in　promoting　improvements　as　a　mere　obstructive　body；　whatever　amount　of　mischief　it　might　obstruct。　　　Were　the　place　vacant　in　England　for　such　a　Senate　（I　need　scarcely　say　that　this　is　a　mere　hypothesis）；　it　might　be　composed　of　some　such　elements　as　the　following。　All　who　were　or　had　been　members　of　the　Legislative　Commission　described　in　a　former　chapter；　and　which　I　regard　as　an　indispensable　ingredient　in　a　well…constituted　popular　government。　All　who　were　or　had　been　Chief　justices；　or　heads　of　any　of　the　superior　courts　of　law　or　equity。　All　who　had　for　five　years　filled　the　office　of　puisne　judge。　All　who　had　held　for　two　years　any　Cabinet　office：　but　these　should　also　be　eligible　to　the　House　of　Commons；　and　if　elected　members　of　it；　their　peerage　or　senatorial　office　should　be　held　in　suspense。　Th