ernal and sectional breach will； through absence of sufficient anxiety to preserve the union； be in danger of going so far as to dissolve it。 A third condition； not less important than the two others； is that there be not a very marked inequality of strength among the several contracting states。 They cannot； indeed； be exactly equal in resources： in all federations there will be a gradation of power among the members； some will be more populous； rich； and civilised than others。 There is a wide difference in wealth and population between New York and Rhode Island； between Bern and Zug or Glaris。 The essential is； that there should not be any one State so much more powerful than the rest as to be capable of vying in strength with many of them combined。 If there be such a one； and only one； it will insist on being master of the joint deliberations： if there be two； they will be irresistible when they agree； and whenever they differ everything will be decided by a struggle for ascendancy between the rivals。 This cause is alone enough to reduce the German Bund to almost a nullity； independently of its wretched internal constitution。 It effects none of the real purposes of a confederation。 It has never bestowed on Germany a uniform system of customs； nor so much as a uniform coinage； and has served only to give Austria and Prussia a legal right of pouring in their troops to assist the local sovereigns in keeping their subjects obedient to despotism： while in regard to external concerns； the Bund would make all Germany a dependency of Prussia if there were no Austria； and of Austria if there were no Prussia： and in the meantime each petty prince has little choice but to be a partisan of one or the other； or to intrigue with foreign governments against both。 There are two different modes of organising a Federal Union。 The federal authorities may represent the Governments solely； and their acts may be obligatory only on the Governments as such； or they may have the power of enacting laws and issuing orders which are binding directly on individual citizens。 The former is the plan of the German so…called Confederation； and of the Swiss Constitution previous to 1847。 It was tried in America for a few years immediately following the War of Independence。 The other principle is that of the existing Constitution of the United States； and has been adopted within the last dozen years by the Swiss Confederacy。 The Federal Congress of the American Union is a substantive part of the government of every individual State。 Within the limits of its attributions； it makes laws which are obeyed by every citizen individually； executes them through its own officers； and enforces them by its own tribunals。 This is the only principle which has been found； or which is ever likely； to produce an effective federal government。 A union between the governments only is a mere alliance； and subject to all the contingencies which render alliances precarious。 If the acts of the President and of Congress were binding solely on the Governments of New York； Virginia； or Pennsylvania； and could only be carried into effect through orders issued by those Governments to officers appointed by them； under responsibility to their own courts of justice no mandates of the Federal Government which were disagreeable to a local majority would ever be executed。 Requisitions issued to a government have no other sanction； or means of enforcement； than war： and a federal army would have to be always in readiness to enforce the decrees of the Federation against any recalcitrant State； subject to the probability that other States； sympathising with the recusant； and perhaps sharing its sentiments on the particular point in dispute； would withhold their contingents； if not send them to fight in the ranks of the disobedient State。 Such a federation is more likely to be a cause than a preventive of internal wars： and if such was not its effect in Switzerland until the events of the years immediately preceding 1847； it was only because the Federal Government felt its weakness so strongly that it hardly ever attempted to exercise any real authority。 In America； the experiment of a Federation on this principle broke down in the first few years of its existence； happily while the men of enlarged knowledge and acquired ascendancy； who founded the independence of the Republic； were still alive to guide it through the difficult transition。 The Federalist； a collection of papers by three of these eminent men； written in explanation and defence of the new Federal Constitution while still awaiting the national acceptance； is even now the most instructive treatise we possess on federal government。*
* Mr。 Freeman's History of Federal Governments； of which only the first volume has yet appeared； is already an accession to the literature of the subject； equally valuable by its enlightened principles and its mastery of historical details。
In Germany； the more imperfect kind of federation； as all know； has not even answered the purpose of maintaining an alliance。 It has never； in any European war； prevented single members of the Confederation from allying themselves with foreign powers against the rest。 Yet this is the only federation which seems possible among monarchical states。 A king； who holds his power by inheritance； not by delegation； and who cannot be deprived of it； nor made responsible to any one for its use； is not likely to renounce having a separate army； or to brook the exercise of sovereign authority over his own subjects； not through him but directly； by another power。 To enable two or more countries under kingly government to be joined together in an effectual confederation it seems necessary that they should all be under the same king。 England and Scotland were a federation of this description during the interval of about a century between the union of the Crowns and that of the Parliaments。 Even this was effective； not through federal institutions； for none existed； but because the regal power in both Constitutions was during the greater part of that time so nearly absolute as to enable the foreign policy of both to be shaped according to a single will。 Under the more perfect mode of federation； where every citizen of each particular State owes obedience to two Governments； that of his own state and that of the federation； it is evidently necessary not only that the constitutional limits of the authority of each should be precisely and clearly defined； but that the power to decide between them in any case of dispute should not reside in either of the Governments； or in any functionary subject to it； but in an umpire independent of both。 There must be a Supreme Court of justice； and a system of subordinate Courts in every State of the Union； before whom such questions shall be carried； and whose judgment on them； in the last stage of appeal； shall be final。 Every State of the Union； and the Federal Government itself； as well as every functionary of each； must be liable to be sued in those Courts for exceeding their powers； or for non…performance of their federal duties； and must in general be obliged to employ those Courts as the instrument for enforcing their federal rights。 This involves the remarkable consequence； actually realised in the United States； that a Court of justice； the highest federal tribunal； is supreme over the various Governments； both State and Federal； having the right to declare that any law made； or act done by them； exceeds the powers assigned to them by the Federal Constitution； and； in consequence； has no legal validity。 It was natural to feel strong doubts； before trial had been made； how such a provision would work； whether the tribunal would have the courage to exercise its constitutional power； if it did； whether it would exercise it wisely and whether the Governments would consent to submit peaceably to its decision。 The discussions on the American Constitution； before its final adoption； give evidence that these natural apprehensions were strongly felt； but they are now entirely quieted； since； during the two generations and more which have subsequently elapsed； nothing has occurred to verify them； though there have at times been disputes of considerable acrimony； and which became the badges of parties； respecting the limits of the authority of the Federal and State Governments。 The eminently beneficial working of so singular a provision is probably； as M。 de Tocqueville remarks； in a great measure attributable to the peculiarity inherent in a Court of justice acting as such… namely； that it does not declare the law eo nomine and in the abstract； but waits until a case between man and man is brought before it judicially involving the point in dispute： from which arises the happy effect that its declarations are not made in a very early stage of the controversy； that much popular discussion usually precedes them； that the Court decides after hearing the point fully argued on both sides by lawyers of reputation； decides only as much of the question at a time as is required by the case before it； and its decision； instead of being volunteered for political purposes； is drawn from it by the duty which it cannot refuse to fulfil； of dispensing justice impartially between adverse litigants。 Even these grounds of confidence would not have sufficed to produce the respectful submission with which all authorities have yielded to the decisions of the Supreme Court on the interpretation of the Constitution； were it not that complete reliance has been felt； not only on the intellectual pre…eminence of the judges composing that exalted tribunal； but on their entire superiority over either private or sectional partialities。 This reliance has been in the main justified； but there is nothing which more vitally imports the American people than to guard with the most watchful solicitude against everything which has the remotest tendency to produce deterioration in the quality of this great national institution。 The confidence on which depends the stability of federal institutions was for the first time impaired by the judgment declaring slavery to be of common right； and consequently lawful in the Territories while not yet constituted as States； even against the will of