es； different systems of jurisprudence； and fundamental institutions grounded on different principles； it is always practicable to reconcile minor diversities with the maintenance of unity of government。 All that is needful is to give a sufficiently large sphere of action to the local authorities。 Under one and the same central government there may be local governors； and provincial assemblies for local purposes。 It may happen； for instance； that the people of different provinces may have preferences in favour of different modes of taxation。 If the general legislature could not be depended on for being guided by the members for each province in modifying the general system of taxation to suit that province； the Constitution might provide that as many of the expenses of the government as could by any possibility be made local should be defrayed by local rates imposed by the provincial assemblies； and that those which must of necessity be general； such as the support of an army and navy； should； in the estimates for the year； be apportioned among the different provinces according to some general estimate of their resources； the amount assigned to each being levied by the local assembly on the principles most acceptable to the locality； and paid en bloc into the national treasury。 A practice approaching to this existed even in the old French monarchy； so far as regarded the pays d'etats； each of which； having consented or been required to furnish a fixed sum； was left to assess it upon the inhabitants by its own officers； thus escaping the grinding despotism of the royal intendants and subdelegues； and this privilege is always mentioned as one of the advantages which mainly contributed to render them； as some of them were； the most flourishing provinces of France。 Identity of central government is compatible with many different degrees of centralisation； not only administrative； but even legislative。 A people may have the desire； and the capacity； for a closer union than one merely federal； while yet their local peculiarities and antecedents render considerable diversities desirable in the details of their government。 But if there is a real desire on all hands to make the experiment successful； there needs seldom be any difficulty in not only preserving these diversities； but giving them the guarantee of a constitutional provision against any attempt at assimilation； except by the voluntary act of those who would be affected by the change。 Chapter 18 Of the Government of Dependencies by a Free State。
FREE STATES； like all others； may possess dependencies； acquired either by conquest or by colonisation； and our own is the greatest instance of the kind in modern history。 It is a most important question how such dependencies ought to be governed。 It is unnecessary to discuss the case of small posts； like Gibraltar； Aden； or Heligoland； which are held only as naval or military positions。 The military or naval object is in this case paramount； and the inhabitants cannot； consistently with it； be admitted to the government of the place； though they ought to be allowed all liberties and privileges compatible with that restriction； including the free management of municipal affairs； and as a compensation for being locally sacrificed to the convenience of the governing State； should be admitted to equal rights with its native subjects in all other parts of the empire。 Outlying territories of some size and population； which are held as dependencies； that is； which are subject； more or less； to acts of sovereign power on the part of the paramount country； without being equally represented （if represented at all） in its legislature； may be divided into two classes。 Some are composed of people of similar civilisation to the ruling country； capable of； and ripe for； representative government： such as the British possessions in America and Australia。 Others； like India； are still at a great distance from that state。 In the case of dependencies of the former class； this country has at length realised； in rare completeness； the true principle of government。 England has always felt under a certain degree of obligation to bestow on such of her outlying populations as were of her own blood and language； and on some who were not； representative institutions formed in imitation of her own： but until the present generation； she has been on the same bad level with other countries as to the amount of self…government which she allowed them to exercise through the representative institutions that she conceded to them。 She claimed to be the supreme arbiter even of their purely internal concerns； according to her own； not their； ideas of how those concerns could be best regulated。 This practice was a natural corollary from the vicious theory of colonial policy… once common to all Europe； and not yet completely relinquished by any other people… which regarded colonies as valuable by affording markets for our commodities； that could be kept entirely to ourselves： a privilege we valued so highly that we thought it worth purchasing by allowing to the colonies the same monopoly of our market for their own productions which we claimed for our commodities in theirs。 This notable plan for enriching them and ourselves； by making each pay enormous sums to the other； dropping the greatest part by the way； has been for some time abandoned。 But the bad habit of meddling in the internal government of the colonies did not at once terminate when we relinquished the idea of making any profit by it。 We continued to torment them； not for any benefit to ourselves； but for that of a section or faction among the colonists： and this persistence in domineering cost us a Canadian rebellion before we had the happy thought of giving it up。 England was like an ill…brought…up elder brother； who persists in tyrannising over the younger ones from mere habit； till one of them； by a spirited resistance； though with unequal strength； gives him notice to desist。 We were wise enough not to require a second warning。 A new era in the colonial policy of nations began with Lord Durham's Report； the imperishable memorial of that nobleman's courage； patriotism； and enlightened liberality； and of the intellect and practical sagacity of its joint authors； Mr。 Wakefield and the lamented Charles Buller。*
* I am speaking here of the adoption of this improved policy； not； of course； of its original suggestion。 The honour of having been its earliest champion belongs unquestionably to Mr。 Roebuck。
It is now a fixed principle of the policy of Great Britain； professed in theory and faithfully adhered to in practice； that her colonies of European race； equally with the parent country； possess the fullest measure of internal self…government。 They have been allowed to make their own free representative constitutions by altering in any manner they thought fit the already very popular constitutions which we had given them。 Each is governed by its own legislature and executive； constituted on highly democratic principles。 The veto of the Crown and of Parliament； though nominally reserved； is only exercised （and that very rarely） on questions which concern the empire； and not solely the particular colony。 How liberal a construction has been given to the distinction between imperial and colonial questions is shown by the fact that the whole of the unappropriated lands in the regions behind our American and Australian colonies have been given up to the uncontrolled disposal of the colonial communities； though they might； without injustice； have been kept in the hands of the Imperial Government； to be administered for the greatest advantage of future emigrants from all parts of the empire。 Every colony has thus as full power over its own affairs as it could have if it were a member of even the loosest federation； and much fuller than would belong to it under the Constitution of the United States； being free even to tax at its pleasure the commodities imported from the mother country。 Their union with Great Britain is the slightest kind of federal union； but not a strictly equal federation； the mother country retaining to itself the powers of a Federal Government； though reduced in practice to their very narrowest limits。 This inequality is； of course； as far as it goes； a disadvantage to the dependencies； which have no voice in foreign policy； but are bound by the decisions of the superior country。 They are compelled to join England in war； without being in any way consulted previous to engaging in it。 Those （now happily not a few） who think that justice is as binding on communities as it is on individuals； and that men are not warranted in doing to other countries； for the supposed benefit of their own country； what they would not be justified in doing to other men for their own benefit… feel even this limited amount of constitutional subordination on the part of the colonies to be a violation of principle； and have often occupied themselves in looking out for means by which it may be avoided。 With this view it has been proposed by some that the colonies should return representatives to the British legislature； and by others； that the powers of our own； as well as of their Parliaments； should be confined to internal policy； and that there should be another representative body for foreign and imperial concerns； in which last the dependencies of Great Britain should be represented in the same manner； and with the same completeness； as Great Britain itself。 On this system there would be perfectly equal federation between the mother country and her colonies； then no longer dependencies。 The feelings of equity； and conceptions of public morality； from which these suggestions emanate； are worthy of all praise； but the suggestions themselves are so inconsistent with rational principles of government that it is doubtful if they have been seriously accepted as a possibility by any reasonable thinker。 Countries separated by half the globe do not present the natural conditions for being under one government； or even members of one federation。 If they had sufficiently the same interests； they have not； and never can have； a sufficient habit of taking counsel together。 They are not par