ublicity which allows observation and criticism of whatever is amiss； the liberty of discussion and censure through the press； the mode of taking evidence； according as it is well or ill adapted to elicit truth； the facilities； whatever be their amount； for obtaining access to the tribunals； the arrangements for detecting crimes and apprehending offenders；… all
these things are not the power； but the machinery for bringing the power into contact with the obstacle： and the machinery has no action of itself； but without it the power； let it be ever so ample； would be wasted and of no effect。 A similar distinction exists in regard to the constitution of the executive departments of administration。 Their machinery is good； when the proper tests are prescribed for the qualifications of officers； the proper rules for their promotion； when the business is conveniently distributed among those who are to transact it； a convenient and methodical order established for its transaction； a correct and intelligible record kept of it after being transacted； when each individual knows for what he is responsible； and is known to others as responsible for it； when the best…contrived checks are provided against negligence； favouritism； or jobbery； in any of the acts of the department。 But political checks will no more act of themselves than a bridle will direct a horse without a rider。 If the checking functionaries are as corrupt or as negligent as those whom they ought to check； and if the public； the mainspring of the whole checking machinery； are too ignorant； too passive； or too careless and inattentive； to do their part； little benefit will be derived from the best administrative apparatus。 Yet a good apparatus is always preferable to a bad。 It enables such insufficient moving or checking power as exists to act at the greatest advantage； and without it； no amount of moving or checking power would be sufficient。 Publicity； for instance； is no impediment to evil nor stimulus to good if the public will not look at what is done； but without publicity； how could they either check or encourage what they were not permitted to see？ The ideally perfect constitution of a public office is that in which the interest of the functionary is entirely coincident with his duty。 No mere system will make it so； but still less can it be made so without a system； aptly devised for the purpose。 What we have said of the arrangements for the detailed administration of the government is still more evidently true of its general constitution。 All government which aims at being good is an organisation of some part of the good qualities existing in the individual members of the community for the conduct of its collective affairs。 A representative constitution is a means of bringing the general standard of intelligence and honesty existing in the community； and the individual intellect and virtue of its wisest members； more directly to bear upon the government； and investing them with greater influence in it； than they would in general have under any other mode of organisation； though； under any； such influence as they do have is the source of all good that there is in the government； and the hindrance of every evil that there is not。 The greater the amount of these good qualities which the institutions of a country succeed in organising； and the better the mode of organisation； the better will be the government。 We have now； therefore； obtained a foundation for a twofold division of the merit which any set of political institutions can possess。 It consists partly of the degree in which they promote the general mental advancement of the community； including under that phrase advancement in intellect； in virtue； and in practical activity and efficiency； and partly of the degree of perfection with which they organise the moral； intellectual； and active worth already existing； so as to operate with the greatest effect on public affairs。 A government is to be judged by its action upon men； and by its action upon things； by what it makes of the citizens； and what it does with them； its tendency to improve or deteriorate the people themselves； and the goodness or badness of the work it performs for them； and by means of them。 Government is at once a great influence acting on the human mind； and a set of organised arrangements for public business： in the first capacity its beneficial action is chiefly indirect； but not therefore less vital； while its mischievous action may be direct。 The difference between these two functions of a government is not； like that between Order and Progress； a difference merely in degree； but in kind。 We must not； however； suppose that they have no intimate connection with one another。 The institutions which ensure the best management of public affairs practicable in the existing state of cultivation tend by this alone to the further improvement of that state。 A people which had the most just laws； the purest and most efficient judicature； the most enlightened administration； the most equitable and least onerous system of finance； compatible with the stage it had attained in moral and intellectual advancement； would be in a fair way to pass rapidly into a higher stage。 Nor is there any mode in which political institutions can contribute more effectually to the improvement of the people than by doing their more direct work well。 And； reversely； if their machinery is so badly constructed that they do their own particular business ill； the effect is felt in a thousand ways in lowering the morality and deadening the intelligence and activity of the people。 But the distinction is nevertheless real； because this is only one of the means by which political institutions improve or deteriorate the human mind； and the causes and modes of that beneficial or injurious influence remain a distinct and much wider subject of study。 Of the two modes of operation by which a form of government or set of political institutions affects the welfare of the community… its operation as an agency of national education； and its arrangements for conducting the collective affairs of the community in the state of education in which they already are； the last evidently varies much less； from difference of country and state of civilisation； than the first。 It has also much less to do with the fundamental constitution of the government。 The mode of conducting the practical business of government； which is best under a free constitution； would generally be best also in an absolute monarchy： only an absolute monarchy is not so likely to practise it。 The laws of property； for example； the principles of evidence and judicial procedure； the system of taxation and of financial administration； need not necessarily be different in different forms of government。 Each of these matters has principles and rules of its own； which are a subject of separate study。 General jurisprudence； civil and penal legislation； financial and commercial policy； are sciences in themselves； or rather； separate members of the comprehensive science or art of government： and the most enlightened doctrines on all these subjects； though not equally likely to be understood； or acted on under all forms of government； yet； if understood and acted on； would in general be equally beneficial under them all。 It is true that these doctrines could not be applied without some modifications to all states of society and of the human mind： nevertheless； by far the greater number of them would require modifications solely of details； to adapt them to any state of society sufficiently advanced to possess rulers capable of understanding them。 A government to which they would be wholly unsuitable must be one so bad in itself； or so opposed to public feeling； as to be unable to maintain itself in existence by honest means。 It is otherwise with that portion of the interests of the community which relate to the better or worse training of the people themselves。 Considered as instrumental to this； institutions need to be radically different； according to the stage of advancement already reached。 The recognition of this truth； though for the most part empirically rather than philosophically； may be regarded as the main point of superiority in the political theories of the present above those of the last age； in which it customary to claim representative democracy for England or France by arguments which would equally have proved it the only fit form of government for Bedouins or Malays。 The state of different communities； in point of culture and development； ranges downwards to a condition very little above the highest of the beasts。 The upward range； too； is considerable； and the future possible extension vastly greater。 A community can only be developed out of one of these states into a higher by a concourse of influences； among the principal of which is the government to which they are subject。 In all states of human improvement ever yet attained； the nature and degree of authority exercised over individuals； the distribution of power； and the conditions of command and obedience； are the most powerful of the influences； except their religious belief； which make them what they are； and enable them to become what they can be。 They may be stopped short at any point in their progress by defective adaptation of their government to that particular stage of advancement。 And the one indispensable merit of a government； in favour of which it may be forgiven almost any amount of other demerit compatible with progress； is that its operation on the people is favourable； or not unfavourable； to the next step which it is necessary for them to take； in order to raise themselves to a higher level。 Thus （to repeat a former example）； a people in a state of savage independence； in which every one lives for himself； exempt； unless by fits； from any external control； is practically incapable of making any progress in civilisation until it has learnt to obey。 The indispensable virtue； therefore； in a government which establishes itself over a people of this sort is； that it make itself obeyed。 To enable it to do this； the constitution of the government must be nearly； or quite； despotic。 A constitution in any degree popular； dependent on the voluntary surre