takes up towards this otherness a perfectly free and detached attitude； and the existence of this
other is； therefore； an existence completely set free from self…consciousness； and in like manner
relating itself merely to itself。 The freer self…consciousness becomes； the freer also is the negative
object of its consciousness。 The object is thus a complete world within itself； with an individuality
of its own； an independent whole of laws peculiar to itself； as well as an independent procedure
and an unfettered active realization of those laws。 It is a nature in general； a nature whose laws
and also whose action belong to itself as a being which is not disturbed about the moral
self…consciousness； just as the latter is not troubled about it。
Starting with a specific character of this sort； there is formed and established a moral outlook on
the world which consists in a process of relating the implicit aspect of morality （moralisches
Ansichseyn） and the explicit aspect （moralisches Fürsichseyn）。 This relation presupposes both
thorough reciprocal indifference and specific independence as between nature and moral purposes
and activity； and also； on the other side； a conscious sense of duty as the sole essential fact； and of
nature as entirely devoid of independence and essential significance of its own。 The moral view of
the world； the moral attitude； consists in the development of the moments which are found present
in this relation of such entirely antithetic and conflicting presuppositions。
To begin with； then； the moral consciousness in general is presupposed。 It takes duty to be the
essential reality： itself is actual and active； and in its actuality and action fulfils duty。 But this moral
consciousness； at the same time； finds before it the assumed freedom of nature： it learns by
experience that nature is not concerned about giving consciousness a sense of the unity of its
reality with that of nature； and hence discovers that nature may let it become happy； but perhaps
also may not。 The non…moral consciousness on the other hand finds； by chance perhaps； its
realization where the moral consciousness sees merely an occasion for acting； but does not see
itself obtaining through its action the happiness of performance and of the enjoyment of
achievement。 It therefore finds reason for bewailing a situation where there is no correspondence
between itself and existence； and lamenting the injustice which confines it to having its object
merely in the form of pure duty； but refuses to let it see this object and itself actually realized。
The moral consciousness cannot renounce happiness and drop this element out of its absolute
purpose。 The purpose； which is expressed as pure duty；。 essentially implies retention of individual
self…consciousness and maintenance of its claims。 Individual conviction and knowledge thereof
constituted a fundamental element in morality。 This moment in the objectified purpose； in duty
fulfilled； is the individual consciousness seeing itself as actually realized。 In other words； this
moment is that of enjoyment； which thus lies in the very principle of morality； not indeed of
morality immediately in the sense of a frame of mind； but in the principle of the actualization of
morality。 Owing to this； however； enjoyment is also involved in morality； as a mood； for morality
seeks； not to remain a frame of mind as opposed to action； but to act or realize itself。 Thus the
purpose； expressed as a whole along with the consciousness of its elements or moments； is that
duty fulfilled shall be both a purely moral act and a realized individuality； and that nature； the
aspect of individuality in contrast with abstract purpose； shall be one with this purpose。
While experience must necessarily bring to light the disharmony between the two aspects； seeing
that nature is detached and free nevertheless duty is alone the essential fact and nature by contrast
is devoid of self…hood。 That purpose in its entirety； which the harmony of the two constitutes；
contains within it actuality itself。 It is； at the same time； the thought of actuality。 The harmony of
morality and nature； or…seeing that nature is taken account of merely so far as consciousness finds
out nature's unity with it — the harmony of morality and happiness； is thought of as necessarily
existing； it is postulated。 For to postulate or demand means that something is thought as being
which is not yet actual — a necessity affecting； not the conception qua conception； but existence。
But necessity is at the same time essentially relation through the conception。 The postulated
existence thus is not something that concerns the imagination of some chance individual
consciousness； but is implied in the very notion of morality itself； whose true content is the unity of
pure with individual consciousness。 It falls to the individual consciousness to see that this unity is；
for it； an actuality： — which means happiness as regards the content of the purpose； and existence
in general as regards its form。 The existence thus demanded…the unity of both — is therefore not a
wish； nor； looked at qua purpose； is it of such a kind as to be still uncertain of attainment； the
purpose is rather a demand of reason； or an immediate certainty and presupposition of reason。
The first experience above referred to and this postulate are not the only experience and postulate；
a whole round of postulates comes to light。 For nature is not merely this completely free external
mode in which； as a bare pure object； consciousness has to realize its purpose。 Consciousness is
per se essentially something for which this other detached reality exists； i。e。 it is itself something
contingent and natural。 This nature； which is properly its own； is sensibility； which； taking the form
of volition； in the shape of Impulses and Inclinations； has by itself a determinate essential being of
its own； i。e。 has specific single purposes； and thus is opposed to pure will with its pure purpose。 In
contrast with this opposition； however； pure consciousness rather takes the relation of sensibility to
it； the absolute unity of sensibility with it； to be the essential fact。 Both of these； pure thought and
sensibility； are essentially and inherently one consciousness； and pure thought is just that for which
and in which this pure unity exists； but for it qua consciousness the opposition between itself and
its impulses holds。 In this conflict between reason and sensibility； the essential thing for reason is
that the conflict should be resolved； and that the unity of both should come out as a result： not the
original unity which consisted in both the opposites being in one individual； but a unity which arises
out of the known opposition of the two。 So attained； such a unity is then actual morality； for in it is
contained the opposition through which the self is a consciousness； or first becomes concrete and
in actual fact self； and at the same time universal。 In other words； we find there expressed that
process of mediation which； as we see； is essential to morality。
Since； of the two factors in opposition； sensibility is otherness out and out； is the negative； while；
on the other hand； pure thought of duty is the ultimate essence which cannot possibly be
surrendered in any respect； it seems as if the unity produced can be brought about only by doing
away with sensibility。 But since sensibility is itself a moment of this process of producing the unity；
is the moment of actuality； we have； in the first instance； to be content to express the unity in this
form — sensibility should be in conformity with morality。
This unity is likewise a postulated existence； it is not there as a fact； for what is there is
consciousness； or the opposition of sensibility and pure consciousness。 All the same； the unity is
not a something per se like the first postulate； in which free external nature constitutes an aspect
and the harmony of nature with moral consciousness in consequence falls outside the latter。
Rather； nature is here that which lies within consciousness； and we have here to deal with morality
（Moralit？t） as such； with a harmony which is the active self's very own。 Consciousness has；
therefore； of itself to bring about this harmonious unity； and 〃to be always making progress in
morality〃。 The completion of this result； however； has to be pushed away into the remote infinite；
because if it actually entered the life of consciousness as an actual fact； the moral consciousness
would be done away with。 For morality is only moral consciousness qua negative force； sensibility
has merely a negative significance for the consciousness of pure duty； it is something merely 〃not in
conformity with〃 duty。 By attaining that harmony； however； morality qua consciousness； i。e。 its
actuality； passes away； just as in the moral consciousness or actuality its harmony vanishes。 The
completion is； therefore； not to be reached as an actual fact； it is to be thought of merely as an
absolute task or problem； i。e。 one which remains a problem pure and simple。 Nevertheless； its
content has to be thought as something which unquestionably has to be； and must not remain a
problem： whether we imagine the moral consciousness quite cancelled in the attainment of this
goal； or riot。 Which of these exactly is the case； can no longer be clearly distinguished in the dim
distance of infinitude； to which the attainment of the end has to be postponed； just because we
cannot decide the point。 We shall be； strictly speaking； bound to say that a definite idea on the
matter ought to be of no interest and ought not to be sought for； because this leads to
contradictions — the contradiction involved in an undertaking that at once ought to remain an
undertaking and yet ought to be carried out； and the conttradiction involved in the morality which
is to be no longer consciousness； i。e。 no longer actual。 By adopting the view； however； that
morality when completed would contain a contradiction； the sacredness of moral truth would be
seriously affected； and the unconditional duty would appear something unreal。
The first postulate was the harmony of morality and objective nature…the fi