seriously affected； and the unconditional duty would appear something unreal。
The first postulate was the harmony of morality and objective nature…the final purpose of the
world： the other was the harmony of morality and will in its sensuous form； in the form if impulse；
etc。…the final purpose of self…consciousness as such。 The former is the harmony in the form of
implicit immanent existence； the latter； the harmony in the form of explicit self…existence。 That；
however； which connects these two extreme final purposes which are thought； and operates as
their mediating ground； is the process of concrete action itself。 They are harmonies whose
moments have not yet become definitely objective in their abstract distinctiveness from each other：
this takes place in concrete actuality； in which the aspects appear in consciousness proper； each as
the other of the other。 The postulates arising by this means contain harmonies which are now both
immanent and self…existent； whereas formerly they were postulated merely separately； the one
being the immanent harmony； the other self…existent。
The moral consciousness； qua simple knowledge and willing of pure duty； is brought； by the
process of acting； into relation with an object opposed to that abstract simplicity； into relation with
the manifold actuality which various cases present； and thereby assumes a moral attitude varied
and manifold in character。 Hence arise； on the side of content； the plurality of laws generally； and；
on the side of form； the contradictory powers of intelligent knowing consciousness and of a being
devoid of consciousness。
To begin with； as regards the plurality of duties； it is merely the aspect of pure or bare duty in them
which the moral consciousness in general recognizes as having validity： the many duties qua many
are determinate and； therefore； are not； as such； anything sacred for the moral consciousness。 At
the same time； however； being necessary； in virtue of the notion of action which implicates a
manifold actuality； and hence manifold types of moral attitude； those many duties must be looked
on as having a substantial existence and value。 Furthermore； since they can only exist in a moral
consciousness； they exist at the same time in another consciousness than that for which only pure
duty qua pure duty is sacred and substantial。
It is thus postulated that there is another consciousness which renders them sacred； or which
knows them as duties and wills them so。 The first maintains pure duty indifferent towards all
specific content； and duty consists merely in being thus indifferent towards it。 The other； however；
contains the equally essential relation to the process of action； and the necessity； therefore； of
determinate content： since duties for this other mean determinate duties； the content is thus； for it；
just as essential as the form in virtue of which the content is a duty at all。 This consciousness is；
consequently； such that in it the universal and the particular are； through and through； one； its
essential principle is thus the same as that of the harmony of morality and happiness。 For this
opposition between morality and happiness expresses in like manner the separation of the
self…identical moral consciousness from that actuality which； qua manifold existence； opposes and
conflicts with the simple nature of duty。 While； however； the first postulate expresses merely the
objective existential harmony between morality and nature； because nature is therein the negative
of self…consciousness； is the moment of existence； this inherent harmony； on the other hand is now
affirmed essentially as a type of consciousness。 For existence now appears as the content of duty；
as that in the determinate duty which gives it specific determinateness。 The immanent harmony is
thus the unity of elements which； qua simple ultimate elements； are essentially thought…created； and
hence cannot exist except in a consciousness。 This latter becomes now a master and ruler of the
world； who brings about the harmony of morality and happiness； and at the same time sanctifies
duties in their Multiplicity。 To sanctify these duties means this much； that the consciousness of pure
duty cannot straight…way and directly accept the determinate or specific duty as sacred； but
because a specific duty； owing to the nature of concrete action which is something specific and
definite； is likewise necessary； its necessity falls outside that consciousness and holds inside
another consciousness； which thus mediates or connects determinate and pure duty； and is the
reason why that specific duty also has validity。
（2） The Divine Lawgiver and the Imperfect Moral Consciousness
In the concrete act； however； consciousness proceeds to work as this particular self； as
completely individual： it directs its activity on actual reality as such； and takes this as its purpose；
for it wants to perform something definite。 〃Duty in general〃 thus falls outside it and within another
being； which is a consciousness and the sacred lawgiver of pure duty。 The consciousness which
acts； just because it acts； accepts the other consciousness； that of pure duty； and admits its validity
immediately； this pure duty is thus a content of another consciousness； and is only indirectly or in a
mediate way sacred for the active consciousness； viz。 in virtue of this other consciousness。
Because it is established in this manner that the validity； the bindingness； of duty as something
wholly and absolutely sacred； falls outside the actual consciousness； this latter thereby stands
altogether on one side as the incomplete moral consciousness。 Just as； in regard to its knowledge；
it is aware of itself as that whose knowledge and conviction are incomplete and contingent； in the
same way； as regards its willing； it feels itself to be that whose purposes are affected with
sensibility。 On account of its 〃unworthiness〃； therefore； it cannot look on happiness as something
necessary； but as a something contingent； and can only expect happiness as the result of 〃grace〃。
But though its actuality is incomplete； duty is still； so far as its pure will and knowledge are
concerned； held to be the essential truth。 In principle； therefore； so far as the notion is opposed to
actual reality； in other words； in thought； it is perfect。 The absolute Being ＇God＇ is； however； just
this object of thought； and is something postulated beyond the actual。 It is therefore the thought in
which the morally imperfect knowledge and will are held to be perfect； and the Absolute； since it
takes this imperfection to have full weight； distributes happiness according to 〃worthiness〃； i。e。
according to the 〃merit〃 ascribed to the imperfect consciousness。
（3） The Moral World as a Presented Idea
This completes the meaning of the moral attitude。 For in the conception of moral
self…consciousness the two aspects； pure duty and actual reality； are affirmed of a single unity； and
thereby the one； like the other； is put forward； not as something self…complete； but as a moment；
or as cancelled and transcended。 This becomes consciously explicit in the last phase of the moral
attitude or point of view。 Consciousness； we there saw； places pure duty in another form of being
than its own consciousness； i。e。 it regards pure duty partly as something ideally presented； partly
as what does not by itself hold good — indeed； the non…moral is rather what is held to be perfect。
In the same way it affirms itself to be that whose actuality； not being in conformity with duty； is
transcended； and； qua transcended； or in the idea of the Absolute ＇God's view＇； no longer
contradicts morality。
For the moral consciousness itself； however； its moral attitude does not mean that consciousness
therein develops its own proper notion and makes this its object。 It has no consciousness of this
opposition either as regards the form or the content thereof； the elements composing this
opposition it does not relate and compare with one another； but goes forward on its own course
of development； without being the connecting principle of those moments。 For it is only aware of
the essence pure and simple； i。e。 the object so far as this is duty； so far as this is an abstract object
of its pure consciousness — in other words； it is only aware of this object as pure knowledge or as
itself。 Its procedure is thus merely that of thinking； not conceiving； is by way of thoughts not
notions。 Consequently it does not yet find the object of its actual consciousness transparently clear
to itself； it is not the absolute notion； which alone grasps otherness as such； its absolute opposite；
as its very self。 Its own reality； as well as all objective reality； no doubt is held to be something
unessential； but its freedom is that of pure thought； in opposition to which； therefore； nature has
likewise arisen as something equally free。 Because both are found in like manner within it…both the
freedom which belongs to ＇external＇ being and the inclusion of this existence within consciousness
— its object comes to be an existing object； which is at the same time merely a thought…product。 In
the last phase of its attitude or point of view； the content is essentially so affirmed that its being has
the character of something presented； and this union of being and thinking is expressed as what in
fact it is； viz。…Imagining （Vorstellen）。
When we look at the moral view of the world and see that this objective condition is nothing else
than the very principle or notion of moral self…consciousness which it makes objective to itself；
there arises through this consciousness concerning the form of its origin another mode of exhibiting
this view of the world。
The first stage； which forms the starting…point； is the actual moral self…consciousness； or is the fact
that there is such a self…consciousness at all。 For the notion establishes moral self…consciousness in
the form that； for it； all reality in general has essential being only so far as such reality is in
conformity with duty； and that notion establishes this essential element as knowledge； i。e。 in
immediate unity with the actual self。 This unity is t