immediate unity with the actual self。 This unity is thus itself actual； is a moral actual consciousness。
The latter； now； qua consciousness； pictures its content to itself as an object； viz。 as the final
purpose of the world； as the harmony of morality with all reality。 Since； however； it pictures this
unity as object and is not yet the complete notion； which has mastery over the object as such； this
unity is taken to be something negative of self…consciousness； i。e。 the unity falls outside it； as
something beyond its actual reality； but at the same time of such a nature as to be also existent；
though merely thought of。
This self…consciousness； which； qua self…consciousness； is something other than the object； thus
finds itself left with the want of harmony between the consciousness of duty and actual reality； and
indeed its own reality。 The proposition consequently now runs thus： 〃there is no morally complete
actual self…consciousness〃； and； since what is moral only is at all so far as it is complete； — for duty
is the pure unadulterated ultimate element （Ansich）； and morality consists merely in conformity to
this pure principle — the second proposition runs： 〃there is no actual existence which is moral〃。
Since； however； in the third place； it is a self； it is inherently the unity of duty and actual reality。 This
unity thus becomes its object； as completed morality — but as something beyond its actual reality；
and yet a 〃beyond〃 which still ought to be real。
In this final goal or aim of the synthetic unity of the two first propositions； the self…conscious
actuality； as well as duty； is only affirmed as a transcended or superseded moment。 For neither of
them is alone； neither is isolated； on the contrary； these factors； whose essential characteristic lies
in being free from one another； are thus each in that unity no longer free from the other； each is
transcended。 Hence； as regards content； they become； as such； object； each of them holds good
for the other； and； as regards form； they become object in suchwise that this reciprocal
interchange is； at the same time； merely pictured — a mere idea。 Or； again； the actually non…moral；
because it is； at the same time； pure thought and elevated above its own actual reality； is in idea
still moral； and is taken to be entirely valid。 In this way the first proposition； that there is a moral
self…consciousness； is reinstated； but bound up with the second that there is none； that is to say；
there is one； but merely in idea。 In other words； there is indeed none； but it is all the same allowed
by some other consciousness to pass for one。
1。 i。e。 there is not the opposition of an object to subject which consciousness requires。
b
Dissemblance （1）
IN the moral attitude of experience we see； on one side； consciousness itself produce its object in
a conscious way。 We find that neither does it pick up the object as something external； nor does
the object come before it in an unconscious manner。 Rather； consciousness throughout proceeds
on an explicit ground； and from this establishes the objective reality。 It thus knows this objective
reality to be itself； for it is aware of itself as the active agent producing this object。 It seems； in
consequence； to attain here its peace and satisfaction； for this can only be found where it does not
need to go any more beyond its object； because this object no longer goes beyond it。 On the
other side； however； it really puts the object away outside itself； as something beyond itself。 But
this latter self…contained entity is at the same time put there as something that is not； free from
self…consciousness； but really there on behalf of and by means of it。
（1） The Contradictions in the Moral View of the World
The moral attitude is； therefore； in fact nothing else than the developed expression of this
fundamental contradiction in its various aspects。 It isto use a Kantian phrase which is here most
appropriated 〃perfect nest〃 of thoughtless contradictions。（2） Consciousness； in developing this
situation； proceeds by fixing definitely one moment； passing thence immediately over to another
and doing away with the first。 But； as soon as it has now set up this second moment； it also 〃shifts〃
（verstellt） this again； and really makes the opposite the essential element。 At the same time； it is
conscious of its contradiction and of its shuffling； for it passes from one moment； immediately in its
relation to this very moment； right over to the opposite。 Because a moment has for it no reality at
all； it affirms that very moment as real： or； what comes to the same thing； in order to assert one
moment as per se existent； it asserts the opposite as the per se； existent。 It thereby confesses that；
as a matter of fact； it is in earnest about neither of them。 The various moments of this vertiginous
fraudulent process we must look at more closely。
Let us； to begin with； agree to accept the assumption that there is an actual moral consciousness；
because the assumption is made directly and not with reference to something preceding； and let us
turn to the harmony of morality and naturethe first postulate。 It is to be immanent； not explicitly
for actual conscious life； not really present； the present is rather simply the contradiction between
the two。 In the present； morality is taken to be something at hand； and actual reality to be so
situated or 〃placed〃 that it is not in harmony with morality。 The concrete moral consciousness；
however； is an active one； that is precisely what constitutes the actuality of its morality。 In the very
process of acting； however； that 〃Place〃 or semblance is immediately 〃displaced〃； is dissembled；
for action is nothing else than the actualization of the inner moral purpose； nothing but the
production of an actuality constituted and determined by the purpose； in other words； the
production of the harmony of moral purpose and reality itself。 At the same time the performance of
the action is a conscious fact； it is the 〃presence〃 of this unity of reality and purpose； and because
in the completed act consciousness realizes itself as a given individual consciousness； or sees
existence returned into itselfand in this consists the nature of enjoymentthere is； eo ipso；
contained in the realization of moral purpose also that form of its realization which is called
enjoyment and happiness。
Action thus； as a fact； fulfils directly what it was assorted could not take place at all； fulfils what
was to be merely a postulate； was to lie merely 〃beyond〃。 Consciousness； therefore； expresses
through its deed that it is not in earnest in making the postulate； since the meaning of acting is really
that it makes a present fact of what was not to be in the present。 And； since the harmony is
postulated for the sake of the actionfor what is to become actual through action must be implicit；
otherwise the actuality would not be possiblethe connexion of action with the postulate is so
constituted that； for the sake of the action； i。e。 for the sake of the actual harmony of purpose
and reality； this harmony is put forward as not actual； as far away； as 〃beyond〃。
In that action takes place； the want of adaptation between purpose and reality is thus not taken
seriously at all。 Action itself； on the other hand； does seem to be taken seriously。 But； as a matter
of fact； the actual deed done is only the action of an individual consciousness； and so is itself
merely something individual； and the result contingent。 The end of reason； however； being the
all…comprehensive universal end； is nothing short of the entire worlda final purpose which goes
far beyond the content of this individual act； and therefore is to be placed altogether beyond
anything actually done。 Because the universal best ought to be carried out； nothing good is done。
In point of fact； however； the nothingness of actual action and the reality of the entire purpose
alone； which are here upheldthese are on all hands again 〃shifted〃 or dissembled。 The moral act
is not something contingent and restricted； its essential nature lies in pure duty。 This pure duty
constitutes the sole entire purpose； and the act； whatever may be the limitation of the content；
being the actualization of that purpose； is the accomplishment of the entire absolute purpose。 Or； if
again we take the reality in the sense of nature； which has laws of its own and stands over against
pure duty； and take it in such a way that duty cannot realize its law within nature； then； since duty
as such is the essential element； we are； when acting； not in fact concerned about the
accomplishment of pure duty which is the whole purpose； for the accomplishment would then
rather have as its end not pure duty； but the opposite； viz。 reality。 But there is again a 〃shifting〃
from the position that it is not reality with which we have to do。 For by the very notion of moral
action； pure duty is essentially an active consciousness。 Action thus ought certainly to take place；
absolute duty ought to be expressed in the whole of nature； and 〃moral law〃 to become 〃natural
law〃。
If； then； we allow this highest good to stand for the essentially real； consciousness is altogether not
in earnest with morality。 For； in this highest good； nature has not a different law from what morality
has。 Moral action itself； in consequence； drops； for action takes place only under the assumption
of a negative element which is to be cancelled by means of the act。 But if nature conforms to the
moral law； then assuredly this moral law would be violated by acting； by cancelling what already
exists。
On that mode of interpretation； then； there has been admitted as the essential situation one which
renders moral action superfluous and in which moral action does not take place at all。 Hence the
postulate of the harmony between morality and realitya harmony posited by the very notion of
moral action； which means bringing the two into agreementfinds on this view； too； an expression
which takes the form：〃because moral action is the absolute purpose； the absolute purpose
isthat moral action do not take pl