existence is object for consciousness； the truth is not given in and itself。 If； however； the law does
not have its truth for in the notion； it is something contingent； not a necessity； in fact； not a law。 But
its being essentially in the form of a notion does not merely not contradict its being present for
observation to deal with； but really gives it on that account necessary existence； and makes it an
object for observation。 The universal in the sense of a rational universality is also universal in the
sense implied in the above notion： its being is for consciousness； it presents itself there as the real；
the objective present； the notion sets itself forth in the form of thinghood and sensuous existence。
But it does not； on that account； lose its nature and fall into the condition of immovable subsisting
passivity； or mere adventitious （gleichgültig） succession。 What is universally valid is also
universally effective： what ought to be； as a matter of fact； is too； and what merely should be； and
is not； has no real truth。 The instinct of reason is entirely within its rights when it stands firm on this
point； and refuses to be led astray by entia intellectus which merely ought to be and； qua ought；
should be allowed to have truth even though they are to be met with nowhere in experience； and
declines to be turned aside by the hypothetical suggestions and all the other impalpable unrealities
designed in the interest of an everlasting 〃ought to be〃 which never is。 （1） For reason is just this
certainty of having reality； and what consciousness is not aware of as a real self （Selbstwesen）； i。e。
what does not appear； is nothing for consciousness at all。
The true nature of law； viz。： that it essentially is reality； no doubt again assumes for consciousness
which remains at the level of observation； the form of an opposite over against the notion and the
inherently universal； in other words； this consciousness does not take such an object as its law to
be a reality of reason； it thinks it has got there something external and foreign。 But it contradicts its
own idea by actually and in fact not taking its universality to mean that all individual things of sense
must have given evidence of the law to enable the truth of the law to be asserted。 The assertion
that stones； when raised from the ground and lot go； fall； does not at all require us to make the
experiment with all stones。 It means most likely that this experiment must have been tried at least
with a good many； and from that we can by analogy draw an inference about the rest with the
greatest probability or with perfect right。 Yet analogy not only gives no perfect right； but； on
account of its nature； contradicts itself so often that the inference to be drawn from analogy itself
rather is that analogy does not permit an inference to be drawn。 Probability； which is what analogy
would come to； loses； when face to face with truth； every distinction of less and greater； be the
probability as great as it may it is nothing as against truth。 The instinct of reason； however； takes；
as a matter of fact； laws of that sort for truth。 It is when reason does not find necessity in them that
it resorts to making this distinction； and lowers the truth of the matter to the level of probability； in
order to bring out the imperfect way in which truth is presented to the consciousness that as yet
has no insight into the pure notion； for universality is before it there merely in the form of simple
immediate universality。 But； at the same time； on account of this universality； the law has truth for
consciousness。 That a stone falls is true for consciousness； because it is aware of the stone being
heavy； i。e。 because in weight； taken by itself as such； the stone has that essential relation to the
earth expressed in the fact of falling。 Consciousness thus finds in experience the objective being of
the law； but has it there in the form of a notion as well； and only because of both factors together is
the law true for consciousness。 The law； therefore； is accepted as a law because it presents itself in
the sphere of appearance and is； at the same time； in its very nature a notion。
The instinct of reason in this type of consciousness； because the law is at the same time inherently
a notion； proceeds to give the law and its moments a purely conceptual form； and proceeds to do
this of necessity； but without knowing that this is what it seeks to do。 It puts the law to the test of
experiment。 As the law first appears； it is enveloped in particulars of sense； and the notion
constituting its nature is involved with empirical elements。 The instinct of reason sets to work to
find out by experiment what follows in such and such circumstances。 By so doing the law seems
only to be plunged still further into sense； but sense existence really gets lost in the process。 The
inner purport of this investigation is to find pure conditions of the law； and this means nothing else
（even if the consciousness stating the fact were to think it meant something different） than
completely to bring out the law in conceptual shape and detach its moments entirely from
determinate specific existence。 For example； negative electricity； which is known at first； say； in the
form of resin…electricity； while positive electricity comes before us as glass…electricitythese； by
means of experiments； lose altogether such a significance； and become purely positive and
negative electricity； neither of which is bound up any longer with things of a particular kind； and we
can no longer say that there are bodies which are electrical positively； others electrical negatively。
In the same way the relationship of acid and base and their reaction constitute a law in which these
opposite factors appear as bodies。 Yet these sundered things have no reality； the power which
tears them apart cannot prevent them from entering forthwith into a process； for they are merely
this relation。 They cannot subsist and be indicated by themselves apart； like a tooth or a claw。 That
it is their very nature to pass over directly into a neutral product makes their existence lie in being
cancelled and superseded； or makes it into a universal； and acid and base possess truth merely
qua Universal。 Just； then； as glass and resin can be equally well positively as negatively electrified；
in the same way acid and base are not attached as properties or qualities to this or that reality；
each thing is only relatively acidulate and basic； what seems to be an absolute base or an absolute
acid gets in the so…called Synsomates （2） the opposite significance in relation to an other。
The result of the experiments is in this way to cancel the moments or inner significations as
properties of specific things； and free the； predicates from their subjects。 These predicates are
found merely as universal； and in truth that is what they are。 Because of this self subsistence they
therefore get the name of kinds of 〃matter〃； which is neither a body nor a property of a body；
certainly no one would call acid； positive and negative electricity； heat； （3） etc。； bodies。
Matter； on the contrary； is not a thing that exists； it is being in the sense of universal being； or being
in the way the concept is being。 Reason； still instinctive； correctly draws this distinction without
being conscious that it （reason）； by the very fact of its testing the law in every sense…particular；
cancels the merely sensuous existence of the law； and； when it construes the moments of the law
as forms of matter； their essential nature is taken to be something universal； and specifically
expressed as a non…sensuous element of sense； an incorporeal and yet objective existence。
We have now to see what turn its result takes； and what new shape this activity of observation
will； in consequence； assume。 As the outcome and truth of this experimentation we find pure law；
which is freed from sensuous elements； we see it as a concept； which； while present in sense；
operates there independently and unrestrained； while enveloped in sense； is detached from it and is
a concept bare and simple。 This； which is in truth result and essence； now comes before this
consciousness itself； but as an object； moreover； since the object is not exactly a result for it and is
unrelated to the preceding process； the object is a specific kind of object； and the relation of
consciousness to it takes the form of another kind of observation。
a （2）
Observation of Organic Nature
Such an object which sustains the procedure in the simple activity of the notion is an organism。
Organic existence is this absolutely fluid condition wherein determinateness； which would only put
it in relation to an other； is dissolved。 Inorganic things involve determinateness in their very
essence； and on that account a thing realizes the completeness of the moments of the notion only
along with another thing； and hence gets lost when it enters the dialectic movement。 In the case of
an organic being； on the other hand； all determinate characteristics； by means of 〃which it is
palpable to another； are held under the control of the simple organic unity； none of them comes
forward as essential and capable of detaching itself from the rest and relating itself to an other
being。 What is organic； therefore； preserves itself in its very relation。
The aspects of law on which the instinct of reason directs its observation here are； as we see from
the above； in the first instance organic nature and inorganic nature in their relation to one another。
The latter means for organic nature just the free play…a freedom opposed to the simple notion of
organic natureloosely connected characteristics in which individuated nature is at once dissolved；
and out of the continuity of which the individuated unit of nature at the same time breaks away and
exists separately。 Air； water； earth； zones and climate are universal elements of this sort； which
make up the indeterminate simple being of natural individualities； and in which these are at the
same time reflected into themselves。 Neither the individuality nor the natural element is absolutely
self…containe