same time reflected into themselves。 Neither the individuality nor the natural element is absolutely
self…contained。 On the contrary： in the independent detachment； which observation finds these
assuming towards one another； they stand at the same time in essential relation to one another； but
in such a way that their independence and mutual indifference form the predominating feature； and
only in part become abstractions。 Here； then； law appears as the relation of an element to the
formative process of the organic being； which at one moment has the element over against itself； at
another exhibits it within its own self…determining organic structure。 But laws like these： animals
belonging to the air are of the nature of birds； those belonging to water have the constitution of
fish； animals in northerly latitudes have thick coats of hair； and so on…such laws exhibit a degree of
poverty which does not do justice to the manifold variety of organic nature。 Besides the fact that
the free activity of organic nature can readily divest its forms of determinate characters like theses
and everywhere presents of necessity exceptions to such laws or rules； as we might call them； the
characterization of those very animals to which they do apply is so very superficial that even the
necessity of the 〃laws〃 can be nothing else but superficial too； and does not carry us further than
what is implied in speaking of the 〃great influence〃 of environment on the organism。 And this does
not tell us what properly is due to that influence and what is not。 Such like relations of organic
beings to the elements they live in cannot therefore be strictly called laws at all。 For； on the one
hand； such a relation； when we look at its content； does not exhaust； as we saw； the range of the
organic beings considered； and on the other； the terms of the relation itself stand indifferently apart
from one another and express no necessity。 In the concept of an acid lies the notion of a base； just
as the notion of positive electricity implies that of negative； but even though we do find as a fact a
thick coat of hair associated with northerly latitudes； the structure of a fish with water； or that of
birds with air； there is nothing in the notion of the north implying the notion of a thick covering of
hair； the notion of the structure of fish does not lie in the notion of the sea； nor that of birds in that
of the air。 Because of this free detachment of the two notions from one another there are； as a fact
also land animals with the essential characters of a bird； of fish； and so on。 The necessity； just
because it cannot be conceived to be an inner necessity of the object； ceases also to have a
foothold in sense； and can be no longer observed in actual reality； but has quitted the sphere of
reality。 Finding thus no place in the real object itself； it becomes what is called a 〃teleological
relation〃； a relation which is external to what is related； and consequently the very reverse of a
law of its constitution。 It is an idea entirely detached from the necessity of nature； a thought which
leaves this necessity of nature behind and floats above it all by itself。 （4）
If the relation； above alluded to； of organic existence to the elemental conditions of nature does not
express its true being； the notion of Purpose； on the other hand； does contain it。 The observing
attitude does not indeed take the to be the genuine essence of organic existence； this notion seems
to it to fall outside the real nature of the organism； and is then merely that external teleological
relation above mentioned。 Yet looking at how the organic being was previously characterized； the
organic is in point of fact just realized concrete purpose。 For since itself maintains itself in relation
to another； it is just that kind of natural existence in which nature reflects itself into the notion； and
the moments of necessity separated out ＇by Understanding＇…a cause and an effect； an active and a
passive…are here brought together and combined into a single unity。 In this way we have here not
only something appearing as a result of necessity； but； because it has returned to itself； the last or
the result is just as much the first which starts the process； and is to itself the purpose which it
realizes。 What is organic does not produce something； it merely conserves itself； or what is
produced is as much there already as produced。
We must elucidate this principle more fully； both as it is in itself and as it is for the instinct of
reason； in order to see how reason finds itself there； but does not know itself in what it finds。 The
concept of purpose； then； which rational observation has reached； is； while reason has
apprehended it in consciousness； given to reason as something actually real as well； it is not merely
an external relation of the actual； but its inner being。 This actual； which is itself a purpose； is related
purposively to an other； i。e。 its relation is a contingent one with respect to what both are
immediately； prima facie they are both self…subsistent and indifferent to one another。 The real
nature of their relation； however； is something different from what they thus appear to be； and its
effect has another meaning than sense…perception directly finds。 The necessity inherent in the
process is concealed； and comes out at the end； but in such a way that this very end shows it to
have been also the first。 The end； however； shows this priority of itself by the fact that nothing
comes out of the alteration the act produced； but what was there already。 Or； again； if we start
from what is first； this； in coming to the end or the result of its act； merely returns to itself； and； just
by so doing； it demonstrates itself to be that which has itself as its end； that is to say； qua first it
has already returned to itself； or is self…contained； is in and for itself。 What； then； it arrives at by the
process of its action is itself； and its arriving merely at itself means feeling itself； is its self…feeling。
Thus we have here； no doubt； the distinction between what it is and what it seeks； but this is
merely the semblance of a distinction； and consequently it is a notion in its very nature。
This is exactly； however； the way self…consciousness is constituted。 It distinguishes itself in like
manner from itself； without any distinction being thereby established。 Hence it is that it finds in
observation of organic nature nothing else than this kind of reality； it finds itself in the form of a
thing； as a life； and yet； between what it is itself and what it has found； draws a distinction which
is； however； no distinction。 Just as the instinct of an animal is to seek and consume food； but
thereby elicits nothing except itself； similarly too the instinct of reason in its search merely finds
reason itself。 An animal ends with self…feeling。 The instinct of reason； on the other hand； is at the
same time； self…consciousness。 But because it is merely instinct； it is put on one side as against
consciousness； and in the latter finds its opposite。 Its satisfaction is； therefore； broken in two by
this opposite； it finds itself； viz。 the purpose； and also finds this purpose in the shape of a thing。 But
the purpose is seen to lie； in the first instance； apart from the thing presenting itself as a purpose。 In
the second place； this purpose qua purpose is at the same time objective； it is taken to fall； there。
fore； not within the observing consciousness； but within another intelligence。
Looked at more closely； this character lies also just as much in the notion of the thingthat of
being in itself purpose。 It preserves itself； this means at one and the same time it is its nature to
conceal the controlling necessity and to present that necessity in the form of a contingent relation。
For its freedom； its being on its own account； means just that it behaves towards its necessary
condition as something indifferent。 It thus presents itself as if it were something whose notion falls
apart from its existence。 In this way reason is compelled to look on its own proper notion as falling
outside it； to look at it as a thing； as that towards which it is indifferent； and which in consequence
is reciprocally indifferent towards it ＇reason＇ and towards its own notion。 Qua instinct it continues
to remain within this state of being； this condition of indifference； and the thing expressing the
notion remains for it something other than this notion； and the notion other than the thing。 Thus for
reason the thing organized is only per se a purpose in the sense that the necessity； which is
presented as concealed within the action of the thingfor the active agency there takes up the
attitude of being indifferent and independentfalls outside the organism itself。
Since； however； the organic qua purpose per se can not behave in any other way than as organic；
the fact of its being per se a purpose is also apparent and sensibly present； and as such it is
observed。 What is organic shows itself when observed to be something self…preserving； returning
and returned into itself。 But in this state of being； observation does not recognize the concept of
purpose； or does not know that the notion of purpose is not in an intelligence anywhere else； but
just exists here and in the form of a thing。 Observation makes a distinction between the concept of
purpose and self…existence and self…preservation； which is not a distinction at all。 That it is no
distinction is something of which it is not aware； what it is aware of is an activity which appears
contingent and indifferent towards what is brought about by that activity； and towards the unity
which is all the while the principle connecting both； that activity and this purpose are taken to fall
asunder。
On this view the special function of the organic is the inner operating activity lying between its first
and last stage； so far as this activity implies the character of singleness。 So far； however； as the
activity has the character of universality； and the active agent is equated with what is the outcome
of its operation； this purposive activity as such would not belong to organic beings。 That single
activity； which