can they maintain their ground when attacked by such
powerful antagonists。 The affections take a narrower and
more natural survey of their object； and by an economy； more
suitable to the infirmity of human minds； regard alone the
beings around us； and are actuated by such events as appear
good or ill to the private system。
The case is the same with as with
ill。 It cannot reasonably be supposed； that those remote
considerations； which are found of so little efficacy with
regard to one； will have a more powerful influence with
regard to the other。 The mind of man is so formed by nature
that； upon the appearance of certain characters；
dispositions； and actions； it immediately feels the
sentiment of approbation or blame； nor are there any
emotions more essential to its frame and constitution。 The
characters which engage our approbation are chiefly such as
contribute to the peace and security of human society； as
the characters which excite blame are chiefly such as tend
to public detriment and disturbance： Whence it may
reasonably be presumed； that the moral sentiments arise；
either mediately or immediately； from a reflection of these
opposite interests。 What though philosophical meditations
establish a different opinion or conjecture； that everything
is right with regard to the W/HOLE； and that the qualities；
which disturb society； are； in the main； as beneficial； and
are as suitable to the primary intention of nature as those
which more directly promote its happiness and welfare？ Are
such remote and uncertain speculations able to
counterbalance the sentiments which arise from the natural
and immediate view of the objects？ A man who is robbed of a
considerable sum； does he find his vexation for the loss
anywise diminished by these sublime reflections？ Why then
should his moral resentment against the crime be supposed
incompatible with them？ Or why should not the acknowledgment
of a real distinction between vice and virtue be
reconcileable to all speculative systems of philosophy； as
well as that of a real distinction between personal beauty
and deformity？ Both these distinctions are founded in the
natural sentiments of the human mind： And these sentiments
are not to be controuled or altered by any philosophical
theory or speculation whatsoever。
The objection admits not of so easy and
satisfactory an answer； nor is it possible to explain
distinctly； how the Deity can be the mediate cause of all
the actions of men； without being the author of sin and
moral turpitude。 These are mysteries； which mere natural and
unassisted reason is very unfit to handle； and whatever
system she embraces； she must find herself involved in
inextricable difficulties； and even contradictions； at every
step which she takes with regard to such subjects。 To
reconcile the indifference and contingency of human actions
with prescience； or to defend absolute decrees； and yet free
the Deity from being the author of sin； has been found
hitherto to exceed all the power of philosophy。 Happy； if
she be thence sensible of her temerity； when she pries into
these sublime mysteries； and leaving a scene so full of
obscurities and perplexities； return； with suitable modesty；
to her true and proper province； the examination of common
life； where she will find difficulties enough to employ her
enquiries； without launching into so boundless an ocean of
doubt； uncertainty； and contradiction！
* * * *
SECTION IX。
Of the Reason of Animals。
A/LL our reasonings concerning matter of fact are
founded on a species of A/NALOGY； which leads us to expect
from any cause the same events； which we have observed to
result from similar causes。 Where the causes are entirely
similar； the analogy is perfect； and the inference； drawn
from it； is regarded as certain and conclusive： Nor does any
man ever entertain a doubt； where he sees a piece of iron；
that it will have weight and cohesion of parts； as in all
other instances； which have ever fallen under his
observation。 But where the objects have not so exact a
similarity； the analogy is less perfect； and the inference
is less conclusive； though still it has some force； in
proportion to the degree of similarity and resemblance。 The
anatomical observations； formed upon one animal； are； by
this species of reasoning； extended to all animals； and it
is certain； that when the circulation of the blood； for
instance； is clearly proved to have place in one creature；
as a frog； or fish； it forms a strong presumption； that the
same principle has place in all。 These analogical
observations may be carried farther； even to this science；
of which we are now treating； and any theory； by which we
explain the operations of the understanding； or the origin
and connexion of the passions in man； will acquire
additional authority； if we find； that the same theory is
requisite to explain the same phenomena in all other
animals。 We shall make trial of this； with regard to the
hypothesis； by which we have； in the foregoing discourse；
endeavoured to account for all experimental reasonings； and
it is hoped； that this new point of view will serve to
confirm all our former observations。
； It seems evident； that animals as well as men
learn many things from experience； and infer； that the same
events will always follow from the same causes。 By this
principle they become acquainted with the more obvious
properties of external objects； and gradually； from their
birth； treasure up a knowledge of the nature of fire； water；
earth； stones； heights； depths； &。； and of the effects
which result from their operation。 The ignorance and
inexperience of the young are here plainly distinguishable
from the cunning and sagacity of the old； who have learned；
by long observation； to avoid what hurt them； and to pursue
what gave ease or pleasure。 A horse； that has been
accustomed to the field； becomes acquainted with the proper
height which he can leap； and will never attempt what
exceeds his force and ability。 An old greyhound will trust
the more fatiguing part of the chace to the younger； and
will place himself so as to meet the hare in her doubles；
nor are the conjectures； which he forms on this occasion；
founded in any thing but his observation and experience。
This is still more evident from the effects of
discipline and education on animals； who； by the proper
application of rewards and punishments； may be taught any
course of action； and most contrary to their natural
instincts and propensities。 Is it not experience； which
renders a dog apprehensive of pain； when you menace him； or
lift up the whip to beat him？ Is it not even experience；
which makes him answer to his name； and infer； from such an
arbitrary sound； that you mean him rather than any of his
fellows； and intend to call him； when you pronounce it in a
certain manner； and with a certain tone and accent？
In all these cases； we may observe； that the animal
infers some fact beyond what immediately strikes his senses；
and that this inference is altogether founded on past
experience； while the creature expects from the present
object the same consequences； which it has always found in
its observation to result from similar objects。
； It is impossible； that this inference of
the animal can be founded on any process of argument or
reasoning； by which he concludes； that like events must
follow like objects； and that the course of nature will
always be regular in its operations。 For if there be in
reality any arguments of this nature； they surely lie too
abstruse for the observation of such imperfect
understandings； since it may well employ the utmost care and
attention of a philosophic genius to discover and observe
them。 Animals； therefore are not guided in these inferences
by reasoning： Neither are children； neither are the
generality of mankind； in their ordinary actions and
conclusions： Neither are philosophers themselves； who； in
all the active parts of life； are； in the main； the same
with the vulgar； and are governed by the same maxims。 Nature
must have provided some other principle； of more ready； and
more general use and application； nor can an operation of
such immense consequence in life； as that of inferring
effects from causes； be trusted to the uncertain process of
reasoning and argumentation。 Were this doubtful with regard
to men； it seems to admit of no question with regard to the
brute creation； and the conclusion being once firmly
established in the one； we have a strong presumption； from
all the rules of analogy； that it ought to be universally
admitted； without any exception or reserve。 It is custom
alone； which engages animals； from every object； that
strikes their senses； to infer its usual attendant； and
carries their imagination； from the appearance of the one；
to conceive the other； in that particular manner； which we
denominate 。 No other explication can be given of
this operation； in all the higher； as well as lower classes
of sensitive beings； which fall under our notice and
observation。＇24＇
But though animals learn many parts of their knowledge
from observation； there are also many parts of it； which
they derive from the original hand of nature； which much
exceed the share of capacity they possess on ordinary
occasions； and in which they improve； little or nothing； by
the longest practice and experience。 These we denominate
I/NSTINCTS； and are so apt to admire as something very
extraordinary； and inexplicable by all the disquisitions of
human understanding。 But our wonder will； perhaps； cease or
diminish； when we consider； that the experimental reasoning
itself； which we possess in common with beasts； and on which
the whole conduct of life depends； is nothing but a species
of instinct or mechanical power； that acts in us unknown to
ourselves； and in its chief operations； is not directed by
any such relations or comparisons of ideas； as are the
proper objects of our intellectual faculties。 Though the
inst