any connexion with the philosophical disputes concerning
metaphysics and religion。
There is still one circumstance； replied I； which you
seem to have overlooked。 Though I should allow your
premises； I must deny your conclusion。 You conclude； that
religious doctrines and reasonings have no influence
on life； because they to have no influence； never
considering； that men reason not in the same manner you do；
but draw many consequences from the belief of a divine
Existence； and suppose that the Deity will inflict
punishments on vice； and bestow rewards on virtue； beyond
what appear in the ordinary course of nature。 Whether this
reasoning of theirs be just or not； is no matter。 Its
influence on their life and conduct must still be the same。
And those； who attempt to disabuse them of such prejudices；
may； for aught I know； be good reasoners； but I cannot allow
them to be good citizens and politicians； since they free
men from one restraint upon their passions； and make the
infringement of the laws of society； in one respect； more
easy and secure。
After all； I may； perhaps； agree to your general
conclusion in favour of liberty； though upon different
premises from those； on which you endeavour to found it。 I
think； that the state ought to tolerate every principle of
philosophy； nor is there an instance； that any government
has suffered in its political interests by such indulgence。
There is no enthusiasm among philosophers； their doctrines
are not very alluring to the people； and no restraint can be
put upon their reasonings； but what must be of dangerous
consequence to the sciences； and even to the state； by
paving the way for persecution and oppression in points；
where the generality of mankind are more deeply interested
and concerned。
But there occurs to me （continued I） with regard to
your main topic； a difficulty； which I shall just propose to
you without insisting on it； lest it lead into reasonings of
too nice and delicate a nature。 In a word； I much doubt
whether it be possible for a cause to be known only by its
effect （as you have all along supposed） or to be of so
singular and particular a nature as to have no parallel and
no similarity with any other cause or object； that has ever
fallen under our observation。 It is only when two
of objects are found to be constantly conjoined； that we can
infer the one from the other； and were an effect presented；
which was entirely singular； and could not be comprehended
under any known ； I do not see； that we could form
any conjecture or inference at all concerning its cause。 If
experience and observation and analogy be； indeed； the only
guides which we can reasonably follow in inferences of this
nature； both the effect and cause must bear a similarity and
resemblance to other effects and causes； which we know； and
which we have found； in many instances； to be conjoined with
each other。 I leave it to your own reflection to pursue the
consequences of this principle。 I shall just observe； that；
as the antagonists of E/PICURUS always suppose the
universe； an effect quite singular and unparalleled； to be
the proof of a Deity； a cause no less singular and
unparalleled； your reasonings； upon that supposition； seem；
at least； to merit our attention。 There is； I own； some
difficulty； how we can ever return from the cause to the
effect； and； reasoning from our ideas of the former； infer
any alteration on the latter； or any； addition to it。
* * * *
SECTION XII。
Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy。
PART I。
T/HERE is not a greater number of philosophical
reasonings； displayed upon any subject； than those； which
prove the existence of a Deity； and refute the fallacies of
； and yet the most religious philosophers still
dispute whether any man can be so blinded as to be a
speculative atheist。 How shall we reconcile these
contradictions？ The knights errant； who wandered about to
clear the world of dragons and giants； never entertained the
least doubt with regard to the existence of these monsters。
The is another enemy of religion； who
naturally provokes the indignation of all divines and graver
philosophers； though it is certain； that no man ever met
with any such absurd creature； or conversed with a man； who
had no opinion or principle concerning any subject； either
of action or speculation。 This begets a very natural
question； What is meant by a sceptic？ And how far it is
possible to push these philosophical principles of doubt and
uncertainty？
There is a species of scepticism； to all
study and philosophy； which is much inculcated by D/ES
C/ARTES and others； as a sovereign preservative against
error and precipitate judgement。 It recommends an universal
doubt； not only of all our former opinions and principles；
but also of our very faculties； of whose veracity； say they；
we must assure ourselves； by a chain of reasoning； deduced
from some original principle； which cannot possibly be
fallacious or deceitful。 But neither is there any such
original principle； which has a prerogative above others；
that are self…evident and convincing： Or if there were；
could we advance a step beyond it； but by the use of those
very faculties； of which we are supposed to be already
diffident。 The C/ARTESIAN doubt； therefore； were it ever
possible to be attained by any human creature （as it plainly
is not） would be entirely incurable； and no reasoning could
ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction upon
any subject。
It must； however； be confessed； that this species of
scepticism； when more moderate； may be understood in a very
reasonable sense； and is a necessary preparative to the
study of philosophy； by preserving a proper impartiality in
our judgements； and weaning our mind from all those
prejudices； which we may have imbibed from education or rash
opinion。 To begin with clear and self…evident principles； to
advance by timorous and sure steps； to review frequently our
conclusions； and examine accurately all their consequences；
though by these means we shall make both a slow and a short
progress in our systems； are the only methods； by which we
can ever hope to reach truth； and attain a proper stability
and certainty in our determinations。
There is another species of scepticism； to
science and enquiry； when men are supposed to have
discovered； either the absolute fallaciousness of their
mental faculties； or their unfitness to reach any fixed
determination in all those curious subjects of speculation；
about which they are commonly employed。 Even our very senses
are brought into dispute； by a certain species of
philosophers； and the maxims of common life are subjected to
the same doubt as the most profound principles or
conclusions of metaphysics and theology。 As these
paradoxical tenets （if they may be called tenets） are to be
met with in some philosophers； and the refutation of them in
several； they naturally excite our curiosity； and make us
enquire into the arguments； on which they may be founded。
I need not insist upon the more trite topics； employed
by the sceptics in all ages； against the evidence of
； such as those which are derived from the
imperfection and fallaciousness of our organs； on numberless
occasions； the crooked appearance of an oar in water； the
various aspects of objects； according to their different
distances； the double images which arise from the pressing
one eye； with many other appearances of a like nature。 These
sceptical topics； indeed； are only sufficient to prove； that
the senses alone are not implicitly to be depended on； but
that we must correct their evidence by reason； and by
considerations； derived from the nature of the medium； the
distance of the object； and the disposition of the organ； in
order to render them； within their sphere； the proper
criteria of truth and falsehood。 There are other more
profound arguments against the senses； which admit not of so
easy a solution。
It seems evident； that men are carried； by a natural
instinct or prepossession； to repose faith in their senses；
and that； without any reasoning； or even almost before the
use of reason； we always suppose an external universe； which
depends not on our perception； but would exist； though we
and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated。 Even
the animal creation are governed by a like opinion； and
preserve this belief of external objects； in all their
thoughts； designs； and actions。
It seems also evident； that； when men follow this blind
and powerful instinct of nature； they always suppose the
very images； presented by the senses； to be the external
objects； and never entertain any suspicion； that the one are
nothing but representations of the other。 This very table；
which we see white； and which we feel hard； is believed to
exist； independent of our perception； and to be something
external to our mind； which perceives it。 Our presence
bestows not being on it： Our absence does not annihilate it。
It preserves its existence uniform and entire； independent
of the situation of intelligent beings； who perceive or
contemplate it。
But this universal and primary opinion of all men is
soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy； which teaches
us； that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an
image or perception； and that the senses are only the
inlets； through which these images are conveyed； without
being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the
mind and the object。 The table； which we see； seems to
diminish； as we remove farther from it： But the real table；
which exists independent of us； suffers no alteration： It
was； therefore； nothing but its image； which was present to
the mind。 These are the obvious dictates of reason； and no
man； who reflects； ever doubted； that the existences； which
we consider； when we say； and ； are
nothing but perceptions