to a greater； and vastly different building； a prologue；
which serves only to introduce the piece； and give it more
grace and propriety？ Whence； do you think； can such
philosophers derive their idea of the gods？ From their own
conceit and imagination surely。 For if they derived it from
the present phenomena； it would never point to any thing
farther； but must be exactly adjusted to them。 That the
divinity may be endowed with attributes； which we
have never seen exerted； may be governed by principles of
action； which we cannot discover to be satisfied： All this
will freely be allowed。 But still this is mere
and hypothesis。 We never can have reason to infer any
attributes； or any principles of action in him； but so far
as we know them to have been exerted and satisfied。
If you answer in the affirmative； I conclude； that；
since justice here exerts itself； it is satisfied。 If you
reply in the negative； I conclude； that you have then no
reason to ascribe justice； in our sense of it； to the gods。
If you hold a medium between affirmation and negation； by
saying； that the justice of the gods； at present； exerts
itself in part； but not in its full extent； I answer； that
you have no reason to give it any particular extent； but
only so far as you see it； ； exert itself。
Thus I bring the dispute； O A/THENIANS； to a short
issue with my antagonists。 The course of nature lies open to
my contemplation as well as to theirs。 The experienced train
of events is the great standard； by which we all regulate
our conduct。 Nothing else can be appealed to in the field；
or in the senate。 Nothing else ought ever to be heard of in
the school； or in the closet。 In vain would our limited
understanding break through those boundaries； which are too
narrow for our fond imagination。 While we argue from the
course of nature； and infer a particular intelligent cause；
which first bestowed； and still preserves order in the
universe； we embrace a principle； which is both uncertain
and useless。 It is uncertain； because the subject lies
entirely beyond the reach of human experience。 It is
useless； because our knowledge of this cause being derived
entirely from the course of nature； we can never； according
to the rules of just reasoning； return back from the cause
with any new inference； or making additions to the common
and experienced course of nature； establish any new
principles of conduct and behaviour。
I observe （said I； finding he had finished his
harangue） that you neglect not the artifice of the
demagogues of old； and as you were pleased to make me stand
for the people； you insinuate yourself into my favour by
embracing those principles； to which； you know； I have
always expressed a particular attachment。 But allowing you
to make experience （as indeed I think you ought） the only
standard of our judgement concerning this； and all other
questions of fact； I doubt not but； from the very same
experience； to which you appeal； it may be possible to
refute this reasoning； which you have put into the mouth of
E/PICURUS。 If you saw； for instance； a half… finished
building； surrounded with heaps of brick and stone and
mortar； and all the instruments of masonry； could you not
from the effect； that it was a work of design and
contrivance？ And could you not return again； from this
inferred cause； to infer new additions to the effect； and
conclude； that the building would soon be finished； and
receive all the further improvements； which art could bestow
upon it？ If you saw upon the sea…shore the print of one
human foot； you would conclude； that a man had passed that
way； and that he had also left the traces of the other foot；
though effaced by the rolling of the sands or inundation of
the waters。 Why then do you refuse to admit the same method
of reasoning with regard to the order of nature？ Consider
the world and the present life only as an imperfect
building； from which you can infer a superior intelligence；
and arguing from that superior intelligence； which can leave
nothing imperfect； why may you not infer a more finished
scheme or plan； which will receive its completion in some
distant point of space or time？ Are not these methods of
reasoning exactly similar？ And under what pretence can you
embrace the one； while you reject the other？
The infinite difference of the subjects； replied he； is
a sufficient foundation for this difference in my
conclusions。 In works of art and contrivance； it is
allowable to advance from the effect to the cause； and
returning back from the cause； to form new inferences
concerning the effect； and examine the alterations； which it
has probably undergone； or may still undergo。 But what is
the foundation of this method of reasoning？ Plainly this；
that man is a being； whom we know by experience； whose
motives and designs we are acquainted with； and whose
projects and inclinations have a certain connexion and
coherence； according to the laws which nature has
established for the government of such a creature。 When；
therefore； we find； that any work has proceeded from the
skill and industry of man； as we are otherwise acquainted
with the nature of the animal； we can draw a hundred
inferences concerning what may be expected from him； and
these inferences will all be founded in experience and
observation。 But did we know man only from the single work
or production which we examine； it were impossible for us to
argue in this manner； because our knowledge of all the
qualities； which we ascribe to him； being in that case
derived from the production； it is impossible they could
point to any thing farther； or be the foundation of any new
inference。 The print of a foot in the sand can only prove；
when considered alone； that there was some figure adapted to
it； by which it was produced： But the print of a human foot
proves likewise； from our other experience； that there was
probably another foot； which also left its impression；
though effaced by time or other accidents。 Here we mount
from the effect to the cause； and descending again from the
cause； infer alterations in the effect； but this is not a
continuation of the same simple chain of reasoning。 We
comprehend in this case a hundred other experiences and
observations； concerning the figure and members of
that species of animal； without which this method of
argument must be considered as fallacious and sophistical。
The case is not the same with our reasonings from the
works of nature。 The Deity is known to us only by his
productions； and is a single being in the universe； not
comprehended under any species or genus； from whose
experienced attributes or qualities； we can； by analogy；
infer any attribute or quality in him。 As the universe shews
wisdom and goodness； we infer wisdom and goodness。 As it
shews a particular degree of these perfections； we infer a
particular degree of them； precisely adapted to the effect
which we examine。 But farther attributes or farther degrees
of the same attributes； we can never be authorised to infer
or suppose； by any rules of just reasoning。 Now； without
some such licence of supposition； it is impossible for us to
argue from the cause； or infer any alteration in the effect；
beyond what has immediately fallen under our observation。
Greater good produced by this Being must still prove a
greater degree of goodness： A more impartial distribution of
rewards and punishments must proceed from a greater regard
to justice and equity。 Every supposed addition to the works
of nature makes an addition to the attributes of the Author
of nature； and consequently； being entirely unsupported by
any reason or argument； can never be admitted but as mere
conjecture and hypothesis。＇36＇
The great source of our mistake in this subject； and of
the unbounded licence of conjecture； which we indulge； is；
that we tacitly consider ourselves； as in the place of the
Supreme Being； and conclude； that he will； on every
occasion； observe the same conduct； which we ourselves； in
his situation； would have embraced as reasonable and
eligible。 But； besides that the ordinary course of nature
may convince us； that almost everything is regulated by
principles and maxims very different from ours； besides
this； I say； it must evidently appear contrary to all rules
of analogy to reason； from the intentions and projects of
men； to those of a Being so different； and so much superior。
In human nature； there is a certain experienced coherence of
designs and inclinations； so that when； from any fact； we
have discovered one intention of any man； it may often be
reasonable； from experience； to infer another； and draw a
long chain of conclusions concerning his past or future
conduct。 But this method of reasoning can never have place
with regard to a Being； so remote and incomprehensible； who
bears much less analogy to any other being in the universe
than the sun to a waxen taper； and who discovers himself
only by some faint traces or outlines； beyond which we have
no authority to ascribe to him any attribute or perfection。
What we imagine to be a superior perfection； may really be a
defect。 Or were it ever so much a perfection； the ascribing
of it to the Supreme Being； where it appears not to have
been really exerted； to the full； in his works； savours more
of flattery and panegyric； than of just reasoning and sound
philosophy。 All the philosophy； therefore； in the world； and
all the religion； which is nothing but a species of
philosophy； will never be able to carry us beyond the usual
course of experience； or give us measures of conduct and
behaviour different from those which are furnished by
reflections on common life。 No new fact can ever be inferred
from the religious hypothesis； no event foreseen or
foretold； no reward or punishment expected or dreaded；
beyond what is already known by practice and observation。 So
that my apology for E/PICURUS will still appear solid and
satisfactory； nor have the political interests of society
any connexion with the philosophical disputes concerning
metaphys