enter upon the enterprize with thorough care and attention；
that； if it lie within the compass of human understanding；
it may at last be happily achieved； if not； it may； however；
be rejected with some confidence and security。 This last
conclusion； surely； is not desirable； nor ought it to be
embraced too rashly。 For how much must we diminish from the
beauty and value of this species of philosophy； upon such a
supposition？ Moralists have hitherto been accustomed； when
they considered the vast multitude and diversity of those
actions that excite our approbation or dislike； to search
for some common principle； on which this variety of
sentiments might depend。 And though they have sometimes
carried the matter too far； by their passion for some one
general principle； it must； however； be confessed； that they
are excusable in expecting to find some general principles；
into which all the vices and virtues were justly to be
resolved。 The like has been the endeavour of critics；
logicians； and even politicians： Nor have their attempts
been wholly unsuccessful； though perhaps longer time；
greater accuracy； and more ardent application may bring
these sciences still nearer their perfection。 To throw up at
once all pretensions of this kind may justly be deemed more
rash； precipitate； and dogmatical； than even the boldest and
most affirmative philosophy；that has ever attempted to
impose its crude dictates and principles on mankind。
What though these reasonings concerning human nature
seem abstract； and of difficult comprehension？ This affords
no presumption of their falsehood。 On the contrary； it seems
impossible； that what has hitherto escaped so many wise and
profound philosophers can be very obvious and easy。 And
whatever pains these researches may cost us； we may think
ourselves sufficiently rewarded； not only in point of profit
but of pleasure； if； by that means； we can make any addition
to our stock of knowledge； in subjects of such unspeakable
importance。
But as； after all； the abstractedness of these
speculations is no recommendation； but rather a disadvantage
to them； and as this difficulty may perhaps be surmounted by
care and art； and the avoiding of all unnecessary detail； we
have； in the following enquiry； attempted to throw some
light upon subjects； from which uncertainty has hitherto
deterred the wise； and obscurity the ignorant。 Happy； if we
can unite the boundaries of the different species of
philosophy； by reconciling profound enquiry with clearness；
and truth with novelty！ And still more happy； if； reasoning
in this easy manner； we can undermine the foundations of an
abstruse philosophy； which seems to have hitherto served
only as a shelter to superstition； and a cover to absurdity
and error！
* * * *
SECTION II。
Of the Origin of Ideas。
E/VERY one will readily allow； that there is a
considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind；
when a man feels the pain of excessive heat； or the pleasure
of moderate warmth； and when he afterwards recalls to his
memory this sensation； or anticipates it by his imagination。
These faculties may mimic or copy the perceptions of the
senses； but they never can entirely reach the force and
vivacity of the original sentiment。 The utmost we say of
them； even when they operate with greatest vigour； is； that
they represent their object in so lively a manner； that we
could say we feel or see it： But； except the mind
be disordered by disease or madness； they never can arrive
at such a pitch of vivacity； as to render these perceptions
altogether undistinguishable。 All the colours of poetry；
however splendid； can never paint natural objects in such a
manner as to make the description be taken for a real
landskip。 The most lively thought is still inferior to the
dullest sensation。
We may observe a like distinction to run through all
the other perceptions of the mind。 A man in a fit of anger；
is actuated in a very different manner from one who only
thinks of that emotion。 If you tell me； that any person is
in love； I easily understand your meaning； and from a just
conception of his situation； but never can mistake that
conception for the real disorders and agitations of the
passion。 When we reflect on our past sentiments and
affections； our thought is a faithful mirror； and copies its
objects truly； but the colours which it employs are faint
and dull； in comparison of those in which our original
perceptions were clothed。 It requires no nice discernment or
metaphysical head to mark the distinction between them。
Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the
mind into two classes or species； which are distinguished by
their different degrees of force and vivacity。 The less
forcible and lively are commonly denominated T/HOUGHTS or
I/DEAS。 The other species want a name in our language； and
in most others； I suppose； because it was not requisite for
any； but philosophical purposes； to rank them under a
general term or appellation。 Let us； therefore； use a little
freedom； and call them I/MPRESSIONS； employing that word in
a sense somewhat different from the usual。 By the term
； then； I mean all our more lively perceptions；
when we hear； or see； or feel； or love； or hate； or desire；
or will。 And impressions are distinguished from ideas； which
are the less lively perceptions； of which we are conscious；
when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements
above mentioned。
Nothing； at first view； may seem more unbounded than
the thought of man； which not only escapes all human power
and authority； but is not even restrained within the limits
of nature and reality。 To form monsters； and join
incongruous shapes and appearances； costs the imagination no
more trouble than to conceive the most natural and familiar
objects。 And while the body is confined to one planet； along
which it creeps with pain and difficulty； the thought can in
an instant transport us into the most distant regions of the
universe； or even beyond the universe； into the unbounded
chaos； where nature is supposed to lie in total confusion。
What never was seen； or heard of； may yet be conceived； nor
is any thing beyond the power of thought； except what
implies an absolute contradiction。
But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded
liberty； we shall find； upon a nearer examination； that it
is really confined within very narrow limits； and that all
this creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the
faculty of compounding； transposing； augmenting； or
diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and
experience。 When we think of a golden mountain； we only join
two consistent ideas； ； and ； with which we
were formerly acquainted。 A virtuous horse we can conceive；
because； from our own feeling； we can conceive virtue； and
this we may unite to the figure and shape of a horse； which
is an animal familiar to us。 In short； all the materials of
thinking are derived either from our outward or inward
sentiment： The mixture and composition of these belongs
alone to the mind and will。 Or； to express myself in
philosophical language； all our ideas or more feeble
perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively
ones。
To prove this； the two following arguments will； I
hope； be sufficient。 First； when we analyze our thoughts or
ideas； however compounded or sublime； we always find that
they resolve themselves into such simple ideas as were
copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment。 Even those
ideas； which； at first view； seem the most wide of this
origin； are found； upon a nearer scrutiny； to be derived
from it。 The idea of God； as meaning an infinitely
intelligent； wise； and good Being； arises from reflecting on
the operations of our own mind； and augmenting； without
limit； those qualities of goodness and wisdom。 We may
prosecute this enquiry to what length we please； where we
shall always find； that every idea which we examine is
copied from a similar impression。 Those who would assert
that this position is not universally true nor without
exception； have only one； and that an easy method of
refuting it； by producing that idea； which； in their
opinion； is not derived from this source。 It will then be
incumbent on us； if we would maintain our doctrine； to
produce the impression； or lively perception； which
corresponds to it。
Secondly。 If it happen； from a defect of the organ；
that a man is not susceptible of any species of sensation；
we always find that he is as little susceptible of the
correspondent ideas。 A blind man can form no notion of
colours； a deaf man of sounds。 Restore either of them that
sense in which he is deficient； by opening this new inlet
for his sensations； you also open an inlet for the ideas；
and he finds no difficulty in conceiving these objects。 The
case is the same； if the object； proper for exciting any
sensation； has never been applied to the organ。 A
L/APLANDER or N/EGROE has no notion of the relish of wine。
And though there are few or no instances of a like
deficiency in the mind； where a person has never felt or is
wholly incapable of a sentiment or passion that belongs to
his species； yet we find the same observation to take place
in a less degree。 A man of mild manners can form no idea of
inveterate revenge or cruelty； nor can a selfish heart
easily conceive the heights of friendship and generosity。 It
is readily allowed； that other beings may possess many
senses of which we can have no conception； because the ideas
of them have never been introduced to us in the only manner
by which an idea can have access to the mind； to wit； by the
actual feeling and sensation。
There is； however； one contradictory phenomenon； which
may prove that it is not absolutely impossible for ideas to
arise； independent of their correspondent impressions。 I
believe it will readily be allowed； that the several
distinct ideas of colour； which enter by the eye； or those
of sound； which are conveyed by the ear； are really
different from each other； though； at the sa