unity in the subject。
It may be objected to M/ILTON that he has traced up
his causes to too great a distance； and that the rebellion
of the angels produces the fall of man by a train of events
which is both very long and very casual。 Not to mention that
the creation of the world； which he has related at length；
is no more the cause of that catastrophe than of the battle
of P/HARSALIA； or any other event that has ever harpooned。
But if we consider； on the other hand； that all these
events； the rebellion of the angels； the creation of the
world； and the fall of man； each other in being
miraculous； and out of the common course of nature； that
they are supposed to be in time； and that；
being detached from all other events； and being the only
original facts which revelation discovers； they strike the
eye at once； and naturally recall each other to the thought
or imagination if we consider all these circumstances； I
say； we shall find that these parts of the action have a
sufficient unity to make them be comprehended in one fable
or narration。 To which we may add that the rebellion of the
angels and the fall of man have a peculiar resemblance； as
being counterparts to each other； and presenting to the
reader the same moral of obedience to our Creator。
These loose hints I have thrown together in order to
excite the curiosity of philosophers； and beget a suspicion
at least if not a full persuasion that this subject is very
copious； and that many operations of the human mind depend
on the connection or association of ideas which is here
explained。 Particularly； the sympathy betwixt the passions
and imagination will； perhaps； appear remarkable； while we
observe that the affections； excited by one object； pass
easily to another connected with it； but transfuse
themselves with difficulty； or not at all； along different
objects which have no manner of connection together。 By
introducing into any composition personages and actions
foreign to each other； an injudicious author loses that
communication of emotions by which alone he can interest the
heart and raise the passions to their proper height and
period。 the full explication of this principle and all its
consequences would lead us into reasonings too profound and
too copious for these Essays。 It is sufficient for us； at
present； to have established this conclusion； that the three
connecting principles of all ideas are the relations of
； ； and 。
* * * *
SECTION IV。
Sceptical Doubts Concerning the Operations of the
Understanding。
PART I。
A/LL the objects of human reason or enquiry may
naturally be divided into two kinds； to wit； ； and 。 Of the first kind are the
sciences of Geometry； Algebra； and Arithmetic； and in short；
every affirmation which is either intuitively or
demonstratively certain。 ； is a proposition
which expresses a relation between these figures。 ； expresses
a relation between these numbers。 Propositions of this kind
are discoverable by the mere operation of thought； without
dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe。
Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature； the
truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their
certainty and evidence。
Matters of fact； which are the second objects of human
reason； are not ascertained in the same manner； nor is our
evidence of their truth； however great； of a like nature
with the foregoing。 The contrary of every matter of fact is
still possible； because it can never imply a contradiction；
and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and
distinctness； as if ever so conformable to reality。 is no less intelligible a
proposition； and implies no more contradiction than the
affirmation； 。 We should in vain；
therefore； attempt to demonstrate its falsehood。 Were it
demonstratively false； it would imply a contradiction； and
could never be distinctly conceived by the mind。
It may； therefore； be a subject worthy of curiosity； to
enquire what is the nature of that evidence which assures us
of any real existence and matter of fact； beyond the present
testimony of our senses； or the records of our memory。 This
part of philosophy； it is observable； has been little
cultivated； either by the ancients or moderns； and therefore
our doubts and errors； in the prosecution of so important an
enquiry； may be the more excusable； while we march through
such difficult paths without any guide or direction。 They
may even prove useful； by exciting curiosity； and destroying
that implicit faith and security； which is the bane of all
reasoning and free enquiry。 The discovery of defects in the
common philosophy； if any such there be； will not； I
presume； be a discouragement； but rather an incitement； as
is usual； to attempt something more full and satisfactory
than has yet been proposed to the public。
All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be
founded on the relation of 。 By means of
that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our
memory and senses。 If you were to ask a man； why he believes
any matter of fact； which is absent； for instance； that his
friend is in the country； or in F/RANCE； he would give you
a reason； and this reason would be some other fact； as a
letter received from him； or the knowledge of his former
resolutions and promises。 A man finding a watch or any other
machine in a desert island； would conclude that there had
once been men in that island。 All our reasonings concerning
fact are of the same nature。 And here it is constantly
supposed that there is a connexion between the present fact
and that which is inferred from it。 Were there nothing to
bind them together； the inference would be entirely
precarious。 The hearing of an articulate voice and rational
discourse in the dark assures us of the presence of some
person： Why？ because these are the effects of the human make
and fabric； and closely connected with it。 If we anatomize
all the other reasonings of this nature； we shall find that
they are founded on the relation of cause and effect； and
that this relation is either near or remote； direct or
collateral。 Heat and light are collateral effects of fire；
and the one effect may justly be inferred from the other。
If we would satisfy ourselves； therefore； concerning
the nature of that evidence； which assures us of matters of
fact； we must enquire how we arrive at the knowledge of
cause and effect。
I shall venture to affirm； as a general proposition；
which admits of no exception； that the knowledge of this
relation is not； in any instance； attained by reasonings ； but arises entirely from experience； when we find
that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with
each other。 Let an object be presented to a man of ever so
strong natural reason and abilities； if that object be
entirely new to him； he will not be able； by the most
accurate examination of its sensible qualities； to discover
any of its causes or effects。 A/DAM； though his rational
faculties be supposed； at the very first； entirely perfect；
could not have inferred from the fluidity and transparency
of water that it would suffocate him； or from the light and
warmth of fire that it would consume him。 No object ever
discovers； by the qualities which appear to the senses；
either the causes which produced it； or the effects which
will arise from it； nor can our reason； unassisted by
experience； ever draw any inference concerning real
existence and matter of fact。
This proposition； ； will readily
be admitted with regard to such objects； as we remember to
have once been altogether unknown to us； since we must be
conscious of the utter inability； which we then lay under；
of foretelling what would arise from them。 Present two
smooth pieces of marble to a man who has no tincture of
natural philosophy； he will never discover that they will
adhere together in such a manner as to require great force
to separate them in a direct line； while they make so small
a resistance to a lateral pressure。 Such events； as bear
little analogy to the common course of nature； are also
readily confessed to be known only by experience； nor does
any man imagine that the explosion of gunpowder； or the
attraction of a loadstone； could ever be discovered by
arguments 。 In like manner； when an effect is
supposed to depend upon an intricate machinery or secret
structure of parts； we make no difficulty in attributing all
our knowledge of it to experience。 Who will assert that he
can give the ultimate reason； why milk or bread is proper
nourishment for a man； not for a lion or a tyger？
But the same truth may not appear； at first sight； to
have the same evidence with regard to events； which have
become familiar to us from our first appearance in the
world； which bear a close analogy to the whole course of
nature； and which are supposed to depend on the simple
qualities of objects； without any secret structure of parts。
We are apt to imagine that we could discover these effects
by the mere operation of our reason； without experience。 We
fancy； that were we brought on a sudden into this world； we
could at first have inferred that one Billiard…ball would
communicate motion to another upon impulse； and that we
needed not to have waited for the event； in order to
pronounce with certainty concerning it。 Such is the
influence of custom； that； where it is strongest； it not
only covers our natural ignorance； but even conceals itself；
and seems not to take place； merely because it is found in
the highest degree。
But to