accurate。 But with regard to the present subject； there are
some considerations which seem to remove all this accusation
of arrogance or suspicion of mistake。
It is certain that the most ignorant and stupid
peasants nay infants； nay even brute beasts improve by
experience； and learn the qualities of natural objects； by
observing the effects which result from them。 When a child
has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a
candle； he will be careful not to put his hand near any
candle； but will expect a similar effect from a cause which
is similar in its sensible qualities and appearance。 If you
assert； therefore； that the understanding of the child is
led into this conclusion by any process of argument or
ratiocination； I may justly require you to produce that
argument； nor have you any pretence to refuse so equitable a
demand。 You cannot say that the argument is abstruse； and
may possibly escape your enquiry； since you confess that it
is obvious to the capacity of a mere infant。 If you
hesitate； therefore； a moment； or if； after reflection； you
produce any intricate or profound argument； you； in a
manner； give up the question； and confess that it is not
reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling
the future； and to expect similar effects from causes which
are； to appearance； similar。 This is the proposition which I
intended to enforce in the present section。 If I be right； I
pretend not to have made any mighty discovery。 And if I be
wrong； I must acknowledge myself to be indeed a very
backward scholar； since I cannot now discover an argument
which； it seems； was perfectly familiar to me long before I
was out of my cradle。
* * * *
SECTION V。
Sceptical Solution of these Doubts。
PART I。
T/HE passion for philosophy； like that for religion；
seems liable to this inconvenience； that； though it aims at
the correction of our manners； and extirpation of our vices；
it may only serve； by imprudent management； to foster a
predominant inclination； and push the mind； with more
determined resolution； towards that side which already
too much； by the bias and propensity of the natural
temper。 It is certain that； while we aspire to the
magnanimous firmness of the philosophic sage； and endeavour
to confine our pleasures altogether within our own minds； we
may； at last； render our philosophy like that of
E/PICTETUS； and other ； only a more refined system
of selfishness； and reason ourselves out of all virtue as
well as social enjoyment。 While we study with attention the
vanity of human life； and turn all our thoughts towards the
empty and transitory nature of riches and honours； we are；
perhaps； all the while flattering our natural indolence；
which； hating the bustle of the world； and drudgery of
business； seeks a pretence of reason to give itself a full
and uncontrolled indulgence。 There is； however； one species
of philosophy which seems little liable to this
inconvenience； and that because it strikes in with no
disorderly passion of the human mind； nor can mingle itself
with any natural affection or propensity； and that is the
A/CADEMIC or S/CEPTICAL philosophy。 The academics always
talk of doubt and suspense of judgment； of danger in hasty
determinations； of confining to very narrow bounds the
enquiries of the understanding； and of renouncing all
speculations which lie not within the limits of common life
and practice。 Nothing； therefore； can be more contrary than
such a philosophy to the supine indolence of the mind； its
rash arrogance； its lofty pretensions； and its superstitious
credulity。 Every passion is mortified by it； except the love
of truth； and that passion never is； nor can be； carried to
too high a degree。 It is surprising； therefore； that this
philosophy； which； in almost every instance； must be
harmless and innocent； should be the subject of so much
groundless reproach and obloquy。 But； perhaps； the very
circumstance which renders it so innocent is what chiefly
exposes it to the public hatred and resentment。 By
flattering no irregular passion； it gains few partizans： By
opposing so many vices and follies； it raises to itself
abundance of enemies； who stigmatize it as libertine；
profane； and irreligious。
Nor need we fear that this philosophy； while it
endeavours to limit our enquiries to common life； should
ever undermine the reasonings of common life； and carry its
doubts so far as to destroy all action； as well as
speculation。 Nature will always maintain her rights； and
prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever。
Though we should conclude； for instance； as in the foregoing
section； that； in all reasonings from experience； there is a
step taken by the mind which is not supported by any
argument or process of the understanding； there is no danger
that these reasonings； on which almost all knowledge
depends； will ever be affected by such a discovery。 If the
mind be not engaged by argument to make this step； it must
be induced by some other principle of equal weight and
authority； and that principle will preserve its influence as
long as human nature remains the same。 What that principle
is may well be worth the pains of enquiry。
Suppose a person； though endowed with the strongest
faculties of reason and reflection； to be brought on a
sudden into this world； he would； indeed； immediately
observe a continual succession of objects； and one event
following another； but he would not be able to discover any
thing farther。 He would not； at first； by any reasoning； be
able to reach the idea of cause and effect； since the
particular powers； by which all natural operations are
performed； never appear to the senses； nor is it reasonable
to conclude； merely because one event； in one instance；
precedes another； that therefore the one is the cause； the
other the effect。 Their conjunction may be arbitrary and
casual。 There may be no reason to infer the existence of one
from the appearance of the other。 And in a word； such a
person； without more experience； could never employ his
conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter of fact； or be
assured of any thing beyond what was immediately present to
his memory and senses。
Suppose； again； that he has acquired more experience；
and has lived so long in the world as to have observed
familiar objects or events to be constantly conjoined
together； what is the consequence of this experience？ He
immediately infers the existence of one object from the
appearance of the other。 Yet he has not； by all his
experience； acquired any idea or knowledge of the secret
power by which the one object produces the other； nor is it
by any process of reasoning； he is engaged to draw this
inference。 But still he finds himself determined to draw it：
And though he should be convinced that his understanding has
no part in the operation； he would nevertheless continue in
the same course of thinking。 There is some other principle
which determines him to form such a conclusion。
This principle is C/USTOM or H/ABIT。 For wherever the
repetition of any particular act or operation produces a
propensity to renew the same act or operation； without being
impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding；
we always say； that this propensity is the effect of
。 By employing that word； we pretend not to have
given the ultimate reason of such a propensity。 We only
point out a principle of human nature； which is universally
acknowledged； and which is well known by its effects。
Perhaps we can push our enquiries no farther； or pretend to
give the cause of this cause； but must rest contented with
it as the ultimate principle； which we can assign； of all
our conclusions from experience。 It is sufficient
satisfaction； that we can go so far； without repining at the
narrowness of our faculties because they will carry us no
farther。 And it is certain we here advance a very
intelligible proposition at least； if not a true one； when
we assert that； after the constant conjunction of two
objects … … heat and flame； for instance； weight and
solidity we are determined by custom alone to expect the
one from the appearance of the other。 This hypothesis seems
even the only one which explains the difficulty； why we
draw； from a thousand instances； an inference which we are
not able to draw from one instance； that is； in no respect；
different from them。 Reason is incapable of any such
variation。 The conclusions which it draws from considering
one circle are the same which it would form upon surveying
all the circles in the universe。 But no man； having seen
only one body move after being impelled by another； could
infer that every other body will move after a like impulse。
All inferences from experience； therefore； are effects of
custom； not of reasoning。＇12＇
Custom； then； is the great guide of human life。 It is
that principle alone which renders our experience useful to
us； and makes us expect； for the future； a similar train of
events with those which have appeared in the past。 Without
the influence of custom； we should be entirely ignorant of
every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to
the memory and senses。 We should never know how to adjust
means to ends； or to employ our natural powers in the
production of any effect。 There would be an end at once of
all action； as well as of the chief part of speculation。
But here it may be proper to remark； that though our
conclusions from experience carry us beyond our memory and
senses； and assure us of matters of fact which happened in
the most distant places and most remote ages； yet some fact
must always be present to the senses or memory； from which
we may first proceed in drawing these conclusions。 A man；
who should find in a desert country the remains of pompous
buildings； would conclude that the country had； in ancient
times； been cultivated by civilized inhabitants； but did
nothing of this nature occur to him； he could