as a privy councillor。 He wrote several works on political law and history； we must specially
mention his work； De jure natur？ et gentium； Libr。 viii。； Londin。 Scan。 1672； 4； and also his
compendium De officio hominis； published at the same place in 1673） 8； and Elementa
jurisprudenti？； universalis。（9） While the divine right of kings was here still recognized —
whereby they rendered account to God alone； or； at all events； were still bound to take counsel of
the Church — the impulses and necessities present in mankind were now considered as well。
These were regarded as the inward principles for private and political law； and from them the
duties both of the government and of rulers were deduced； so that the freedom of mankind might
not be interfered with。 The basis of the state in Puffendorf's view is the social instinct： the highest
end of the state is the peace and security of social life through the transformation of inward duties
as prescribed by； conscience into external duties as compelled by law。（10）
B 6。 NEWTON。
The other side is that thought likewise applied itself to nature； and in this connection Isaac Newton
is famous by reason of his mathematical discoveries and his work in physics。 He was born in 1642
at Cambridge； made a special study of mathematics； and became professor of the same at
Cambridge； later on he was made president of the Royal Society in London； and he died in
1727。（11）
Newton was indisputably the chief contributor to the popularity of the philosophy of Locke； or the
English method of treating of Philosophy； and more especially did he promote its application to all
the physical sciences。 “Physics； beware of metaphysics；” was his maxim；（12） which signifies；
Science； beware of thought； and all the physical sciences； even to the present day； have； following
in his wake； faithfully observed this precept； inasmuch as they have not entered upon an
investigation of their conceptions； or thought about thoughts。 Physics can； however； effect nothing
without thought； it has its categories and laws through thought alone； and without thought it does
not effect any progress。 Newton was mainly instrumental in introducing to physics the
determinations respecting forces； which pertain to reflection； he raised science to the standpoint of
reflection； and set the laws of forces in the place of the laws of phenomena。 Regarding matters as
he did； Newton derived his conclusions from his experiences； and in physics and the theory of
colour…vision； he made bad observations and drew worse conclusions。 He passed from
experiences to general points of view； again made them fundamental； and from them constructed
the individual； this is how his theories are constructed。 The observation of things； the discovery of
the law immanent therein； and the universal which is found within them； has become the real point
of interest。 In this way； Newton is so complete a barbarian as regards his conceptions that his case
is like that of another of his countrymen who was surprised and rejoiced to learn that he had
talked prose all his life； not having had any idea that he was so accomplished。 This Newton； like all
the Physicists； indeed； never learned； he did not know that he thought in； and had to deal with
Notions； while he imagined he was dealing with physical facts： and he presented the extremest
contrast to Boehme； who handled sensuous things as Notions； and； by sheer force of mind；
obtained entire possession of their actuality and subjugated them。 Instead of this Newton treated
Notions like sensuous things； and dealt with them just as men deal with wood and stone。 And this
is even now the case。 In the beginnings of physical science we read of the power of inertia； for
instance； of the force of acceleration； of molecules； of centripetal and centrifugal force； as of facts
which definitely exist； what are really the final results of reflection are represented as their first
grounds。 If we ask for the cause of there being no advance made in such sciences； we find that it is
because men do not understand that they should apply themselves to Notions； but make up their
minds to adopt these determinations without sense or understanding。 Hence in Newton's Optics；
for instance； there are conclusions derived from his experience which are so untrue and devoid of
understanding； that while they are set forth as the finest example of how men can learn to know
nature by means of experiments and conclusions derived from experiments； they may also serve as
an example of how we should neither experiment nor draw conclusions； of how nothing at all can
be learned。 A miserable kind of experience like this itself contradicts itself through nature； for
nature is more excellent than it appears in this wretched experience： both nature itself and
experience； when carried a little further； contradict it。 Hence； of all the splendid discoveries of
Newton in optics； none now remain excepting one — the division of light into seven colours。 This is
partly because the conception of whole and part come into play； and partly from an obdurate
closing of the eyes to the opposite side。 From this empirical method in Philosophy； we shall now
pass on to Leibnitz。
1。 Brucker。 Histor。 critic。 philos。 T。 IV。 P。 2； pp。 731…736； 743…745。
2。 Hug。 Grot。 De jure belli ac pacis； B。 III。 chap。 xi。 § 13…16 （Ed。 Gronov。 Lipsi？； 1758； 8vo）；
pp。 900…905； chap。 iv。 § 10； pp。 792； 793。
3。 Buhle： Geschichte der neuern Philosophie； Vol。 III。 Sec。 1； pp。 223； 224； 227。
4。 Hobbes。 Epistola dedicatoria ante Elementor。 philos。 Sectionem primam （Thom？ Hobbesii
Opera philosophica； qu？ latine scripsit omnia； Amstelod； 1668； 4to）； pp。 1； 2。
5。 Cf。 Brucker。 Histor。 crit。 philos。 T。 IV。 P。 II。 p。 154。
6。 Hobbes； De cive； chap。 i。 § 2； 3 （Oper。 phil。 etc。 Amstel。 1668）； pp。 3； 4。
7。 Hobbes； De cive； chap。 i。 § 4…6； 12…14； pp。 4…8； Leviathan； chap。 xiii。 （Oper。）； pp。 63…66。
8。 Ibidem； chap。 v。 § 6…12； pp。 37…38； chap。 vi。 § 12…14； pp。 44…46。
9。 Buhle： Geschichte der neuern Philosophie； Vol。 IV。 Sec。 2； pp。 519…523； Rixner： Handbuch
der Geschichte der Philosophie； Vol。 III。 p。 29。
10。 Rixner： Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie； Vol。 III。 p。 31； cf。 Puttendorf： De jure
natur？ et gent。 II。 2； § 5…7 （Francof。 ad Moenum； 1706； 4）； pp。 157…161； VII。 1； § 3…7； pp。
900…909。
11。 Buhle： Geschichte der neuern Philosophie； Vol。 IV。 Sec。 1； pp。 107； 108。
12。 Buhle： Geschichte der neuern Philosophie； Vol。 IV。 p。 115； cf。 Newtoni Optices； P。 III。
（Londini； 1706； 4） p。 314。
Section Two： Period of the Thinking Understanding
Chapter I。 — The Metaphysics of the Understanding
C 1。 LEIBNITZ。
As in other respects Leibnitz represents the extreme antithesis to Newton； so in respect of
philosophy he presents a striking contrast to Locke and his empiricism； and also to Spinoza。 He
upholds thought as against the perception of the English school； and in lieu of sensuous Being he
maintains Being for thought to be the essence of truth； just as Boehme at an earlier time upheld
implicit Being。 While Spinoza asserted the universality； the oneness of substance merely； and while
with Locke we saw infinite determinations made the basis； Leibnitz； by means of his fundamental
principle of individuality； brings out the essentiality of the opposite aspect of Spinoza's philosophy；
existence for self； the monad； but the monad regarded as the absolute Notion； though perhaps not
yet as the 〃I。〃 The opposed principles； which were forced asunder； find their completion in each
other； since Leibnitz's principle of individuation completed Spinoza's system as far as outward
aspect goes。
Gottfried Wilhelm； Baron von Leibnitz； was born in 1646 at Leipzig； where his father was
professor of Philosophy。 The subject that he studied in view of a profession was jurisprudence；
but first； in accordance with the fashion of the day； he made a study of Philosophy； and to it he
devoted particular attention。 To begin with； he picked up in Leipzig a large and miscellaneous
stock of knowledge； then he studied Philosophy and mathematics at Jena under the mathematician
and theosophist Weigel； and took his degree of Master of Philosophy in Leipzig。 There also； on
the occasion of his graduation as Doctor of Philosophy； he defended certain philosophical theses；
some of which discourses are still contained in his works （ed。 Dutens； T。 II。 P。 I。 p。 400）。 His first
dissertation； and that for which he obtained the degree of doctor of philosophy； was： De principio
individui； — a principle which remained the abstract principle of his whole philosophy； as
opposed to that of Spinoza。 After he had acquired a thorough knowledge of the subject； he
wished to graduate also as Doctor of Laws。 But though he died an imperial councillor； it was his ill
fortune to receive from the Faculty at Leipzig a refusal to confer the doctorate upon him； his youth
being the alleged reason。 Such a thing could scarcely happen nowadays。 It may be that it was
done because of his over…great philosophical attainments； seeing that lawyers are wont to hold the
same in horror。 He now quitted Leipzig； and betook himself to Altdorf； where he graduated with
distinction。 Shortly afterwards he became acquainted in Nürnberg with a company of alchemists；
with whose ongoings he became associated。 Here he made extracts from alchemistic writings； and
studied the mysteries of this occult science。 His activity in the pursuit of learning extended also to
historical； diplomatic； mathematical and philosophical subjects。 He subsequently entered the
service of the Elector of Mayence； becoming a member of council； and； in 1672 he was appointed
tutor to a son of Von Boineburg； Chancellor of State to the Elector。 With this young man he
travelled to Paris； where he lived for four years。 He at this time made the acquaintance of the great
mathematician Huygens； and was by him for the first time properly introduced into the domain of
mathematics。 When the education of his pupil was completed； and the Baron Von Boineburg died；
Leibnitz went on his own account to London； where he became acquaint