mathematics。 When the education of his pupil was completed； and the Baron Von Boineburg died；
Leibnitz went on his own account to London； where he became acquainted with Newton and
other scholars； at whose head was Oldenburg； who was also on friendly terms with Spinoza。 After
the death of the Elector of Mayence； the salary of Leibnitz ceased to be paid； he therefore left
England and returned to France。 The Duke of Brunswick…Lüneburg then took him into his service；
and gave him the appointment of councillor and librarian at Hanover； with permission to spend as
much time as he liked in foreign countries。 He therefore remained for some time longer in France；
England； and Holland。 In the year 1677 he settled down in Hanover； where he became busily
engaged in affairs of state； and was specially occupied with historical matters。 In the Harz
Mountains he had works constructed for carrying off the floods which did damage to the mines
there。 Notwithstanding these manifold occupations he invented the differential calculus in 1677； on
occasion of which there arose a dispute between him and Newton； which was carried on by the
latter and the Royal Society of London in a most ungenerous manner。 For it was asserted by the
English； who gave themselves the credit of everything； and were very unfair to others； that the
discovery was really made by Newton。 But Newton's Principia only appeared later； and in the
first edition indeed Leibnitz was mentioned with commendation in a note which was afterwards
omitted。 From his headquarters in Hanover； Leibnitz； commissioned by his prince； made several
journeys through Germany； and also went to Italy in order to collect historical evidence relative to
the House of Este； and for the purpose of proving more clearly the relationship between this
princely family and that of Brunswick…Lüneburg。 At other times he was likewise much occupied
with historical questions。 Owing to his acquaintance with the consort of Frederick I。 of Prussia；
Sophia Charlotte； a Hanoverian princess； he was enabled to bring about the foundation of an
Academy of Science in Berlin； in which city he lived for a considerable time。 In Vienna he also
became acquainted with Prince Eugène； which occasioned his being appointed finally an Imperial
Councillor。 He published several very important historical works as the result of this journey。 His
death took place at Hanover in 1716； when he was seventy years of age。（1）
It was not only on Philosophy； but also on the most varied branches of science that Leibnitz
expended toil and trouble and energy； it was to mathematics； however； that he specially devoted
his attention； and he is the inventor of the methods of the integral and differential calculus。 His great
services in regard to mathematics and physics we here leave out of consideration； and pay
attention to his philosophy alone。 None of his books can be exactly looked on as giving a
complete systematic account of his philosophy。 To the more important among them belongs his
work on the human understanding （Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain） in reply to
Locke； but this is a mere refutation。 His philosophy is therefore scattered through various little
treatises which were written in very various connections； in letters； and replies to objections which
caused him to bring out one aspect of the question more strongly than another； we consequently
find no elaborated systematic whole； superintended or perfected by him。 The work which has
some appearance of being such； his Théodicée； better known to the public than any thing else he
wrote； is a popular treatise which he drewup for Queen Sophia Charlotte in reply to Bayle； and in
which he took pains not to present the matter in very speculative form。 A Würtemberg theologian；
Pfaff by name； and others who were correspondents of Leibnitz and were themselves only too
well versed in philosophy； brought it as a charge against Leibnitz — a charge which he never
denied — that his philosophy was written in popular form。（2） They laughed very much afterwards
at Wolff； who had taken them to be quite in earnest； his opinion was that if Leibnitz were not
perfectly serious in this sense with his Théodicée； yet he had unconsciously written his best
therein。 Leibnitz's Théodicée is not what we can altogether appreciate； it is a justification of God
in regard to the evil in the world。 His really philosophic thoughts are most connectedly expressed
in a treatise on the principles of Grace （Principes de la Nature et de la Grace）；（3） and especially
in the pamphlet addressed to Prince Eugéne of Savoy。（4） 。Buhle （Geschichte der neuern
Philosophie； vol。 iv。 section 1； p。 131） says： “His philosophy is not so much the product of free；
independent； original speculation； as the result of well…tested earlier” and later “systems； an
eclecticism whose defects he tried to remedy in his own way。 It is a desultory treatment of
Philosophy in letters。”
Leibnitz followed the same general plan in his philosophy as the physicists adopt when they
advance a hypothesis to explain existing data。 He has it that general conceptions of the Idea are to
be found； from which the particular may be derived； here； on account of existing data； the general
conception； for example the determination of force or matter furnished by reflection； must have its
determinations disposed in such a way that it fits in with the data。 Thus the philosophy of Leibnitz
seems to be not so much a philosophic system as an hypothesis regarding the existence of the
world； namely how it is to be determined in accordance with the metaphysical determinations and
the data and assumptions of the ordinary conception； which are accepted as valid（5） — thoughts
which are moreover propounded without the sequence pertaining to the Notion and mainly in
narrative style； and which taken by themselves show no necessity in their connection。 Leibnitz's
philosophy therefore appears like a string of arbitrary assertions； which follow one on another like
a metaphysical romance； it is only when we see what he wished thereby to avoid that we learn to
appreciate its value。 He really makes use of external reasons mainly in order to establish relations：
“Because the validity of such relations cannot be allowed； nothing remains but to establish the
matter in this way。” If we are not acquainted with these reasons； this procedure strikes us as
arbitrary。
a。 Leibnitz's philosophy is an idealism of the intellectuality of the universe； and although from one
point of view he stands opposed to Locke； as from another point of view he is in opposition to the
Substance of Spinoza； he yet binds them both together again。 For； to go into the matter more
particularly； on the one hand he expresses in the many monads the absolute nature of things
distinguished and of individuality； on the other hand； in contrast to this and apart from it； he
expresses the ideality of Spinoza and the non…absolute nature of all difference； as the idealism of
the popular conception。 Leibnitz's philosophy is a metaphysics； and in sharp contrast to the simple
universal Substance of Spinoza； where all that is determined is merely transitory； it makes
fundamental the absolute multiplicity of individual substances； which after the example of the
ancients he named monads — an expression already used by the Pythagoreans。 These monads he
then proceeds to determine as follows。
Firstly： “Substance is a thing that is capable of activity； it is compound or simple； the compound
cannot exist without the simple。 The monads are simple substances。” The proof that they
constitute the truth in all things is very simple； it is a superficial reflection。 For instance； one of
Leibnitz's maxims is： “Because there are compound things； the principles of the same must be
simple； for the compound consists of the simple。”（6） This proof is poor enough； it is an example of
the favourite way of starting from something definite； say the compound； and then drawing
conclusions therefrom as to the simple。 It is quite right in a way； but really it is tautology。 Of
course； if the compound exists； so does the simple； for the compound means something in itself
manifold whose connection or unity is external。 From the very trivial category of the compound it
is easy to deduce the simple。 It is a conclusion drawn from a certain premiss； but the question is
whether the premiss is true。 These monads are not； however； something abstract and simple in
itself； like the empty Epicurean atoms； which； as they were in themselves lacking in determination；
drew all their determination from their aggregation alone。 The monads are； on the contrary；
substantial forms； a good expression； borrowed from the Scholastics （supra； p。 71）； or the
metaphysical points of the Alexandrian School （Vol。 II。 p。 439）； they are the entelechies of
Aristotle taken as pure activity； which are forms in themselves （Vol。 II。 pp。 138； 182； 183）。
“These monads are not material or extended； nor do they originate or decay in the natural fashion；
for they can begin only by a creative act of God； and they can end only by annihilation。”（7）
Thereby they are distinguished from the atoms； which are regarded simply as principles。 The
expression creation we are familiar with from religion； but it is a meaningless word derived from
the ordinary conception； in order to be a thought and to have philosophic significance； it must be
much more closely defined。
Secondly： “On account of their simplicity the monads are not susceptible of alteration by another
monad in their inner essence； there is no causal connection between them。” Each of them is
something indifferent and independent as regards the rest； otherwise it would not be an entelechy。
Each of them is so much for itself that all its determinations and modifications go on in itself alone；
and no determination from without takes place。 Leibnitz says： “There are three ways in which
substances are connected： （1） Causality； influence； （2） The relation of assistance； （3） The relation
of harmony。 The relation of influence is a relation pertaining to a commonplace or popular
philosophy。 But as it is impossible to understand how material particles