philosophy。 But as it is impossible to understand how material particles or immaterial qualities can
pass from one substance into another； such a conception as this must be abandoned。” If we
accept the reality of the many； there can be no transition at all； each is an ultimate and absolutely
independent entity。 “The system of assistance；” according to Descartes； “is something quite
superfluous； a Deus ex machina； because continual miracles in the things of nature are assumed。”
If we； like Descartes； assume independent substances； no causal nexus is conceivable； for this
presupposes an influence； a bearing of the one upon the other； and in this way the other is not a
substance。 “Therefore there remains only harmony； a unity which is in itself or implicit。 The monad
is therefore simply shut up in itself； and cannot be determined by another； this other cannot be set
into it。 It can neither get outside itself； nor can others get inside it。”（8） That is also Spinoza's way of
regarding matters： each attribute entirely represents the essence of God for itself； extension and
thought have no influence on each other。
In the third place； “however； these monads must at the same time have certain qualities or
determinations in themselves； inner actions； through which they are distinguished from others。
There cannot be two things alike； for otherwise they would not be two； they would not be different
but one and the same。”（9） Here then Leibnitz's axiom of the undistinguishable comes into words。
What is not in itself distinguished is not distinguished。 This may be taken in a trivial sense； as that
there are not two individuals which are alike。 To such sensuous things the maxim has no
application； it is prima facie indifferent whether there are things which are alike or not； there may
also be always a difference of space。 This is the superficial sense； which does not concern us。 The
more intimate sense is； however； that each thing is in itself something determined； distinguishing
itself from others implicitly or in itself。 Whether two things are like or unlike is only a comparison
which we make； which falls within our ken。 But what we have further to consider is the determined
difference in themselves。 The difference must be a difference in themselves； not for our
comparison； for the subject must have the difference as its own peculiar characteristic or
determination； i。e。； the determination must be immanent in the individual。 Not only do we
distinguish the animal by its claws； but it distinguishes itself essentially thereby； it defends itself； it
preserves itself。 If two things are different only in being two； then each of them is one； but the fact
of their being two does not constitute a distinction between them； the determined difference in itself
is the principal point。
Fourthly： “The determinateness and the variation thereby established is； however； an inward
implicit principle； it is a multiplicity of modification； of relations to surrounding existences； but a
multiplicity which remains locked up in simplicity。 Determinateness and variation such as this；
which remains and goes on in the existence itself； is a perception；” and therefore Leibnitz says all
monads perceive or represent （for we may translate perceptio by representation ＇Vorstellung＇）。 In
other words； they are in themselves universal； for universality is just simplicity in multiplicity； and
therefore a simplicity which is at the same time change and motion of multiplicity。 This is a very
important determination； in substance itself there is negativity； determinateness； without its
simplicity and its implicitude being given up。 Further； in it there is this idealism； that the simple is
something in itself distinguished； and in spite of its variation； that it yet remains one； and continues
in its simplicity。 An instance of this is found in “I；” my spirit。 I have many conceptions； a wealth
of thought is in me； and yet I remain one； notwithstanding this variety of state。 This identity may be
found in the fact that what is different is at the same time abrogated； and is determined as one； the
monads are therefore distinguished by modifications in themselves； but not by external
determinations。 These determinations contained in the monads exist in them in ideal fashion； this
ideality in the monad is in itself a whole； so that these differences are only representations and
ideas。 This absolute difference what is termed the Notion； what falls asunder in the mere
representation is held together。 This is what possesses interest in Leibnitz's philosophy。 Such
ideality in the same way pertains to the material； which is also a multiplicity of monads； therefore
the system of Leibnitz is an intellectual system； in accordance with which all that is material has
powers of representation and perception。 As thus representing； the monad； says Leibnitz；
possesses activity； for activity is to be different； and yet to be one； and this is the only true
difference。 The monad not only represents； it also changes； but in doing so； it yet remains in itself
absolutely what it is。 This variation is based on activity。 “The activity of the inner principle； by
means of which it passes from one perception to another； is desire （appetitus）。” Variation in
representation is desire； and that constitutes the spontaneity of the monad； all is now complete in
itself； and the category of influence falls away。 Indeed； this intellectuality of all things is a great
thought on the part of Leibnitz： “All multiplicity is included in unity；”（10） determination is not a
difference in respect of something else； but reflected into itself； and maintaining itself。 This is one
aspect of things； but the matter is not therein complete； it is equally the case that it is different in
respect of other things。
Fifthly： These representations and ideas are not necessarily conscious representations and ideas；
any more than all monads as forming representations are conscious。 It is true that consciousness is
itself perception； but a higher grade of the same； perceptions of consciousness Leibnitz calls
apperceptions。 The difference between the merely representing and the self…conscious monads
Leibnitz makes one of degrees of clearness。 The expression representation has； however； certainly
something awkward about it； since we are accustomed to associate it only with consciousness；
and with consciousness as such； but Leibnitz admits also of unconscious representation。 When he
then adduces examples of unconscious representations； he appeals to the condition of a swoon or
of sleep； in which we are mere monads： and that representations without consciousness are
present in such states he shows from the fact of our having perceptions immediately after
awakening out of sleep； which shows that others must have been there； for one perception arises
only out of others。（11） That is a trivial and empirical demonstration。
Sixthly： These monads constitute the principle that exists。 Matter is nothing else than their
passive capability。 This passive capability it is which constitutes the obscurity of the
representations； or a confusion which never arrives at distinction； or desire； or activity。（12） That is
a correct definition of the conception； it is Being； matter； in accordance with the moment of
simplicity。 This is implicitly activity； “mere implicitness without actualization” would therefore be a
better expression。 The transition from obscurity to distinctness Leibnitz exemplifies by the state of
swooning。
Seventhly： Bodies as bodies are aggregates of monads： they are mere heaps which cannot be
termed substances； any more than a flock of sheep can bear this name。（13） The continuity of the
same is an arrangement or extension； but space is nothing in itself；（14） it is only in another； or a
unity which our understanding gives to that aggregate。（15）
b。 Leibnitz goes on to determine and distinguish more clearly as the principal moments； inorganic；
organic； and conscious monads； and he does it in the following way。
Such bodies as have no inner unity； whose elements are connected merely by space； or externally；
are inorganic； they have not an entelechy or one monad which rules over the rest。（16） The
continuity of space as a merely external relation has not the Notion in itself of the likeness of these
monads in themselves。 Continuity is in fact to be regarded in them as an arrangement； a similarity in
themselves。 Leibnitz therefore defines their movements as like one another； as a harmony in
themselves；（17） but again； this is as much as saying that their similarity is not in themselves。 In fact
continuity forms the essential determination of the inorganic； but it must at the same time not be
taken as something external or as likeness； but as penetrating or penetrated unity； which has
dissolved individuality in itself like a fluid。 But to this point Leibnitz does not attain； because for him
monads are the absolute principle； and individuality does not annul itself。
A higher degree of Being is found in bodies with life and soul； in which one monad has dominion
over the rest。 The body which is bound up with the monad； of which the one monad is the
entelechy or soul； is with this soul named a living creature； an animal。 One such entelechy rules
over the rest； yet not really； but formally： the limbs of this animal； however； are again themselves
such living things； each of which has in its turn its ruling entelechy within it。（18） But ruling is here an
inappropriate expression。 To rule in this case is not to rule over others； for all are independent； it is
therefore only a formal expression。 If Leibnitz had not helped himself out with the word rule； and
developed the idea further； this dominant monad would have abrogated the others； and put them in
a negative position； the implicitness of the other monads； or the principle of the absolute Being of
these points or individuals would have disappeared。 Yet we shall later on come across this relation
of the individuals to one another。
The conscious monad distinguishes itself from the naked （material） monads by the distinctness of
the representation。 But this is of course only an indefinite word； a f