concessions； farther declare that it is impossible any
corporeal thing should exist in nature。
。 You amaze me。 Was ever anything more wild and
extravagant than the notions you now maintain： and is it not
evident you are led into all these extravagances by the belief of
？ This makes you dream of those unknown
natures in everything。 It is this occasions your distinguishing
between the reality and sensible appearances of things。 It is to
this you are indebted for being ignorant of what everybody else
knows perfectly well。 Nor is this all： you are not only ignorant
of the true nature of everything； but you know not whether
anything really exists； or whether there are any true natures at
all； forasmuch as you attribute to your material beings an
absolute or external existence； wherein you suppose their reality
consists。 And； as you are forced in the end to acknowledge such
an existence means either a direct repugnancy； or nothing at all；
it follows that you are obliged to pull down your own hypothesis
of material Substance； and positively to deny the real existence
of any part of the universe。 And so you are plunged into the
deepest and most deplorable scepticism that ever man was。 Tell
me； Hylas； is it not as I say？
。 I agree with you。 was no more
than an hypothesis； and a false and groundless one too。 I will no
longer spend my breath in defence of it。 But whatever hypothesis
you advance； or whatsoever scheme of things you introduce in its
stead； I doubt not it will appear every whit as false： let me but
be allowed to question you upon it。 That is； suffer me to serve
you in your own kind； and I warrant it shall conduct you through
as many perplexities and contradictions； to the very same state
of scepticism that I myself am in at present。
。 I assure you； Hylas； I do not pretend to frame any
hypothesis at all。 I am of a vulgar cast； simple enough to
believe my senses； and leave things as I find them。 To be plain；
it is my opinion that the real things are those very things I
see； and feel； and perceive by my senses。 These I know； and；
finding they answer all the necessities and purposes of life；
have no reason to be solicitous about any other unknown beings。 A
piece of sensible bread； for instance； would stay my stomach
better than ten thousand times as much of that insensible；
unintelligible； real bread you speak of。 It is likewise my
opinion that colours and other sensible qualities are on the
｛230｝ objects。 I cannot for my life help thinking that snow is
white； and fire hot。 You indeed； who by and fire mean
certain external； unperceived； unperceiving substances； are in
the right to deny whiteness or heat to be affections inherent in
。 But I； who understand by those words the things I see and
feel； am obliged to think like other folks。 And； as I am no
sceptic with regard to the nature of things； so neither am I as
to their existence。 That a thing should be really perceived by my
senses； and at the same time not really exist； is to me a plain
contradiction； since I cannot prescind or abstract； even in
thought； the existence of a sensible thing from its being
perceived。 Wood； stones； fire； water； flesh； iron； and the like
things； which I name and discourse of； are things that I know。
And I should not have known them but that I perceived them by my
senses； and things perceived by the senses are immediately
perceived； and things immediately perceived are ideas； and ideas
cannot exist without the mind； their existence therefore consists
in being perceived； when； therefore； they are actually perceived
there can be no doubt of their existence。 Away then with all that
scepticism； all those ridiculous philosophical doubts。 What a
jest is it for a philosopher to question the existence of
sensible things； till he hath it proved to him from the veracity
of God； or to pretend our knowledge in this point falls short of
intuition or demonstration！ I might as well doubt of my own
being； as of the being of those things I actually see and feel。
。 Not so fast； Philonous： you say you cannot conceive
how sensible things should exist without the mind。 Do you not？
。 I do。
。 Supposing you were annihilated； cannot you conceive
it possible that things perceivable by sense may still exist？
。 can； but then it must be in another mind。 When I
deny sensible things an existence out of the mind； I do not mean
my mind in particular； but all minds。 Now； it is plain they have
an existence exterior to my mind； since I find them by experience
to be independent of it。 There is therefore some other Mind
wherein they exist； during the intervals between the times of
｛231｝ my perceiving them： as likewise they did before my birth；
and would do after my supposed annihilation。 And； as the same is
true with regard to all other finite created spirits； it
necessarily follows there is an ； which
knows and comprehends all things； and exhibits them to our view
in such a manner； and according to such rules； as He Himself hath
ordained； and are by us termed the 。
。 Answer me； Philonous。 Are all our ideas perfectly
inert beings？ Or have they any agency included in them？
。 They are altogether passive and inert。
。 And is not God an agent； a being purely active？
。 I acknowledge it。
。 No idea therefore can be like unto； or represent the
nature of God？
。 It cannot。
。 Since therefore you have no of the mind of
God； how can you conceive it possible that things should exist in
His mind？ Or； if you can conceive the mind of God； without having
an idea of it； why may not I be allowed to conceive the existence
of Matter； notwithstanding I have no idea of it？
。 As to your first question： I own I have properly no
； either of God or any other spirit； for these being
active； cannot be represented by things perfectly inert； as our
ideas are。 I do nevertheless know that 1； who am a spirit or
thinking substance； exist as certainly a s I know my ideas exist。
Farther； I know what I mean by the terms I ； and I
know this immediately or intuitively； though I do not perceive it
as I perceive a triangle； a colour； or a sound。 The Mind； Spirit；
or Soul is that indivisible unextended thing which thinks； acts；
and perceives。 I say ； because unextended； and
； because extended； figured； moveable things are
ideas； and that which perceives ideas； which thinks and wills； is
plainly itself no idea； nor like an idea。 Ideas are things
inactive； and perceived。 And Spirits a sort of beings altogether
different from them。 I do not therefore say my soul is an idea；
or like an idea。 However； taking the word in a large
sense； my soul may be said to furnish me with an idea； that is；
an image or likeness of God though indeed extremely
inadequate。 For； all the notion I have of God is obtained by
reflecting on my own soul； heightening its powers； and removing
its ｛232｝ imperfections。 I have； therefore； though not an
inactive idea； yet in some sort of an active thinking
image of the Deity。 And； though I perceive Him not by sense； yet
I have a notion of Him； or know Him by reflexion and reasoning。
My own mind and my own ideas I have an immediate knowledge of；
and； by the help of these； do mediately apprehend the possibility
of the existence of other spirits and ideas。 Farther； from my own
being； and from the dependency I find in myself and my ideas； I
do； by an act of reason； necessarily infer the existence of a
God； and of all created things in the mind of God。 So much for
your first question。 For the second： I suppose by this time you
can answer it yourself。 For you neither perceive Matter
objectively； as you do an inactive being or idea； nor know it； as
you do yourself； by a reflex act； neither do you mediately
apprehend it by similitude of the one or the other； nor yet
collect it by reasoning from that which you know immediately。 All
which makes the case of widely different from that of
the 。
＇。 You say your own soul supplies you with some sort of
an idea or image of God。 But； at the same time； you acknowledge
you have； properly speaking； no of your own soul。 You even
affirm that spirits are a sort of beings altogether different
from ideas。 Consequently that no idea can be like a spirit。 We
have therefore no idea of any spirit。 You admit nevertheless that
there is spiritual Substance； although you have no idea of it；
while you deny there can be such a thing as material Substance；
because you have no notion or idea of it。 Is this fair dealing？
To act consistently； you must either admit Matter or reject
Spirit。 What say you to this？
。 say； in the first place； that I do not deny the
existence of material substance； merely because I have no notion
of it' but because the notion of it is inconsistent； or； in other
words； because it is repugnant that there should be a notion of
it。 Many things； for aught I know； may exist； whereof neither I
nor any other man hath or can have any idea or notion whatsoever。
But then those things must be possible； that is； nothing ｛233｝
inconsistent must be included in their definition。 I say；
secondly； that； although we believe things to exist which we do
not perceive； yet we may not believe that any particular thing
exists； without some reason for such belief： but I have no reason
for believing the existence of Matter。 I have no immediate
intuition thereof： neither can I immediately from my sensations；
ideas； notions； actions； or passions； infer an unthinking；
unperceiving； inactive Substance either by probable deduction；
or necessary consequence。 Whereas the being of my Self； that is；
my own soul； mind； or thinking principle； I evidently know by
reflexion。 You will forgive me if I repeat the same things in
answer to the same objections。 In the very notion or definition
of ； there is included a manifest repugnance
and inconsisten