personal memoirs-1- 第57部分

the　cavalry　might　turn　the　Confederates　on　the　Central　or　Charles

City　road；　but　the　continually　increasing　force　of　the　enemy　showed

this　to　be　impracticable。　　The　long　front　presented　by　Hancock's

corps　and　the　cavalry　deceived　General　Lee；　and　he　undoubtedly

thought　that　nearly　all　of　Grant's　army　had　been　moved　to　the　north

side　of　the　James　River；　and　to　meet　the　danger　he　transferred　the

most　of　his　own　strength　to　the　same　side　to　confront　his　adversary；

thinning　the　lines　around　Petersburg　to　reinforce　those　opposing　us

on　the　Central　and　New　Market　roads。　　This　was　what　Grant　hoped　Lee

would　do　in　case　the　operations　of　Hancock　and　myself　became

impracticable；　for　Grant　had　an　alternative　plan　for　carrying

Petersburg　by　assault　in　conjunction　with　the　explosion　of　a　mine

that　had　been　driven　under　the　enemy's　works　from　the　front　of

Burnside's　corps。



Now　that　there　was　no　longer　a　chance　for　the　cavalry　to　turn　the

enemy's　left；　our　attention　was　directed　to　keeping　up　the　deception

of　Lee；　and　on　the　afternoon　of　the　28th　Hancock's　corps　withdrew　to

a　line　nearer　the　head　of　the　bridge；　the　cavalry　drawing　back　to　a

position　on　his　right。　　From　now　on；　all　sorts　of　devices　and

stratagems　were　practicedanything　that　would　tend　to　make　the

Confederates　believe　we　were　being　reinforced；　while　Hancock　was

preparing　for　a　rapid　return　to　Petersburg　at　the　proper　time。　　In

order　to　delude　the　enemy　still　more　after　night…fall　of　the　28th　I

sent　one　of　my　divisions　to　the　south　side　of　the　James；　first

covering　the　bridgeway　with　refuse　hay　to　keep　the　tram　of　the　horses

from　being　heard。　　After　daylight　the　next　morning；　I　marched　this

division　back　again　on　foot；　in　full　view　of　the　enemy；　to　create　the

impression　of　a　continuous　movement　large　bodies　of　infantry　to　the

north　side；　while　the　same　time　Kautz　was　made　to　skirmish　with　the

enemy　on　our　extreme　right。　　These　various　artifices　had　the　effect

intended；　for　by　the　evening　of　the　29th　Lee　had　transferred　all　his

infantry　to　the　north　bank　of　the　James；　except　three　divisions；　and

all　his　cavalry　save　one。



The　morning　of　the　30th　had　been　fixed　upon　to　explode　the　mine　and

assault　the　enemy's　works；　so　after　dark　on　the　evening　of　the　29th

Hancock　hastily　but　quietly　withdrew　his　corps　to　the　south　side　to

take　part　in　the　engagement　which　was　to　succeed　the　explosion；　and　I

was　directed　to　follow　Hancock。　　This　left　me　on　the　north　side　of

the　river　confronting　two…thirds　of　Lee's　army　in　a　perilous

position；　where　I　could　easily　be　driven　into　Curl's　Neck　and　my

whole　command　annihilated。　　The　situation；　therefore；　was　not　a

pleasant　one　to　contemplate；　but　it　could　not　be　avoided。　　Luckily

the　enemy　did　not　see　fit　to　attack；　and　my　anxiety　was　greatly

relieved　by　getting　the　whole　command　safely　across　the　bridge

shortly　after　daylight；　having　drawn　in　the　different　brigades

successively　from　my　right。　　By　10　o'clock　on　the　morning　of　the　3oth

my　leading　division　was　well　over　toward　the　left　of　our　army　in

front　of　Petersburg；　marching　with　the　purpose　to　get　around　the

enemy's　right　flank　during　the　operations　that　were　to　succeed　the

mine　explosion；　but　when　I　reached　General　Meade's　headquarters　I

found　that　lamentable　failure　had　attended　the　assault　made　when　the

enemy's　works　were　blown　up　in　the　morning。　　Blunder　after　blunder

had　rendered　the　assault　abortive；　and　all　the　opportunities　opened

by　our　expedition　to　the　north　side　were　irretrievably　lost；　so

General　Meade　at　once　arrested　the　movement　of　the　cavalry。



In　the　expedition　to　Deep　Bottom　I　was　under　the　command　of　Major…

General　Hancock；　who；　by　seniority；　was　to　control　my　corps　as　well

as　his　own　until　the　way　was　opened　for　me　to　get　out　on　the　Virginia

Central　railroad。　　If　this　opportunity　was　gained；　I　was　to　cut　loose

and　damage　Lee's　communications　with　the　Shenandoah　Valley　in　such

manner　as　best　suited　the　conditions；　but　my　return　was　not　to　be

jeopardized　nor　long　delayed。　　This　necessitated　that　Hancock's　line

should　extend　to　Bottom's　bridge　on　the　Chickahominy。　　The　enemy's

early　discovery　of　the　movement　and　his　concentration　of　troops　on

the　north　side　prevented　Hancock　from　accomplishing　the　programme

laid　out　for　him。　　Its　impracticability　was　demonstrated　early　on　the

27th；　and　Hancock's　soldierly　instincts　told　him　this　the　moment　he

unexpectedly　discovered　Kershaw　blocking　the　New　Market　and　Charles

City　roads。　　To　Hancock　the　temptation　to　assault　Kershaw's　position

was　strong　indeed；　but　if　he　carried　it　there　would　still　remain　the

dubious　problem　of　holding　the　line　necessary　for　my　safe　return；　so

with　rare　judgment　he　desisted　zealously　turning　to　the　alternative

propositionthe　assault　on　Petersburgfor　more　significant　results。

This　was　the　only　occasion　during　the　war　in　which　I　was　associated

with　Hancock　in　campaign。　　Up　till　then　we　had　seldom　met；　and　that

was　the　first　opportunity　I　had　to　observe　his　quick　apprehension；

his　physical　courage；　and　the　soldierly　personality　which　had　long

before　established　his　high　reputation。



On　the　1st　of　August；　two　days　after　the　mine　explosion；　I　was。

relieved　from　the　personal　command　of　the　Cavalry　Corps；　and　ordered

to　the　Shenandoah　Valley；　where　at　a　later　date　Torbert's　and

Wilson's　divisions　joined　me。　　Practically；　after　I　went　to　the

valley；　my　command　of　the　Cavalry　Corps　became　supervisory　merely。

During　the　period　of　my　immediate　control　of　the　corps；　I　tried　to

carry　into　effect；　as　far　as　possible；　the　views　I　had　advanced

before　and　during　the　opening　of　the　Wilderness　campaign；　i。e。；　〃that

our　cavalry　ought　to　fight　the　enemy's　cavalry；　and　our　infantry　the

enemy's　infantry〃；　for　there　was　great　danger　of　breaking　the　spirit

of　the　corps　if　it　was　to　be　pitted　against　the　enemy's　compact

masses　of　foot…troops　posted　behind　intrenchments；　and　unless　there

was　some　adequate　tactical　or　strategical　advantage　to　be　gained；

such　a　use　of　it　would　not　be　justified。　　Immediately　succeeding　the

battles　of　the　Wilderness；　opportunity　offered　to　put　this　plan　into

execution　to　some　extent；　and　from　that　time　forwardfrom　the　battle

of　Yellow　Tavernour　success　was　almost　continuous；　resulting

finally；　before　the　close　of　the　war；　in　the　nearly　total

annihilation　of　the　enemy's　cavalry。



The　constant　activity　of　the　corps　from　May　5　till　August　1　gave

little　opportunity　for　the　various　division　and　brigade　commanders　to

record　its　work　in　detail；　so　there　exists　but　meagre　accounts　of　the

numerous　skirmishes　and　graver　conflicts　in　which；　in　addition　to　the

fights　mentioned　in　this　narrative；　it　engaged。　　A　detailed　history

of　its　performances　is　not　within　the　province　of　a　work　of　this

nature；　but　in　review；　it　can　be　said；　without　trespassing　on　the

reader's　time；　that　the　Cavalry　Corps　led　the　advance　of　the　Army　of

the　Potomac　into　the　Wilderness　in　the　memorable　campaign　of　1864；

that　on　the　expedition　by　way　of　Richmond　to　Haxall's　it　marked　out

the　army's　line　of　march　to　the　North　Anna；　that　it　again　led　the

advance　to　the　Tolopotomy；　and　also　to　Cold　Harbor；　holding　that

important　strategic　point　at　great　hazard；　and　that　by　the　Trevillian

expedition　it　drew　away　the　enemy's　cavalry　from　the　south　side　of

the　Chickahominy；　and　thereby　assisted　General　Grant　materially　in

successfully　marching　to　the　James　River　and　Petersburg。

Subsequently；　Wilson　made　his　march　to　Staunton　bridge；　destroying

railroads　and　supplies　of　inestimable　value；　and　though　this　was

neutralized　by　his　disaster　near　Ream's　Station；　the　temporary　set…

back　there　to　one　division　was　soon　redeemed　by　victory　over　the

Confederate　infantry　at　the　battle　of　Darbytown。



In　the　campaign　we　were　almost　always　on　the　march；　night　and　day；

often　unable　to　care　properly　for　our　wounded；　and　obliged　to　bury

our　dead　where　they　fell；　and　innumerable　combats　attest　the　part　the

cavalry　played　in　Grant's　march　from　the　Rapidan　to　Petersburg。　　In

nearly　all　of　these　our　casualties　were　heavy；　particularly　so　when；

as　was　often　the　case；　we　had　to　engage　the　Confederate　infantry；　but

the　enemy　returned　such　a　full　equivalent　in　dead　and　wounded　in

every　instance；　that　finally　his　mounted　power；　which　from　the

beginning　of　the　war　had　been　nurtured　with　a　wise　appreciation　of

its　value；　was　utterly　broken。









CHAPTER　XXIII。



GENERAL　HUNTER'S　SUCCESSFUL　MARCH　AND　SUBSEQUENT　RETREATGENERAL

JUBAL　A。　EARLY　THREATENS　WASHINGTONCHAMBERSBURG；　PA。；　BURNED

SELECTED　TO　OPERATE　AGAINST　GENERAL　EARLYTHE　SHENANDOAH　VALLEY

THE　CONFEDERATE　ARMY。



When　the　attempt　to　take　Petersburg　in　conjunction　with　the　mine

explosion　resulted　in　such　a　dismal　failure；　all　the　operations

contemplated　in　connection　with　that　project　came　to　a　standstill；

and　there　was　every　prospect　that　the　intensely　hot　and　sultry

weather　would　prevent　further　activity　in　the　Army　of　the　Potomac

till　a　more　propitious　season。　　Just　now；　however；　the　conditions

existing　in　the　Shenandoah　Valley　and　along　the　upper　Potomac

demanded　the　special　attention　of　General　Grant；　for；　notwithstanding

the　successful　march　that　Major…General　David　Hunter　had　made　toward

Lynchburg　early　in　the　summer；　what　he　had　first　gained　was

subsequently　lost　by　strategical　mistakes；　that　culminated　in

disaster　during　the　retreat　he　was　obliged　to　make　from　the　vicinity

of　Lynchburg　to　the　Kanawha　Valley。　　This　route　of　march　uncovered

the　lower　portion　of　the　Valley　of　the　Shenandoah；　and　with　the

exception　of　a　small　force　of　Union　troops　under　General　Franz　Sigel

posted　aft　Martinsburg　for　the　purpose　of　covering　the　Baltimore　and

Ohio　railroad；　there　was　nothing　at　hand　to　defend　the　lower　valley。



The　different　bodies　of　Confederates　which　compelled　Hunter's　retreat

were　under　command　of　General　Jubal　A。　Early；　who　had　been　sent　to

Lynchburg　wi