personal memoirs-1- 第58部分

The　different　bodies　of　Confederates　which　compelled　Hunter's　retreat

were　under　command　of　General　Jubal　A。　Early；　who　had　been　sent　to

Lynchburg　with　Ewell's　corps　after　the　defeat　of　the　Confederate

General　W。　C。　Jones　near　Staunton　on　the　5th　of　June；　to　take　command

of　the　Valley　District。　　When　Early　had　forced　Hunter　into　the

Kanawha　region　far　enough　to　feel　assured　that　Lynchburg　could　not

again　be　threatened　from　that　direction；　he　united　to　his　own　corps

General　John　C。　Breckenridge's　infantry　division　and　the　cavalry　of

Generals　J。　H。　Vaughn；　John　McCausland。　　B。　T。　Johnson；　and　J。　D。

Imboden；　which　heretofore　had　been　operating　in　southwest　and　western

Virginia　under　General　Robert　Ransom；　Jr。；　and　with　the　column　thus

formed；　was　ready　to　turn　his　attention　to　the　lower　Shenandoah

Valley。　　At　Early's　suggestion　General　Lee　authorized　him　to　move

north　at　an　opportune　moment；　cross　the　upper　Potomac　into　Maryland

and　threaten　Washington。　　Indeed；　General　Lee　had　foreshadowed　such　a

course　when　Early　started　toward　Lynchburg　for　the　purpose　of

relieving　the　pressure　in　front　of　Petersburg；　but　was　in　some　doubt

as　to　the　practicability　of　the　movement　later；　till　persuaded　to　it

by　the　representations　of　Early　after　that　general　had　driven　Hunter

beyond　the　mountains　and　found　little　or　nothing　opposing　except　the

small　force　of　Sigel；　which　he　thought　he　could　readily　overcome　by

celerity　of　movement。



By　rapid　marching　Early　reached　Winchester　on　the　2d　of　July；　and　on

the　4th　occupied　Martinsburg；　driving　General　Sigel　out　of　that　place

the　same　day　that　Hunter's　troops；　after　their　fatiguing　retreat

through　the　mountains；　reached　Charlestown；　West　Virginia。　　Early　was

thus　enabled　to　cross　the　Potomac　without　difficulty；　when；　moving

around　。　　Harper's　Ferry；　through　the　gaps　of　the　South　Mountain；　he

found　his　path　unobstructed　till　he　reached　the　Monocacy；　where

Ricketts's　division　of　the　Sixth　Corps；　and　some　raw　troops　that　had

been　collected　by　General　Lew　Wallace；　met　and　held　the　Confederates

till　the　other　reinforcements　that　had　been　ordered　to　the　capital

from　Petersburg　could　be　brought　up。　　Wallace　contested　the　line　of

the　Monocacy　with　obstinacy；　but　had　to　retire　finally　toward

Baltimore。　　The　road　was　then　open　to　Washington；　and　Early　marched

to　the　outskirts　and　began　against　the　capital　the　demonstrations

which　were　designed　to　divert　the　Army　of　the　Potomac　from　its　main

purpose　in　front　of　Petersburg。



Early's　audacity　in　thus　threatening　Washington　had　caused　some

concern　to　the　officials　in　the　city；　but　as　the　movement　was　looked

upon　by　General　Grant　as　a　mere　foray　which　could　have　no　decisive

issue；　the　Administration　was　not　much　disturbed　till　the

Confederates　came　in　close　proximity。　　Then　was　repeated　the　alarm

and　consternation　of　two　years　before；　fears　for　the　safety　of　the

capital　being　magnified　by　the　confusion　and　discord　existing　among

the　different　generals　in　Washington　and　Baltimore；　and　the　imaginary

dangers　vanished　only　with　the　appearance　of　General　Wright；　who；

with　the　Sixth　Corps　and　one　division　of　the　Nineteenth　Corps；　pushed

out　to　attack　Early　as　soon　as　he　could　get　his　arriving　troops　in

hand；　but　under　circumstances　that　precluded　celerity　of　movement；

and　as　a　consequence　the　Confederates　escaped　with　little　injury；

retiring　across　the　Potomac　to　Leesburg；　unharassed　save　by　some

Union　cavalry　that　had　been　sent　out　into　Loudoun　County　by　Hunter；

who　in　the　meantime　had　arrived　at　Harper's　Ferry　by　the　Baltimore

and　Ohio　railroad。　　From　Leesburg　Early　retired　through　Winchester

toward　Strasburg；　but　when　the　head　of　his　column　reached　this　place

he　found　that　he　was　being　followed　by　General　Crook　with　the

combined　troops　of　Hunter　and　Sigel　only；　Wright　having　returned　to

Washington　under　orders　to　rejoin　Meade　at　Petersburg。　　This

reduction　of　the　pursuing　force　tempting　Early　to　resume　the

offensive；　he　attacked　Crook　at　Kernstown；　and　succeeded　in

administering　such　a　check　as　to　necessitate　this　general's　retreat

to　Martinsburg；　and　finally　to　Harper's　Ferry。　　Crook's　withdrawal

restored　to　Early　the　line　of　the　upper　Potomac；　so；　recrossing　this

stream；　he　advanced　again　into　Maryland；　and　sending　McCausland　on　to

Chambersburg；　Pennsylvania；　laid　that　town　in　ashes；　leaving　three

thousand　non…combatants　without　shelter　or　food。



When　Early　fell　back　from　the　vicinity　of　Washington　toward

Strasburg；　General　Grant　believed　that　he　would　rejoin　Lee；　but　later

manoeuvres　of　the　enemy　indicated　that　Early　had　given　up　this　idea；

if　he　ever；　entertained　it；　and　intended　to　remain　in　the　valley；

since　it　would　furnish　Lee　and　himself　with　subsistence；　and　also

afford　renewed　opportunities　for　threatening　Washington。　　Indeed；　the

possession　of　the　Valley　of　the　Shenandoah　at　this　time　was　of　vast

importance　to　Lee's　army；　and　on　every　hand　there　were　indications

that　the　Confederate　Government　wished　to　hold　it　at　least　until

after　the　crops　could　be　gathered　in　to　their　depots　at　Lynchburg　and

Richmond。　　Its　retention；　besides　being　of　great　advantage　in　the

matter　of　supplies；　would　also　be　a　menace　to　the　North　difficult　for

General　Grant　to　explain；　and　thereby　add　an　element　of　considerable

benefit　to　the　Confederate　cause；　so　when　Early's　troops　again

appeared　at　Martinsburg　it　was　necessary　for　General　Grant　to

confront　them　with　a　force　strong　enough　to　put　an　end　to　incursions

north　of　the　Potomac；　which　hitherto　had　always　led　to　National

discomfiture　at　some　critical　juncture；　by　turning　our　army　in

eastern　Virginia　from　its　chief　purposethe　destruction　of　Lee　and

the　capture　of　the　Confederate　capital。



This　second　irruption　of　Early；　and　his　ruthless　destruction　of

Chambersburg　led　to　many　recommendations　on　the　part　of　General　Grant

looking　to　a　speedy　elimination　of　the　confusion　then　existing　among

the　Union　forces　along　the　upper　Potomac；　but　for　a　time　the

authorities　at　Washington　would　approve　none　of　his　propositions。

The　President　and　Secretary　Stanton　seemed　unwilling　to　adopt　his

suggestions；　and　one　measure　which　he　deemed　very　importantthe

consolidation　into　a　single　command　of　the　four　geographical

districts　into　which；　to　relieve　political　pressure　no　doubt；　the

territory　had　been　dividedmet　with　serious　opposition。　　Despite

Grant's　representations；　he　could　not　prevail　on　the　Administration

to　approve　this　measure；　but　finally　the　manoeuvres　of　Early　and　the

raid　to　Chambersburg　compelled　a　partial　compliance；　though　Grant　had

somewhat　circumvented　the　difficulty　already　by　deciding　to　appoint　a

commander　for　the　forces　in　the　field　that　were　to　operate　against

Early。



On　the　31st　of　July　General　Grant　selected　me　as　this　commander；　and

in　obedience　to　his　telegraphic　summons　I　repaired　to　his

headquarters　at　City　Point。　　In　the　interview　that　followed；　he

detailed　to　me　the　situation　of　affairs　on　the　upper　Potomac；　telling

me　that　I　was　to　command　in　the　field　the　troops　that　were　to　operate

against　Early；　but　that　General　Hunter；　who　was　at　the　head　of　the

geographical　department；　would　be　continued　in　his　position　for　the

reason　that　the　Administration　was　reluctant　to　reconstruct　or

consolidate　the　different　districts。　　After　informing　me　that　one

division　of　the　Cavalry　Corps　would　be　sent　to　my　new　command；　he

went　on　to　say　that　he　wanted　me　to　push　the　enemy　as　soon　as　this

division　arrived；　and　if　Early　retired　up　the　Shenandoah　Valley　I　was

to　pursue；　but　if　he　crossed　the　Potomac　I　was　to　put　myself　south　of

him　and　try　to　compass　his　destruction。　　The　interview　having　ended；

I　returned　to　Hancock　Station　to　prepare　for　my　departure；　and　on　the

evening　of　August　1　I　was　relieved　from　immediate　duty　with　the　Army

of　the　Potomac；　but　not　from　command　of　the　cavalry　as　a　corps

organization。



I　arrived　at　Washington　on　the　4th　of　August；　and　the　next　day

received　instructions　from　General　Halleck　to　report　to　General　Grant

at　Monocacy　Junction；　whither　he　had　gone　direct　from　City　Point；　in

consequence　of　a　characteristic　despatch　from　the　President

indicating　his　disgust　with　the　confusion；　disorder；　and　helplessness

prevailing　along　the　upper　Potomac；　and　intimating　that　Grant's

presence　there　was　necessary。



In　company　with　the　Secretary　of　War　I　called　on　the　President　before

leaving　Washington；　and　during　a　short　conversation　Mr。　Lincoln

candidly　told　me　that　Mr。　Stanton　had　objected　to　my　assignment　to

General　Hunter's　command；　because　he　thought　me　too　young；　and　that

he　himself　had　concurred　with　the　Secretary；　but　now；　since　General

Grant　had　〃ploughed　round〃　the　difficulties　of　the　situation　by

picking　me　out　to　command　the　〃boys　in　the　field；〃　he　felt　satisfied

with　what　had　been　done；　and　〃hoped　for　the　best。〃　　Mr。　Stanton

remained　silent　during　these　remarks；　never　once　indicating　whether

he；　too；　had　become　reconciled　to　my　selection　or　not；　and　although；

after　we　left　the　White　House；　he　conversed　with　me　freely　in　regard

to　the　campaign　I　was　expected　to　make；　seeking　to　impress　on　me　the

necessity　for　success　from　the　political　as　well　as　from　the　military

point　of　view；　yet　he　utterly　ignored　the　fact　that　he　had　taken　any

part　in　disapproving　the　recommendation　of　the　general…in…chief。



August　6；　I　reported　to　General　Grant　at　the　Monocacy；　and　he　there

turned　over　to　me　the　following　instructions；　which　he　had　previously

prepared　for　General　Hunter　in　the　expectation　that　general　would

continue　to　command　the　department：



〃HEADQUARTERS　IN　THE　FIELD；

〃Monocacy　Bridge；　Md。；　Aug。　　5；　1864。



〃GENERAL：　Concentrate　all　your　available　force　without　delay　in　the

vicinity　of　Harper's　Ferry；　leaving　only　such　railroad　guards　and

garrisons　for　public　property　as　may　be　necessary。



〃Use　in　this　concentration　the　railroad；　if　by　so　doing　time　c