meno- 第5部分

together　into　the　nature　of　virtue？



　　Men。　By　all　means；　Socrates。　And　yet　I　would　much　rather　return　to



my　original　question；　Whether　in　seeking　to　acquire　virtue　we　should



regard　it　as　a　thing　to　be　taught；　or　as　a　gift　of　nature；　or　as



coming　to　men　in　some　other　way？



　　Soc。　Had　I　the　command　of　you　as　well　as　of　myself；　Meno；　I　would



not　have　enquired　whether　virtue　is　given　by　instruction　or　not；　until



we　had　first　ascertained　〃what　it　is。〃　But　as　you　think　only　of



controlling　me　who　am　your　slave；　and　never　of　controlling



yourself；…such　being　your　notion　of　freedom；　I　must　yield　to　you；



for　you　are　irresistible。　And　therefore　I　have　now　to　enquire　into　the



qualities　of　a　thing　of　which　I　do　not　as　yet　know　the　nature。　At



any　rate；　will　you　condescend　a　little；　and　allow　the　question



〃Whether　virtue　is　given　by　instruction；　or　in　any　other　way；〃　to　be



argued　upon　hypothesis？　As　the　geometrician；　when　he　is　asked



whether　a　certain　triangle　is　capable　being　inscribed　in　a　certain



circle；　will　reply：　〃I　cannot　tell　you　as　yet；　but　I　will　offer　a



hypothesis　which　may　assist　us　in　forming　a　conclusion：　If　the



figure　be　such　that　when　you　have　produced　a　given　side　of　it；　the



given　area　of　the　triangle　falls　short　by　an　area　corresponding　to　the



part　produced；　then　one　consequence　follows；　and　if　this　is　impossible



then　some　other；　and　therefore　I　wish　to　assume　a　hypothesis　before



I　tell　you　whether　this　triangle　is　capable　of　being　inscribed　in



the　circle〃：…that　is　a　geometrical　hypothesis。　And　we　too；　as　we



know　not　the　nature　and　…qualities　of　virtue；　must　ask；　whether　virtue



is　or　not　taught；　under　a　hypothesis：　as　thus；　if　virtue　is　of　such



a　class　of　mental　goods；　will　it　be　taught　or　not？　Let　the　first



hypothesis　be…that　virtue　is　or　is　not　knowledge；…in　that　case　will　it



be　taught　or　not？　or；　as　we　were　just　now　saying；　remembered〃？　For



there　is　no　use　in　disputing　about　the　name。　But　is　virtue　taught　or



not？　or　rather；　does　not　everyone　see　that　knowledge　alone　is　taught？



　　Men。　I　agree。



　　Soc。　Then　if　virtue　is　knowledge；　virtue　will　be　taught？



　　Men。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　Then　now　we　have　made　a　quick　end　of　this　question：　if　virtue



is　of　such　a　nature；　it　will　be　taught；　and　if　not；　not？



　　Men。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　The　next　question　is；　whether　virtue　is　knowledge　or　of　another



species？



　　Men。　Yes；　that　appears　to　be　the　…question　which　comes　next　in



order。



　　Soc。　Do　we　not　say　that　virtue　is　a　good？…This　is　a　hypothesis　which



is　not　set　aside。



　　Men。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　Now；　if　there　be　any　sort…of　good　which　is　distinct　from



knowledge；　virtue　may　be　that　good；　but　if　knowledge　embraces　all



good；　then　we　shall　be　right　in　think　in　that　virtue　is　knowledge？



　　Men。　True。



　　Soc。　And　virtue　makes　us　good？



　　Men。　Yes。



　　Soc。　And　if　we　are　good；　then　we　are　profitable；　for　all　good　things



are　profitable？



　　Men。　Yes。



　　Soc。　Then　virtue　is　profitable？



　　Men。　That　is　the　only　inference。



　　Soc。　Then　now　let　us　see　what　are　the　things　which　severally



profit　us。　Health　and　strength；　and　beauty　and　wealth…these；　and　the



like　of　these；　we　call　profitable？



　　Men。　True。



　　Soc。　And　yet　these　things　may　also　sometimes　do　us　harm：　would　you



not　think　so？



　　Men。　Yes。



　　Soc。　And　what　is　the　guiding　principle　which　makes　them　profitable



or　the　reverse？　Are　they　not　profitable　when　they　are　rightly　used；



and　hurtful　when　they　are　not　rightly　used？



　　Men。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　Next；　let　us　consider　the　goods　of　the　soul：　they　are



temperance；　justice；　courage；　quickness　of　apprehension；　memory；



magnanimity；　and　the　like？



　　Men。　Surely。



　　Soc。　And　such　of　these　as　are　not　knowledge；　but　of　another　sort；



are　sometimes　profitable　and　sometimes　hurtful；　as；　for　example；



courage　wanting　prudence；　which　is　only　a　sort　of　confidence？　When　a



man　has　no　sense　he　is　harmed　by　courage；　but　when　he　has　sense　he



is　profited？



　　Men。　True。



　　Soc。　And　the　same　may　be　said　of　temperance　and　quickness　of



apprehension；　whatever　things　are　learned　or　done　with　sense　are



profitable；　but　when　done　without　sense　they　are　hurtful？



　　Men。　Very　true。



　　Soc。　And　in　general；　all　that　the　attempts　or　endures；　when　under



the　guidance　of　wisdom；　ends　in　happiness；　but　when　she　is　under　the



guidance　of　folly；　in　the　opposite？



　　Men。　That　appears　to　be　true。



　　Soc。　If　then　virtue　is　a　quality　of　the　soul；　and　is　admitted　to



be　profitable；　it　must　be　wisdom　or　prudence；　since　none　of　the　things



of　the　soul　are　either　profitable　or　hurtful　in　themselves；　but　they



are　all　made　profitable　or　hurtful　by　the　addition　of　wisdom　or　of



folly；　and　therefore　and　therefore　if　virtue　is　profitable；　virtue



must　be　a　sort　of　wisdom　or　prudence？



　　Men。　I　quite　agree。



　　Soc。　And　the　other　goods；　such　as　wealth　and　the　like；　of　which　we



were　just　now　saying　that　they　are　sometimes　good　and　sometimes



evil；　do　not　they　also　become　profitable　or　hurtful；　accordingly　as



the　soul　guides　and　uses　them　rightly　or　wrongly；　just　as　the　things



of　the　soul　herself　are　benefited　when　under　the　guidance　of　wisdom



and　harmed　by　folly？



　　Men。　True。



　　Soc。　And　the　wise　soul　guides　them　rightly；　and　the　foolish　soul



wrongly。



　　Men。　Yes。



　　Soc。　And　is　not　this　universally　true　of　human　nature？　All　other



things　hang　upon　the　soul；　and　the　things　of　the　soul　herself　hang



upon　wisdom；　if　they　are　to　be　good；　and　so　wisdom　is　inferred　to　be



that　which　profits…and　virtue；　as　we　say；　is　profitable？



　　Men。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　And　thus　we　arrive　at　the　conclusion　that　virtue　is　either



wholly　or　partly　wisdom？



　　Men。　I　think　that　what　you　are　saying；　Socrates；　is　very　true。



　　Soc。　But　if　this　is　true；　then　the　good　are　not　by　nature　good？



　　Men。　I　think　not。



　　Soc。　If　they　had　been；　there　would　assuredly　have　been　discerners　of



characters　among　us　who　would　have　known　our　future　great　men；　and



on　their　showing　we　should　have　adopted　them；　and　when　we　had　got



them；　we　should　have　kept　them　in　the　citadel　out　of　the　way　of



harm；　and　set　a　stamp　upon　them　far　rather　than　upon　a　piece　of



gold；　in　order　that　no　one　might　tamper　with　them；　and　when　they



grew　up　they　would　have　been　useful　to　the　state？



　　Men。　Yes；　Socrates；　that　would　have　been　the　right　way。



　　Soc。　But　if　the　good　are　not　by　nature　good；　are　they　made　good　by



instruction？



　　Men。　There　appears　to　be　no　other　alternative；　Socrates。　On　the



supposition　that　virtue　is　knowledge；　there　can　be　no　doubt　that



virtue　is　taught。



　　Soc。　Yes；　indeed；　but　what　if　the　supposition　is　erroneous？



　　Men。　I　certainly　thought　just　now　that　we　were　right。



　　Soc。　Yes；　Meno；　but　a　principle　which　has　any　soundness　should　stand



firm　not　only　just　now；　but　always。



　　Men。　Well；　and　why　are　you　so　slow　of　heart　to　believe　that



knowledge　is　virtue？



　　Soc。　I　will　try　and　tell　you　why；　Meno。　I　do　not　retract　the



assertion　that　if　virtue　is　knowledge　it　may　be　taught；　but　I　fear



that　I　have　some　reason　in　doubting　whether　virtue　is　knowledge：　for



consider　now。　and　say　whether　virtue；　and　not　only　virtue　but　anything



that　is　taught；　must　not　have　teachers　and　disciples？



　　Men。　Surely。



　　Soc。　And　conversely；　may　not　the　art　of　which　neither　teachers　nor



disciples　exist　be　assumed　to　be　incapable　of　being　taught？



　　Men。　True；　but　do　you　think　that　there　are　no　teachers　of　virtue？



　　Soc。　I　have　certainly　often　enquired　whether　there　were　any；　and



taken　great　pains　to　find　them；　and　have　never　succeeded；　and　many



have　assisted　me　in　the　search；　and　they　were　the　persons　whom　I



thought　the　most　likely　to　know。　Here　at　the　moment　when　he　is



wanted　we　fortunately　have　sitting　by　us　Anytus；　the　very　person　of



whom　we　should　make　enquiry；　to　him　then　let　us　repair。　In　the　first



Place；　he　is　the　son　of　a　wealthy　and　wise　father；　Anthemion；　who



acquired　his　wealth；　not　by　accident　or　gift；　like　Ismenias　the　Theban



（who　has　recently　made　himself　as　rich　as　Polycrates）；　but　by　his



own　skill　and　industry；　and　who　is　a　well…conditioned；　modest　man；　not



insolent；　or　over…bearing；　or　annoying；　moreover；　this　son　of　his



has　received　a　good　education；　as　the　Athenian　people　certainly　appear



to　think；　for　they　choose　him　to　fill　the　highest　offices。　And　these



are　the　sort　of　men　from　whom　you　are　likely　to　learn　whether　there



are　any　teachers　of　virtue；　and　who　they　are。　Please；　Anytus；　to



help　me　and　your　friend　Meno　in　answering　our　question；　Who　are　the



teachers？　Consider　the　matter　thus：　If　we　wanted　Meno　to　be　a　good



physician；　to　whom　should　we　send　him？　Should　we　not　send　him　to　the



physicians？



　　Any。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　Or　if　we　wanted　him　to　be　a　good　cobbler；　should　we　not　send



him　to　the　cobblers？



　　Any。　Yes。



　　Soc。　And　so　forth？



　　Any。　Yes。



　　Soc。　Let　me　trouble　you　with　one　more　question。　When　we　say　that



we　should　be　right　in　sending　him　to　the　physicians　if　we　wanted　him



to　be　a　physician；　do　we　mean　that　we　should　be　right　in　sending　him



to　those　who　profess　the　art；　rather　than　to　those　who　do　not；　and



to　those　who　demand　payment　for　teaching　the　art；　and　profess　to　teach



it　to　any　one　who　will　come　and　learn？　And　if　these　were　our



reasons；　should　we　not　be　right　in　sending　him？



　　Any。　Yes。



　　Soc。　And　might　not　the　same　be　said　of　flute…playing；　and　of　the



other　arts？　Would　a　man　who　wanted　to　make　another　a　flute…player



refuse　to　send　him　to　those　who　profess　to　teach　the　art　for　money；



and　be　plaguing　other　persons　to　give　him　instruction；　who　are　not



professed　teachers　and　who　never　had　a　single　disciple　in　that



branch　of　knowledge　which　he　wishes