charmides- 第12部分

itself；　and　of　all　other　desires？







Certainly　not。







Or　can　you　imagine　a　wish　which　wishes　for　no　good；　but　only　for　itself　and



all　other　wishes？







I　should　answer；　No。







Or　would　you　say　that　there　is　a　love　which　is　not　the　love　of　beauty；　but



of　itself　and　of　other　loves？







I　should　not。







Or　did　you　ever　know　of　a　fear　which　fears　itself　or　other　fears；　but　has



no　object　of　fear？







I　never　did；　he　said。







Or　of　an　opinion　which　is　an　opinion　of　itself　and　of　other　opinions；　and



which　has　no　opinion　on　the　subjects　of　opinion　in　general？







Certainly　not。







But　surely　we　are　assuming　a　science　of　this　kind；　which；　having　no



subject…matter；　is　a　science　of　itself　and　of　the　other　sciences？







Yes；　that　is　what　is　affirmed。







But　how　strange　is　this；　if　it　be　indeed　true：　　we　must　not　however　as　yet



absolutely　deny　the　possibility　of　such　a　science；　let　us　rather　consider



the　matter。







You　are　quite　right。







Well　then；　this　science　of　which　we　are　speaking　is　a　science　of　something；



and　is　of　a　nature　to　be　a　science　of　something？







Yes。







Just　as　that　which　is　greater　is　of　a　nature　to　be　greater　than　something



else？　　（Socrates　is　intending　to　show　that　science　differs　from　the　object



of　science；　as　any　other　relative　differs　from　the　object　of　relation。　　But



where　there　is　comparisongreater；　less；　heavier；　lighter；　and　the　likea



relation　to　self　as　well　as　to　other　things　involves　an　absolute



contradiction；　and　in　other　cases；　as　in　the　case　of　the　senses；　is　hardly



conceivable。　　The　use　of　the　genitive　after　the　comparative　in　Greek；



（Greek）；　creates　an　unavoidable　obscurity　in　the　translation。）







Yes。







Which　is　less；　if　the　other　is　conceived　to　be　greater？







To　be　sure。







And　if　we　could　find　something　which　is　at　once　greater　than　itself；　and



greater　than　other　great　things；　but　not　greater　than　those　things　in



comparison　of　which　the　others　are　greater；　then　that　thing　would　have　the



property　of　being　greater　and　also　less　than　itself？







That；　Socrates；　he　said；　is　the　inevitable　inference。







Or　if　there　be　a　double　which　is　double　of　itself　and　of　other　doubles；



these　will　be　halves；　for　the　double　is　relative　to　the　half？







That　is　true。







And　that　which　is　greater　than　itself　will　also　be　less；　and　that　which　is



heavier　will　also　be　lighter；　and　that　which　is　older　will　also　be　younger：　



and　the　same　of　other　things；　that　which　has　a　nature　relative　to　self　will



retain　also　the　nature　of　its　object：　　I　mean　to　say；　for　example；　that



hearing　is；　as　we　say；　of　sound　or　voice。　　Is　that　true？







Yes。







Then　if　hearing　hears　itself；　it　must　hear　a　voice；　for　there　is　no　other



way　of　hearing。







Certainly。







And　sight　also；　my　excellent　friend；　if　it　sees　itself　must　see　a　colour；



for　sight　cannot　see　that　which　has　no　colour。







No。







Do　you　remark；　Critias；　that　in　several　of　the　examples　which　have　been



recited　the　notion　of　a　relation　to　self　is　altogether　inadmissible；　and　in



other　cases　hardly　credibleinadmissible；　for　example；　in　the　case　of



magnitudes；　numbers；　and　the　like？







Very　true。







But　in　the　case　of　hearing　and　sight；　or　in　the　power　of　self…motion；　and



the　power　of　heat　to　burn；　this　relation　to　self　will　be　regarded　as



incredible　by　some；　but　perhaps　not　by　others。　　And　some　great　man；　my



friend；　is　wanted；　who　will　satisfactorily　determine　for　us；　whether　there



is　nothing　which　has　an　inherent　property　of　relation　to　self；　or　some



things　only　and　not　others；　and　whether　in　this　class　of　self…related



things；　if　there　be　such　a　class；　that　science　which　is　called　wisdom　or



temperance　is　included。　　I　altogether　distrust　my　own　power　of　determining



these　matters：　　I　am　not　certain　whether　there　is　such　a　science　of　science



at　all；　and　even　if　there　be；　I　should　not　acknowledge　this　to　be　wisdom　or



temperance；　until　I　can　also　see　whether　such　a　science　would　or　would　not



do　us　any　good；　for　I　have　an　impression　that　temperance　is　a　benefit　and　a



good。　　And　therefore；　O　son　of　Callaeschrus；　as　you　maintain　that



temperance　or　wisdom　is　a　science　of　science；　and　also　of　the　absence　of



science；　I　will　request　you　to　show　in　the　first　place；　as　I　was　saying



before；　the　possibility；　and　in　the　second　place；　the　advantage；　of　such　a



science；　and　then　perhaps　you　may　satisfy　me　that　you　are　right　in　your



view　of　temperance。







Critias　heard　me　say　this；　and　saw　that　I　was　in　a　difficulty；　and　as　one



person　when　another　yawns　in　his　presence　catches　the　infection　of　yawning



from　him；　so　did　he　seem　to　be　driven　into　a　difficulty　by　my　difficulty。　



But　as　he　had　a　reputation　to　maintain；　he　was　ashamed　to　admit　before　the



company　that　he　could　not　answer　my　challenge　or　determine　the　question　at



issue；　and　he　made　an　unintelligible　attempt　to　hide　his　perplexity。　　In



order　that　the　argument　might　proceed；　I　said　to　him；　Well　then　Critias；　if



you　like；　let　us　assume　that　there　is　this　science　of　science；　whether　the



assumption　is　right　or　wrong　may　hereafter　be　investigated。　　Admitting　the



existence　of　it；　will　you　tell　me　how　such　a　science　enables　us　to



distinguish　what　we　know　or　do　not　know；　which；　as　we　were　saying；　is



self…knowledge　or　wisdom：　　so　we　were　saying？







Yes；　Socrates；　he　said；　and　that　I　think　is　certainly　true：　　for　he　who　has



this　science　or　knowledge　which　knows　itself　will　become　like　the　knowledge



which　he　has；　in　the　same　way　that　he　who　has　swiftness　will　be　swift；　and



he　who　has　beauty　will　be　beautiful；　and　he　who　has　knowledge　will　know。　



In　the　same　way　he　who　has　that　knowledge　which　is　self…knowing；　will　know



himself。







I　do　not　doubt；　I　said；　that　a　man　will　know　himself；　when　he　possesses



that　which　has　self…knowledge：　　but　what　necessity　is　there　that；　having



this；　he　should　know　what　he　knows　and　what　he　does　not　know？







Because；　Socrates；　they　are　the　same。







Very　likely；　I　said；　but　I　remain　as　stupid　as　ever；　for　still　I　fail　to



comprehend　how　this　knowing　what　you　know　and　do　not　know　is　the　same　as



the　knowledge　of　self。







What　do　you　mean？　he　said。







This　is　what　I　mean；　I　replied：　　I　will　admit　that　there　is　a　science　of



science；can　this　do　more　than　determine　that　of　two　things　one　is　and　the



other　is　not　science　or　knowledge？







No；　just　that。







But　is　knowledge　or　want　of　knowledge　of　health　the　same　as　knowledge　or



want　of　knowledge　of　justice？







Certainly　not。







The　one　is　medicine；　and　the　other　is　politics；　whereas　that　of　which　we



are　speaking　is　knowledge　pure　and　simple。







Very　true。







And　if　a　man　knows　only；　and　has　only　knowledge　of　knowledge；　and　has　no



further　knowledge　of　health　and　justice；　the　probability　is　that　he　will



only　know　that　he　knows　something；　and　has　a　certain　knowledge；　whether



concerning　himself　or　other　men。







True。







Then　how　will　this　knowledge　or　science　teach　him　to　know　what　he　knows？　



Say　that　he　knows　health；not　wisdom　or　temperance；　but　the　art　of



medicine　has　taught　it　to　him；and　he　has　learned　harmony　from　the　art　of



music；　and　building　from　the　art　of　building；neither；　from　wisdom　or



temperance：　　and　the　same　of　other　things。







That　is　evident。







How　will　wisdom；　regarded　only　as　a　knowledge　of　knowledge　or　science　of



science；　ever　teach　him　that　he　knows　health；　or　that　he　knows　building？







It　is　impossible。







Then　he　who　is　ignorant　of　these　things　will　only　know　that　he　knows；　but



not　what　he　knows？







True。







Then　wisdom　or　being　wise　appears　to　be　not　the　knowledge　of　the　things



which　we　do　or　do　not　know；　but　only　the　knowledge　that　we　know　or　do　not



know？







That　is　the　inference。







Then　he　who　has　this　knowledge　will　not　be　able　to　examine　whether　a



pretender　knows　or　does　not　know　that　which　he　says　that　he　knows：　　he　will



only　know　that　he　has　a　knowledge　of　some　kind；　but　wisdom　will　not　show



him　of　what　the　knowledge　is？







Plainly　not。







Neither　will　he　be　able　to　distinguish　the　pretender　in　medicine　from　the



true　physician；　nor　between　any　other　true　and　false　professor　of



knowledge。　　Let　us　consider　the　matter　in　this　way：　　If　the　wise　man　or　any



other　man　wants　to　distinguish　the　true　physician　from　the　false；　how　will



he　proceed？　　He　will　not　talk　to　him　about　medicine；　and　that；　as　we　were



saying；　is　the　only　thing　which　the　physician　understands。







True。







And；　on　the　other　hand；　the　physician　knows　nothing　of　science；　for　this



has　been　assumed　to　be　the　province　of　wisdom。







True。







And　further；　since　medicine　is　science；　we　must　infer　that　he　does　not　know



anything　of　medicine。







Exactly。







Then　the　wise　man　may　indeed　know　that　the　physician　has　some　kind　of



science　or　knowledge；　but　when　he　wants　to　discover　the　nature　of　this　he



will　ask；　What　is　the　subject…matter？　　For　the　several　sciences　are



distinguished　not　by　the　mere　fact　that　they　are　sciences；　but　by　the



nature　of　their　subjects。　　Is　not　that　true？







Quite　true。







And　medicine　is　distinguish