charmides- 第13部分

Quite　true。







And　medicine　is　distinguished　from　other　sciences　as　having　the　subject…



matter　of　health　and　disease？







Yes。







And　he　who　would　enquire　into　the　nature　of　medicine　must　pursue　the



enquiry　into　health　and　disease；　and　not　into　what　is　extraneous？







True。







And　he　who　judges　rightly　will　judge　of　the　physician　as　a　physician　in



what　relates　to　these？







He　will。







He　will　consider　whether　what　he　says　is　true；　and　whether　what　he　does　is



right；　in　relation　to　health　and　disease？







He　will。







But　can　any　one　attain　the　knowledge　of　either　unless　he　have　a　knowledge



of　medicine？







He　cannot。







No　one　at　all；　it　would　seem；　except　the　physician　can　have　this　knowledge；



and　therefore　not　the　wise　man；　he　would　have　to　be　a　physician　as　well　as



a　wise　man。







Very　true。







Then；　assuredly；　wisdom　or　temperance；　if　only　a　science　of　science；　and　of



the　absence　of　science　or　knowledge；　will　not　be　able　to　distinguish　the



physician　who　knows　from　one　who　does　not　know　but　pretends　or　thinks　that



he　knows；　or　any　other　professor　of　anything　at　all；　like　any　other　artist；



he　will　only　know　his　fellow　in　art　or　wisdom；　and　no　one　else。







That　is　evident；　he　said。







But　then　what　profit；　Critias；　I　said；　is　there　any　longer　in　wisdom　or



temperance　which　yet　remains；　if　this　is　wisdom？　　If；　indeed；　as　we　were



supposing　at　first；　the　wise　man　had　been　able　to　distinguish　what　he　knew



and　did　not　know；　and　that　he　knew　the　one　and　did　not　know　the　other；　and



to　recognize　a　similar　faculty　of　discernment　in　others；　there　would



certainly　have　been　a　great　advantage　in　being　wise；　for　then　we　should



never　have　made　a　mistake；　but　have　passed　through　life　the　unerring　guides



of　ourselves　and　of　those　who　are　under　us；　and　we　should　not　have



attempted　to　do　what　we　did　not　know；　but　we　should　have　found　out　those



who　knew；　and　have　handed　the　business　over　to　them　and　trusted　in　them；



nor　should　we　have　allowed　those　who　were　under　us　to　do　anything　which



they　were　not　likely　to　do　well；　and　they　would　be　likely　to　do　well　just



that　of　which　they　had　knowledge；　and　the　house　or　state　which　was　ordered



or　administered　under　the　guidance　of　wisdom；　and　everything　else　of　which



wisdom　was　the　lord；　would　have　been　well　ordered；　for　truth　guiding；　and



error　having　been　eliminated；　in　all　their　doings；　men　would　have　done



well；　and　would　have　been　happy。　　Was　not　this；　Critias；　what　we　spoke　of



as　the　great　advantage　of　wisdomto　know　what　is　known　and　what　is　unknown



to　us？







Very　true；　he　said。







And　now　you　perceive；　I　said；　that　no　such　science　is　to　be　found　anywhere。







I　perceive；　he　said。







May　we　assume　then；　I　said；　that　wisdom；　viewed　in　this　new　light　merely　as



a　knowledge　of　knowledge　and　ignorance；　has　this　advantage：that　he　who



possesses　such　knowledge　will　more　easily　learn　anything　which　he　learns；



and　that　everything　will　be　clearer　to　him；　because；　in　addition　to　the



knowledge　of　individuals；　he　sees　the　science；　and　this　also　will　better



enable　him　to　test　the　knowledge　which　others　have　of　what　he　knows



himself；　whereas　the　enquirer　who　is　without　this　knowledge　may　be　supposed



to　have　a　feebler　and　weaker　insight？　　Are　not　these；　my　friend；　the　real



advantages　which　are　to　be　gained　from　wisdom？　　And　are　not　we　looking　and



seeking　after　something　more　than　is　to　be　found　in　her？







That　is　very　likely；　he　said。







That　is　very　likely；　I　said；　and　very　likely；　too；　we　have　been　enquiring



to　no　purpose；　as　I　am　led　to　infer；　because　I　observe　that　if　this　is



wisdom；　some　strange　consequences　would　follow。　　Let　us；　if　you　please；



assume　the　possibility　of　this　science　of　sciences；　and　further　admit　and



allow；　as　was　originally　suggested；　that　wisdom　is　the　knowledge　of　what　we



know　and　do　not　know。　　Assuming　all　this；　still；　upon　further



consideration；　I　am　doubtful；　Critias；　whether　wisdom；　such　as　this；　would



do　us　much　good。　　For　we　were　wrong；　I　think；　in　supposing；　as　we　were



saying　just　now；　that　such　wisdom　ordering　the　government　of　house　or　state



would　be　a　great　benefit。







How　so？　he　said。







Why；　I　said；　we　were　far　too　ready　to　admit　the　great　benefits　which



mankind　would　obtain　from　their　severally　doing　the　things　which　they　knew；



and　committing　the　things　of　which　they　are　ignorant　to　those　who　were



better　acquainted　with　them。







Were　we　not　right　in　making　that　admission？







I　think　not。







How　very　strange；　Socrates！







By　the　dog　of　Egypt；　I　said；　there　I　agree　with　you；　and　I　was　thinking　as



much　just　now　when　I　said　that　strange　consequences　would　follow；　and　that



I　was　afraid　we　were　on　the　wrong　track；　for　however　ready　we　may　be　to



admit　that　this　is　wisdom；　I　certainly　cannot　make　out　what　good　this　sort



of　thing　does　to　us。







What　do　you　mean？　he　said；　I　wish　that　you　could　make　me　understand　what



you　mean。







I　dare　say　that　what　I　am　saying　is　nonsense；　I　replied；　and　yet　if　a　man



has　any　feeling　of　what　is　due　to　himself；　he　cannot　let　the　thought　which



comes　into　his　mind　pass　away　unheeded　and　unexamined。







I　like　that；　he　said。







Hear；　then；　I　said；　my　own　dream；　whether　coming　through　the　horn　or　the



ivory　gate；　I　cannot　tell。　　The　dream　is　this：　　Let　us　suppose　that　wisdom



is　such　as　we　are　now　defining；　and　that　she　has　absolute　sway　over　us；



then　each　action　will　be　done　according　to　the　arts　or　sciences；　and　no　one



professing　to　be　a　pilot　when　he　is　not；　or　any　physician　or　general；　or



any　one　else　pretending　to　know　matters　of　which　he　is　ignorant；　will



deceive　or　elude　us；　our　health　will　be　improved；　our　safety　at　sea；　and



also　in　battle；　will　be　assured；　our　coats　and　shoes；　and　all　other



instruments　and　implements　will　be　skilfully　made；　because　the　workmen　will



be　good　and　true。　　Aye；　and　if　you　please；　you　may　suppose　that　prophecy；



which　is　the　knowledge　of　the　future；　will　be　under　the　control　of　wisdom；



and　that　she　will　deter　deceivers　and　set　up　the　true　prophets　in　their



place　as　the　revealers　of　the　future。　　Now　I　quite　agree　that　mankind；　thus



provided；　would　live　and　act　according　to　knowledge；　for　wisdom　would　watch



and　prevent　ignorance　from　intruding　on　us。　　But　whether　by　acting



according　to　knowledge　we　shall　act　well　and　be　happy；　my　dear　Critias；



this　is　a　point　which　we　have　not　yet　been　able　to　determine。







Yet　I　think；　he　replied；　that　if　you　discard　knowledge；　you　will　hardly



find　the　crown　of　happiness　in　anything　else。







But　of　what　is　this　knowledge？　I　said。　　Just　answer　me　that　small　question。　



Do　you　mean　a　knowledge　of　shoemaking？







God　forbid。







Or　of　working　in　brass？







Certainly　not。







Or　in　wool；　or　wood；　or　anything　of　that　sort？







No；　I　do　not。







Then；　I　said；　we　are　giving　up　the　doctrine　that　he　who　lives　according　to



knowledge　is　happy；　for　these　live　according　to　knowledge；　and　yet　they　are



not　allowed　by　you　to　be　happy；　but　I　think　that　you　mean　to　confine



happiness　to　particular　individuals　who　live　according　to　knowledge；　such



for　example　as　the　prophet；　who；　as　I　was　saying；　knows　the　future。　　Is　it



of　him　you　are　speaking　or　of　some　one　else？







Yes；　I　mean　him；　but　there　are　others　as　well。







Yes；　I　said；　some　one　who　knows　the　past　and　present　as　well　as　the　future；



and　is　ignorant　of　nothing。　　Let　us　suppose　that　there　is　such　a　person；



and　if　there　is；　you　will　allow　that　he　is　the　most　knowing　of　all　living



men。







Certainly　he　is。







Yet　I　should　like　to　know　one　thing　more：　　which　of　the　different　kinds　of



knowledge　makes　him　happy？　or　do　all　equally　make　him　happy？







Not　all　equally；　he　replied。







But　which　most　tends　to　make　him　happy？　the　knowledge　of　what　past；



present；　or　future　thing？　　May　I　infer　this　to　be　the　knowledge　of　the　game



of　draughts？







Nonsense　about　the　game　of　draughts。







Or　of　computation？







No。







Or　of　health？







That　is　nearer　the　truth；　he　said。







And　that　knowledge　which　is　nearest　of　all；　I　said；　is　the　knowledge　of



what？







The　knowledge　with　which　he　discerns　good　and　evil。







Monster！　I　said；　you　have　been　carrying　me　round　in　a　circle；　and　all　this



time　hiding　from　me　the　fact　that　the　life　according　to　knowledge　is　not



that　which　makes　men　act　rightly　and　be　happy；　not　even　if　knowledge



include　all　the　sciences；　but　one　science　only；　that　of　good　and　evil。　



For；　let　me　ask　you；　Critias；　whether；　if　you　take　away　this；　medicine　will



not　equally　give　health；　and　shoemaking　equally　produce　shoes；　and　the　art



of　the　weaver　clothes？whether　the　art　of　the　pilot　will　not　equally　save



our　lives　at　sea；　and　the　art　of　the　general　in　war？







Quite　so。







And　yet；　my　dear　Critias；　none　of　these　things　will　be　well　or　beneficially



done；　if　the　science　of　the　good　be　wanting。







True。







But　that　science　is　not　wisdom　or　temperance；　but　a　science　of　human



advantage；　not　a　science　of　other　sciences；　or　of　ignorance；　but　of　good



and　evil：　　and　if　this　be　of　use；　then　wisdom　or　temperance　will　not　be　of



use。







And　why；　he　re