ons； and if elected members of it； their peerage or senatorial office should be held in suspense。 The condition of time is needed to prevent persons from being named Cabinet Ministers merely to give them a seat in the Senate； and the period of two years is suggested； that the same term which qualifies them for a pension might entitle them to a senatorship。 All who had filled the office of Commander…in…Chief； and all who； having commanded an army or a fleet； had been thanked by Parliament for military or naval successes。 All who had held； during ten years； first…class diplomatic appointments。 All who had been Governors…General of India or British America； and all who had held for ten years any Colonial Governorships。 The permanent civil service should also be represented； all should be senators who had filled； during ten years； the important offices of Under…Secretary to the Treasury； permanent Under…Secretary of State； or any others equally high and responsible。 If； along with the persons thus qualified by practical experience in the administration of public affairs； any representation of the speculative class were to be included… a thing in itself desirable… it would be worth consideration whether certain professorships； in certain national institutions； after a tenure of a few years； might confer a seat in the Senate。 Mere scientific and literary eminence are too indefinite and disputable： they imply a power of selection； whereas the other qualifications speak for themselves； if the writings by which reputation has been gained are unconnected with politics； they are no evidence of the special qualities required； while if political； they would enable successive Ministries to deluge the House with party tools。 The historical antecedents of England render it all but certain that； unless in the improbable case of a violent subversion of the existing Constitution； any Second Chamber which could possibly exist would have to be built on the foundation of the House of Lords。 It is out of the question to think practically of abolishing that assembly； to replace it by such a Senate as I have sketched； or by any other； but there might not be the same insuperable difficulty in aggregating the classes or categories just spoken of to the existing body； in the character of Peers for life。 An ulterior； and perhaps； on this supposition； a necessary step； might be； that the hereditary Peerage should be present in the House by their representatives instead of personally： a practice already established in the case of the Scotch and Irish Peers； and which the mere multiplication of the order will probably at some time or other render inevitable。 An easy adaptation of Mr。 Hare's plan would prevent the representative Peers from representing exclusively the party which has the majority in the Peerage。 If； for example； one representative were allowed for every ten Peers； any ten might be admitted to choose a representative； and the Peers might be free to group themselves for that purpose as they pleased。 The election might be thus conducted： All Peers who were candidates for the representation of their order should be required to declare themselves such； and enter their names in a list。 A day and place should be appointed at which Peers desirous of voting should be present； either in person； or； in the usual parliamentary manner； by their proxies。 The votes should be taken； each Peer voting for only one。 Every candidate who had as many as ten votes should be declared elected。 If any one had more； all but ten should be allowed to withdraw their votes； or ten of the number should be selected by lot。 These ten would form his constituency； and the remainder of his voters would be set free to give their votes over again for some one else。 This process should be repeated until （so far as possible） every Peer present either personally or by proxy was represented。 When a number less than ten remained over； if amounting to five they might still be allowed to agree on a representative； if fewer than five； their votes must be lost； or they might be permitted to record them in favour of somebody already elected。 With this inconsiderable exception； every representative Peer would represent ten members of the Peerage； all of whom had not only voted for him； but selected him as the one； among all open to their choice； by whom they were most desirous to be represented。 As a compensation to the Peers who were not chosen representatives of their order； they should be eligible to the House of Commons； a justice now refused to Scotch Peers； and to Irish Peers in their own part of the kingdom； while the representation in the House of Lords of any but the most numerous party in the Peerage is denied equally to both。 The mode of composing a Senate； which has been here advocated； not only seems the best in itself； but is that for which historical precedent； and actual brilliant success； can to the greatest extent be pleaded。 It is not； however； the only feasible plan that might be proposed。 Another possible mode of forming a Second Chamber would be to have it elected by the First； subject to the restriction that they should not nominate any of their own members。 Such an assembly； emanating like the American Senate from popular choice； only once removed； would not be considered to clash with democratic institutions； and would probably acquire considerable popular influence。 From the mode of its nomination it would be peculiarly unlikely to excite the jealousy of； to come into hostile collision with； the popular House。 It would； moreover （due provision being made for the representation of the minority）； be almost sure to be well composed； and to comprise many of that class of highly capable men； who； either from accident or for want of showy qualities； had been unwilling to seek； or unable to obtain； the suffrages of a popular constituency。 The best constitution of a Second Chamber is that which embodies the greatest number of elements exempt from the class interests and prejudices of the majority； but having in themselves nothing offensive to democratic feeling。 I repeat； however； that the main reliance for tempering the ascendancy of the majority can be placed in a Second Chamber of any kind。 The character of a representative government is fixed by the constitution of the popular House。 Compared with this； all other questions relating to the form of government are insignificant。 Chapter 14 Of the Executive in a Representative Government。
IT WOULD be out of place； in this treatise； to discuss the question into what departments or branches the executive business of government may most conveniently be divided。 In this respect the exigencies of different governments are different； and there is little probability that any great mistake will be made in the classification of the duties when men are willing to begin at the beginning； and do not hold themselves bound by the series of accidents which； in an old government like ours； has produced the existing division of the public business。 It may be sufficient to say that the classification of functionaries should correspond to that of subjects； and that there should not be several departments independent of one another to superintend different parts of the same natural whole； as in our own military administration down to a recent period； and in a less degree even at present。 Where the object to be attained is single （such as that of having an efficient army）； the authority commissioned to attend to it should be single likewise。 The entire aggregate of means provided for one end should be under one and the same control and responsibility。 If they are divided among independent authorities； the means； with each of those authorities； become ends； and it is the business of nobody except the head of the Government； who is probably without the appropriate departmental experience； to take care of the real end。 The different classes of means are not combined and adapted to one another under the guidance of any leading idea； and while every department pushes forward its own requirements； regardless of those of the rest； the purpose of the work is perpetually sacrificed to the work itself。 As a general rule； every executive function； whether superior or subordinate； should be the appointed duty of some given individual。 It should be apparent to all the world who did everything； and through whose default anything was left undone。 Responsibility is null when nobody knows who is responsible。 Nor； even when real； can it be divided without being weakened。 To maintain it at its highest there must be one person who receives the whole praise of what is well done； the whole blame of what is ill。 There are； however； two modes of sharing responsibility： by one it is only enfeebled； by the other； absolutely destroyed。 It is enfeebled when the concurrence of more than one functionary is required to the same act。 Each one among them has still a real responsibility； if a wrong has been done； none of them can say he did not do it； he is as much a participant as an accomplice is in an offence： if there has been legal criminality they may all be punished legally； and their punishment needs not be less severe than if there had been only one person concerned。 But it is not so with the penalties； any more than with the rewards； of opinion： these are always diminished by being shared。 Where there has been no definite legal offence； no corruption or malversation； only an error or an imprudence； or what may pass for such； every participator has an excuse to himself and to the world； in the fact that other persons are jointly involved with him。 There is hardly anything； even to pecuniary dishonesty； for which men will not feel themselves almost absolved； if those whose duty it was to resist and remonstrate have failed to do it； still more if they have given a formal assent。 In this case； however； though responsibility is weakened； there still is responsibility： every one of those implicated has in his individual capacity assented to； and joined in； the act。 Things are much worse when the act itself is only that of a majority… a Board； deliberating with closed doors； nobody knowing； or； except in some extreme case； being ever lik