countries？ We learn thence the great force of custom and
education； which mould the human mind from its infancy and
form it into a fixed and established character。 Is the
behaviour and conduct of the one sex very unlike that of the
other？ Is it thence we become acquainted with the different
characters which nature has impressed upon the sexes； and
which she preserves with constancy and regularity？ Are the
actions of the same person much diversified in the different
periods of his life； from infancy to old age？ This affords
room for many general observations concerning the gradual
change of our sentiments and inclinations； and the different
maxims which prevail in the different ages of human
creatures。 Even the characters； which are peculiar to each
individual； have a uniformity in their influence； otherwise
our acquaintance with the persons and our observation of
their conduct could never teach us their dispositions； or
serve to direct our behaviour with regard to them。
I grant it possible to find some actions； which seem to
have no regular connexion with any known motives； and are
exceptions to all the measures of conduct which have ever
been established for the government of men。 But if we would
willingly know what judgment should be formed of such
irregular and extraordinary actions； we may consider the
sentiments commonly entertained with regard to those
irregular events which appear in the course of nature； and
the operations of external objects。 All causes are not
conjoined to their usual effects with like uniformity。 An
artificer； who handles only dead matter； may be disappointed
of his aim； as well as the politician； who directs the
conduct of sensible and intelligent agents。
The vulgar； who take things according to their first
appearance； attribute the uncertainty of events to such an
uncertainty in the causes as makes the latter often fail of
their usual influence； though they meet with no impediment
in their operation。 But philosophers； observing that； almost
in every part of nature； there is contained a vast variety
of springs and principles； which are hid； by reason of their
minuteness or remoteness； find； that it is at least possible
the contrariety of events may not proceed from any
contingency in the cause； but from the secret operation of
contrary causes。 This possibility is converted into
certainty by farther observation； when they remark that；
upon an exact scrutiny； a contrariety of effects always
betrays a contrariety of causes； and proceeds from their
mutual opposition。 A peasant can give no better reason for
the stopping of any clock or watch than to say that it does
not commonly go right： But an artist easily perceives that
the same force in the spring or pendulum has always the same
influence on the wheels； but fails of its usual effects；
perhaps by reason of a grain of dust； which puts a stop to
the whole movement。 From the observation of several parallel
instances； philosophers form a maxim that the connexion
between all causes and effects is equally necessary； and
that its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from
the secret opposition of contrary causes。
Thus； for instance； in the human body； when the usual
symptoms of health or sickness disappoint our expectation；
when medicines operate not with their wonted powers； when
irregular events follow from any particular cause； the
philosopher and physician are not surprised at the matter；
nor are ever tempted to deny； in general； the necessity and
uniformity of those principles by which the animal economy
is conducted。 They know that a human body is a mighty
complicated machine： That many secret powers lurk in it；
which are altogether beyond our comprehension： That to us it
must often appear very uncertain in its operations： And that
therefore the irregular events； which outwardly discover
themselves； can be no proof that the laws of nature are not
observed with the greatest regularity in its internal
operations and government。
The philosopher； if he be consistent； must apply the
same reasoning to the actions and volitions of intelligent
agents。 The most irregular and unexpected resolutions of men
may frequently be accounted for by those who know every
particular circumstance of their character and situation。 A
person of an obliging disposition gives a peevish answer：
But he has the toothache； or has not dined。 A stupid fellow
discovers an uncommon alacrity in his carriage： But he has
met with a sudden piece of good fortune。 Or even when an
action； as sometimes happens； cannot be particularly
accounted for； either by the person himself or by others； we
know； in general； that the characters of men are； to a
certain degree； inconstant and irregular。 This is； in a
manner； the constant character of human nature； though it be
applicable； in a more particular manner； to some persons who
have no fixed rule for their conduct； but proceed in a
continued course of caprice and inconstancy。 The internal
principles and motives may operate in a uniform manner；
notwithstanding these seeming irregularities； in the same
manner as the winds； rain； cloud； and other variations of
the weather are supposed to be governed by steady
principles； though not easily discoverable by human sagacity
and enquiry。
Thus it appears； not only that the conjunction between
motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as
that between the cause and effect in any part of nature； but
also that this regular conjunction has been universally
acknowledged among mankind； and has never been the subject
of dispute； either in philosophy or common life。 Now； as it
is from past experience that we draw all
concerning the future； and as we conclude that objects will
always be conjoined together which we find to have always
been conjoined； it may seem superfluous to prove that this
experienced uniformity in human actions is a source whence
we draw inferences concerning them。 But in order to throw
the argument into a greater variety of lights we shall also
insist； though briefly； on this latter topic。
The mutual dependence of men is so great in all
societies that scarce any human action is entirely complete
in itself； or is performed without some reference to the
actions of others； which are requisite to make it answer
fully the intention of the agent。 The poorest artificer； who
labours alone； expects at least the protection of the
magistrate； to ensure him the enjoyment of the fruits of his
labour。 He also expects that； when he carries his goods to
market； and offers them at a reasonable price； he shall find
purchasers； and shall be able； by the money he acquires； to
engage others to supply him with those commodities which are
requisite for his subsistence。 In proportion as men extend
their dealings； and render their intercourse with others
more complicated； they always comprehend； in their schemes
of life； a greater variety of voluntary actions； which they
expect； from the proper motives； to co… operate with their
own。 In all these conclusions they take their measures from
past experience； in the same manner as in their reasonings
concerning external objects； and firmly believe that men； as
well as all the elements； are to continue； in their
operations； the same that they have ever found them。 A
manufacturer reckons upon the labour of his servants for the
execution of any work as much as upon the tools which he
employs； and would be equally surprised were his
expectations disappointed。 In short； this experimental
inference and reasoning concerning the actions of others
enters so much into human life that no man； while awake； is
ever a moment without employing it。 Have we not reason；
therefore； to affirm that all mankind have always agreed in
the doctrine of necessity according to the foregoing
definition and explication of it？
Nor have philosophers even entertained a different
opinion from the people in this particular。 For； not to
mention that almost every action of their life supposes that
opinion； there are even few of the speculative parts of
learning to which it is not essential。 What would become of
； had we not a dependence on the veracity of the
historian according to the experience which we have had of
mankind？ How could be a science； if laws and
forms of government had not a uniform influence upon
society？ Where would be the foundation of ； if
particular characters had no certain or determinate power to
produce particular sentiments； and if these sentiments had
no constant operation on actions？ And with what pretence
could we employ our upon any poet or polite
author； if we could not pronounce the conduct and sentiments
of his actors either natural or unnatural to such
characters； and in such circumstances？ It seems almost
impossible； therefore； to engage either in science or action
of any kind without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity；
and this from motive to voluntary actions； from
characters to conduct。
And indeed； when we consider how aptly and
evidence link together； and form only one chain of
argument； we shall make no scruple to allow that they are of
the same nature； and derived from the same principles。 A
prisoner who has neither money nor interest； discovers the
impossibility of his escape； as well when he considers the
obstinacy of the gaoler； as the walls and bars with which he
is surrounded； and； in all attempts for his freedom； chooses
rather to work upon the stone and iron of the one； than upon
the inflexible nature of the other。 The same prisoner； when
conducted to the scaffold； foresees his death as certainly
from the constancy and fidelity of his guards； as from the
operation of the axe or wheel。 His mind runs along a certain
train of ideas： The refusal of the soldiers to consent to
his escape； the action of the executioner； the separation of
the head and body； bleeding； convulsive motions； and death。
Here is a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary
actions； but the mind feels no difference between them in
passing from one link to another： Nor is it