actions； but the mind feels no difference between them in
passing from one link to another： Nor is it less certain of
the future event than if it were connected with the objects
present to the memory or senses； by a train of causes；
cemented together by what we are pleased to call a
necessity。 The same experienced union has the
same effect on the mind； whether the united objects be
motives； volition； and actions； or figure and motion。 We may
change the name of things； but their nature and their
operation on the understanding never change。
Were a man； whom I know to be honest and opulent； and
with whom I live in intimate friendship； to come into my
house； where I am surrounded with my servants； I rest
assured that he is not to stab me before he leaves it in
order to rob me of my silver standish； and I no more suspect
this event than the falling of the house itself； which is
new； and solidly built and founded。 。 So may a sudden
earthquake arise； and shake and tumble my house about my
ears。 I shall therefore change the suppositions。 I shall say
that I know with certainty that he is not to put his hand
into the fire and hold it there till it be consumed： And
this event； I think I can foretell with the same assurance；
as that； if he throw himself out at the window； and meet
with no obstruction； he will not remain a moment suspended
in the air。 No suspicion of an unknown frenzy can give the
least possibility to the former event； which is so contrary
to all the known principles of human nature。 A man who at
noon leaves his purse full of gold on the pavement at
Charing…Cross； may as well expect that it will fly away like
a feather； as that he will find it untouched an hour after。
Above one half of human reasonings contain inferences of a
similar nature； attended with more or less degrees of
certainty proportioned to our experience of the usual
conduct of mankind in such particular situations。
I have frequently considered； what could possibly be
the reason why all mankind； though they have ever； without
hesitation； acknowledged the doctrine of necessity in their
whole practice and reasoning； have yet discovered such a
reluctance to acknowledge it in words； and have rather shown
a propensity； in all ages； to profess the contrary opinion。
The matter； I think； may be accounted for after the
following manner。 If we examine the operations of body； and
the production of effects from their causes； we shall find
that all our faculties can never carry us farther in our
knowledge of this relation than barely to observe that
particular objects are together； and
that the mind is carried； by a ； from
the appearance of one to the belief of the other。 But though
this conclusion concerning human ignorance be the result of
the strictest scrutiny of this subject； men still entertain
a strong propensity to believe that they penetrate farther
into the powers of nature； and perceive something like a
necessary connexion between the cause and the effect。 When
again they turn their reflections towards the operations of
their own minds； and no such connexion of the motive
and the action； they are thence apt to suppose； that there
is a difference between the effects which result from
material force； and those which arise from thought and
intelligence。 But being once convinced that we know nothing
farther of causation of any kind than merely the of objects； and the consequent of
the mind from one to another； and finding that these two
circumstances are universally allowed to have place in
voluntary actions； we may be more easily led to own the same
necessity common to all causes。 And though this reasoning
may contradict the systems of many philosophers； in
ascribing necessity to the determinations of the will； we
shall find； upon reflection； that they dissent from it in
words only； not in their real sentiment。 Necessity；
according to the sense in which it is here taken； has never
yet been rejected； nor can ever； I think； be rejected by any
philosopher。 It may only； perhaps； be pretended that the
mind can perceive； in the operations of matter； some farther
connexion between the cause and effect； and connexion that
has not place in voluntary actions of intelligent beings。
Now whether it be so or not； can only appear upon
examination； and it is incumbent on these philosophers to
make good their assertion； by defining or describing that
necessity； and pointing it out to us in the operations of
material causes。
It would seem； indeed； that men begin at the wrong end
of this question concerning liberty and necessity； when they
enter upon it by examining the faculties of the soul； the
influence of the understanding； and the operations of the
will。 Let them first discuss a more simple question； namely；
the operations of body and of brute unintelligent matter；
and try whether they can there form any idea of causation
and necessity； except that of a constant conjunction of
objects； and subsequent inference of the mind from one to
another。 If these circumstances form； in reality； the whole
of that necessity； which we conceive in matter； and if these
circumstances be also universally acknowledged to take place
in the operations of the mind； the dispute is at an end； at
least； must be owned to be thenceforth merely verbal。 But as
long as we will rashly suppose； that we have some farther
idea of necessity and causation in the operations of
external objects； at the same time； that we can find nothing
farther in the voluntary actions of the mind； there is no
possibility of bringing the question to any determinate
issue； while we proceed upon so erroneous a supposition。 The
only method of undeceiving us is to mount up higher； to
examine the narrow extent of science when applied to
material causes； and to convince ourselves that all we know
of them is the constant conjunction and inference above
mentioned。 We may； perhaps； find that it is with difficulty
we are induced to fix such narrow limits to human
understanding： But we can afterwards find no difficulty when
we come to apply this doctrine to the actions of the will。
For as it is evident that these have a regular conjunction
with motives and circumstances and characters； and as we
always draw inferences from one to the other； we must be
obliged to acknowledge in words that necessity； which we
have already avowed； in every deliberation of our lives； and
in every step of our conduct and behaviour。＇22＇
But to proceed in this reconciling project with regard
to the question of liberty and necessity； the most
contentious question of metaphysics； the most contentious
science； it will not require many words to prove； that all
mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of liberty as well
as in that of necessity； and that the whole dispute； in this
respect also； has been hitherto merely verbal。 For what is
meant by liberty； when applied to voluntary actions？ We
cannot surely mean that actions have so little connexion
with motives； inclinations； and circumstances； that one does
not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the
other； and that one affords no inference by which we can
conclude the existence of the other。 For these are plain and
acknowledged matters of fact。 By liberty； then； we can only
mean ； this is； if we choose to remain
at rest； we may； if we choose to move； we also may。 Now this
hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to
every one who is not a prisoner and in chains。 Here； then；
is no subject of dispute。
Whatever definition we may give of liberty； we should
be careful to observe two requisite circumstances； ；
that it be consistent with plain matter of fact； ；
that it be consistent with itself。 If we observe these
circumstances； and render our definition intelligible； I am
persuaded that all mankind will be found of one opinion with
regard to it。
It is universally allowed that nothing exists without a
cause of its existence； and that chance； when strictly
examined； is a mere negative word； and means not any real
power which has anywhere a being in nature。 But it is
pretended that some causes are necessary； some not
necessary。 Here then is the advantage of definitions。 Let
any one a cause； without comprehending； as a part
of the definition； a with its effect；
and let him show distinctly the origin of the idea；
expressed by the definition； and I shall readily give up the
whole controversy。 But if the foregoing explication of the
matter be received； this must be absolutely impracticable。
Had not objects a regular conjunction with each other； we
should never have entertained any notion of cause and
effect； and this regular conjunction produces that inference
of the understanding； which is the only connexion； that we
can have any comprehension of。 Whoever attempts a definition
of cause； exclusive of these circumstances； will be obliged
either to employ unintelligible terms or such as are
synonymous to the term which he endeavours to define。＇23＇
And if the definition above mentioned be admitted； liberty；
when opposed to necessity； not to constraint； is the same
thing with chance； which is universally allowed to have no
existence。
* * * *
PART II。
T/HERE is no method of reasoning more common； and yet
none more blameable； than； in philosophical disputes； to
endeavour the refutation of any hypothesis； by a pretence of
its dangerous consequences to religion and morality。 When
any opinion leads to absurdities； it is certainly false； but
it is not certain that an opinion is false； because it is of
dangerous consequence。 Such topics； therefore； ought
entirely to be forborne； as serving nothing to the discovery
of truth； but only to make the person of an antagonist
odious。 This I o